FALCON Software Requirements Specification
Full-scope review draft — 9 October 2026. Proposed for TM review; not an approved baseline.
- This is the single editable SRS.
- It consolidates the previous detailed draft, all 199 numbered TM requirement rows, 28 narrative obligations, existing local requirements and the subsequent drafting decisions.
- Each requirement has an observable verification check.
- A written response is not evidence of implementation or acceptance: all verification results remain Not Run.
Open values and interpretations are identified in section 5.4. Proposed additions and detailed refinements are identified separately from TM obligations. The active coverage record maps requirement IDs and source locators. The previous full draft (internal reference) remains an unchanged reference.
| Document control | Value |
|---|---|
| Prepared for | TM FALCON POC and Pilot |
| Working edition | Full-scope review draft, 9 October 2026 |
| Formal version, document owner and named reviewers | To Confirm |
| TM approval authority, approval date and approved revision | To Confirm; no approval recorded by this document |
| Requirement authority | Original TM modality and conditions remain in the source register; solution responses remain Proposed unless explicitly stated otherwise |
| Verification | Not Run; criteria below are proposed checks, not test results |
Reading guide
- 1. Introduction: purpose, boundaries and requirement conventions.
- 2. Solution Overview: users, responsibilities, module catalogue and operational flows.
- 3. Requirements: interfaces; functional modules and submodules; quality; compliance; engineering; AI/ML.
- 4. Verification: methods, evidence, milestone gates and acceptance handling.
- 5. Appendixes: data dictionary, recorded decisions, proposed states, parameter/decision register, glossary and narrative-source responses.
Suggested joint Team/TM review order
| Review step | Question to resolve | Record against |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Scope and authority | Is the interpretation within the TM source and agreed delivery boundary? | Requirement status/source; OPEN or Q reference. |
| 2. Expected behaviour | Are the rules, information and exception handling clear and complete? | Requirement ID and local B clause. |
| 3. Verification | Can the expected result be observed under the stated conditions? | Requirement ID and local AC criterion. |
| 4. Outstanding agreement | Which value, policy or interpretation is still needed? | Section 5.4 decision or PAR reference. |
| 5. Review record | What was agreed, by whom and against which revision? | Decision/review record with authority, date and evidence. |
Drafting agreement, test execution and TM acceptance remain separate records. Local B/AC references restart within each requirement; always include the parent requirement ID.
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
-
This SRS specifies the FALCON capabilities to be developed and verified for the POC and Pilot.
-
It defines user actions, system responses, business rules, data, interfaces, operating constraints and acceptance criteria.
-
TM reviewers, developers, integrators, field engineers and testers will use it to agree what FALCON must deliver and determine whether each requirement has been met.
-
The customer baseline is TM’s URG (internal reference), supplied as
URG_FALCON (1).docxon 9 October 2026. -
It is identical to the previously referenced
URG_FALCON.docx: SHA-256706b597f7756e1d467f1f4fe109f98009c66f2f92f6a35d646446b13903426ab. -
Although its cover says Software Requirements Specification, this project uses it as the TM requirements baseline from which this detailed SRS is developed.
1.2 Solution scope
FALCON supports the detection, assessment, prediction, prevention and handling of threats to fibre infrastructure from construction, theft or vandalism, and animal or rodent activity.
The full solution scope comprises:
- Importing and validating approved asset and incident data, and receiving observations from deployed devices.
- Displaying assets, devices, events, alerts and risk information on operational maps and dashboards.
- Detecting and classifying supported threats and assessing historical and predicted risk.
- Applying configured rules to generate alerts, request approval and initiate authorised responses.
- Recording investigation, assignment, field actions, preventive interventions and outcomes.
- Reporting operational results and retaining the records needed to explain system and user actions.
- Providing access control, data protection, monitoring, recovery and model lifecycle controls.
- Meeting the field equipment, deployment, integration, commissioning and support requirements applicable to the selected solution.
Legal proceedings and prosecution, and financial reconciliation or fraud investigation, are outside the scope stated by TM.
1.3 POC and Pilot boundary
-
FALCON will operate in an isolated POC/Pilot environment.
-
TM asset and incident/docket data will be supplied as files for offline import.
-
Actual field devices will communicate with the FALCON platform through the FALCON IoT service.
-
Live connections to TM production systems are not included in the current delivery direction.
-
TM’s definition of the production environment permits an isolated POC/Pilot without production integration unless otherwise agreed.
-
The URG also requires documented integration capabilities and marks enterprise integration as an initial-phase area.
-
These are separate considerations: an isolated deployment does not remove the requirement to specify supported interfaces.
-
The required POC/Pilot interface demonstration and the meaning of initial-phase integration need clarification with TM.
The Pilot covers two designated sites in different states. Site identities, equipment quantities and deployment conditions require TM and engineering input.
1.4 Requirement authority and status
The source register preserves TM’s original identifiers, wording and shall/should/may conditions. This SRS turns those requirements into testable rules and links each rule to its source. Additional functionality identifies its separate source.
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Proposed | Draft behaviour or criterion for review. |
| Confirmed | Agreed at the authority and scope identified in its decision record. User drafting agreement is distinct from TM approval. |
| To Confirm | A specific decision or value is unresolved. |
| Deferred | Explicitly postponed with its reason and allocation recorded. |
- Requirement wording and acceptance criteria in this rewrite remain Proposed for TM review.
- User-confirmed drafting decisions are identified in section 5.2 and the decision log; they do not establish TM approval.
- The Confirmed status of HW-PWR-001 is retained at its recorded authority; its acceptance conditions remain To Confirm.
1.5 Document structure
| Chapter | Contents |
|---|---|
| 1. Introduction | Purpose, scope, source baseline and requirement conventions. |
| 2. Solution Overview | System boundary, users, operational flows, dependencies and release allocation. |
| 3. Requirements | Detailed interfaces, functional behaviour, quality attributes, compliance, engineering obligations and AI/ML requirements. |
| 4. Verification | Acceptance criteria, verification methods, evidence and requirement traceability. |
| 5. Appendixes | Shared definitions, data dictionary, state models, parameter register and supporting references. |
The linked design documents specify the detailed topology, source-code structure, API payloads and reasons for technology choices. This SRS retains the mandatory technical constraints and requirements to produce those documents.
1.6 Requirement and change conventions
| Review topic | Convention |
|---|---|
| Customer authority | The original URG remains the baseline. Preserve each shall, should, may, condition and “where technically feasible” qualification. |
| Source identity | Each source response records the exact TM ID, unique URG table/row locator, source modality and response disposition. |
| Duplicate source ID | Keep both REQ-MLOP-004 rows separate by locator and title. |
| Proposed responses | Numbered source responses describe proposed solution behaviour for TM agreement. |
| Retained identities | Existing PL, SH, HW, FE and MD IDs retain their identity and recorded status. SRS-EVT-001–018 retain the accepted drafting structure. |
| Additional refinements | Other SRS IDs represent consolidated source responses or explicitly labelled BA refinements. An addition does not establish a new TM obligation or delivery commitment. |
| Detailed review references | Use the requirement ID plus local clause/criterion, for example SRS-GIS-104/B05 or SRS-GIS-104/AC04. |
| Open decisions | Read the brief reference beside a requirement with the full question/status in section 5.4. A missing value is not an agreed default. |
| Baselined changes | Record source/rationale, affected requirements/interfaces/data/tests, impact assessment and approving authority. |
| History and approval | Retain superseded versions and decision evidence. Neither repository code nor a prototype establishes requirement approval. |
2. Solution Overview
2.1 System context
The platform maintains operational records and applies business rules. The IoT service manages device communication, translates device messages, delivers commands and returns their results. Field devices provide the sensing and intervention capabilities supported by the selected equipment.
flowchart LR TM[TM asset and incident files] -->|Offline import| P[FALCON platform] D[Field devices] <-->|Observations, health, commands and results| I[FALCON IoT service] I <--> P U[Authorised users] <-->|Web interface| P
TM assets and FALCON devices are separate records. Each deployed device is linked to the location or infrastructure it monitors. Deployment history preserves the location associated with earlier events when a device moves.
2.2 Users
| Role | Main responsibilities |
|---|---|
| Superadmin | Manage platform security settings, system monitoring, performance settings, backups, recovery and technical maintenance. |
| Administrator | Manage application users, sites, devices, data imports, rules and closure outcomes. |
| Operator | Review alerts, own cases, assign field work, approve permitted actions, review field results and close cases. |
| Field Team | From M3, sign in to view assigned work, record progress, upload evidence and submit completion details. |
| Viewer | View permitted maps, dashboards and reports. |
- Administrators, Operators and Viewers can view records across sites within their permissions.
- Field Team members can access only their assigned work and the records needed for that work.
- Superadmins need a separately assigned operational role to use operational functions.
- Restricted records and evidence require the relevant access permission.
- Public self-registration is not available.
TM’s SMEs, data/AI specialists and management may also review the solution. Their job titles do not grant application access.
Functional permission matrix
Operational access
| Action | Superadmin | Administrator | Operator | Field Team | Viewer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| View maps and operational records | Not allowed | Allowed | Allowed | Assigned work only | Allowed |
| View operational dashboards and reports | Not allowed | Allowed | Allowed | To confirm | Allowed |
| Create and manage application accounts | To confirm | Allowed within approved account scope | Not allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Import TM files | Not allowed | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Manage sites, devices and deployment records | Not allowed | Allowed | To confirm | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Configure rules and closure outcomes | Not allowed | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Review and acknowledge alerts; create cases | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Assign field work and review submitted results | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Record field progress, evidence and completion details | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed | Assigned work only | Not allowed |
| Close a case | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Approve an action or pause automatic action | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed for approved actions | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Issue a manual deterrent command | Not allowed | To confirm | Allowed for approved devices and actions | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| View live cameras | Not allowed | Allowed | Allowed | Not allowed | Not allowed |
| Download Excel/PDF operational reports | Not allowed | To confirm | To confirm | Not allowed | To confirm |
| Review operational audit records | Not allowed | To confirm | To confirm | Not allowed | Not allowed |
These permissions apply to each role on its own. An additional assigned role provides only the permissions listed for that role. Actions must also meet approval, maintenance, device availability and cooldown rules.
Technical access
| Action | Superadmin | Other application roles |
|---|---|---|
| Manage platform security settings | Allowed | Not allowed |
| View system health, performance and technical diagnostic records | Allowed | Not allowed |
| Configure agreed performance settings and monitoring limits | Allowed | Not allowed |
| Manage backups and execute approved recovery procedures | Allowed | Not allowed |
| Perform approved platform maintenance | Allowed | Not allowed |
| Create or assign Superadmin access | To confirm | To confirm for Administrator; not allowed for other roles |
| Approve or deploy a model release | Separate release approval required | Separate release approval required |
- Superadmin access does not approve a model release or a physical device action.
- Superadmins apply agreed technical settings. Changes to acceptance targets require the recorded review and approval process.
- Account types, role-grant permissions and Superadmin provisioning are listed in section 5.4, DET-076.
- The server checks permissions for every protected request, including direct API, media and export requests.
- Disabled accounts and revoked credentials cannot make new protected requests. Active-session revocation timing remains in DET-002.
2.3 Main operational flows
| Flow | Step | Expected progression |
|---|---|---|
| Detection and response | 1 | Receive, record and validate the observation/event. |
| Detection and response | 2 | Evaluate rules; create or update an alert where required. |
| Detection and response | 3 | Obtain required approval and perform the permitted response. |
| Detection and response | 4 | Record execution evidence and operational outcome separately. |
| Historical and predictive risk | 1 | Import and validate TM data; associate usable records with locations/assets. |
| Historical and predictive risk | 2 | Calculate historical indicators and the agreed future-risk prediction separately. |
| Historical and predictive risk | 3 | Display results and contributing information; use qualifying risk results to support preventive decisions. |
| Investigation and field intervention | 1 | Create a linked case when investigation, assignment or field intervention is needed. |
| Investigation and field intervention | 2 | Assign a responsible Operator and record reported field actions. |
| Investigation and field intervention | 3 | Close with outcome and note; attachments remain optional. Case states are Open, In Progress and Closed. |
Outcome distinction: Command dispatch, confirmed device execution, case closure and threat resolution are separate recorded facts.
2.4 Delivery allocation
| Stage | Review item | Specification |
|---|---|---|
| M1 requirements and solution baseline | Deliverable boundary | Master SRS and source-level design RTM; logical architecture/operational scenarios; shared data/interface contracts; device/site approach; delivery dependencies; verification and acceptance plan. |
| M1 requirements and solution baseline | Review / acceptance evidence | Named TM review of the identified revision, source ambiguities/deviations and criteria. |
| M1 requirements and solution baseline | Review / acceptance evidence | Unresolved source interpretations/targets/owners are explicit, not silently accepted. |
| M2 controlled actual-device POC | Deliverable boundary | Initial access, imports/registration, map/dashboard/events and actual Capability1 detection/manual deterrent with basic live camera, as in the checklist. |
| M2 controlled actual-device POC | Review / acceptance evidence | Real equipment/configuration records, controlled-location demonstration and traceable permission/interface/component tests. |
| M2 controlled actual-device POC | Review / acceptance evidence | Physical execution evidence distinct from UI or service receipt. |
| M3 integrated first increment | Deliverable boundary | Agreed field detection/response, internal alerts/cases/workflows, initial historical and predictive risk, audit/safeguards and basic reporting/exports. |
| M3 integrated first increment | Review / acceptance evidence | Integrated field trace, model/data evaluation, control/failure cases, regression results and outstanding-item disposition. |
| M3 integrated first increment | Review / acceptance evidence | Case/closure and threat outcome remain separate from device result. |
| M4 expanded capability and prevention | Deliverable boundary | Second agreed threat capability, rule-based preventive recommendations/intervention tracking and effectiveness review; proposed read-only AI assistant; start agreed mobilisation increment. |
| M4 expanded capability and prevention | Review / acceptance evidence | Capability-specific evaluation, prediction/operational limitations, preventive decision/outcome records, bilingual assistant/read-only tests if adopted, and regression evidence. |
| M4 expanded capability and prevention | Review / acceptance evidence | Capability2 identity and assistant allocation need TM agreement. |
| M5 complete agreed MVP and readiness | Deliverable boundary | Third agreed capability and remaining agreed full-solution functions; remaining agreed equipment/asset records; completed agreed mobilisation increment; formal validation/UAT, documentation and initial training. |
| M5 complete agreed MVP and readiness | Review / acceptance evidence | All three threat-family responses exercised under agreed conditions, installation inventory, system/integration/regression evidence, performance/load/stress and vulnerability-assessment/penetration-testing (VAPT) reports with remediation/retest evidence as source-listed proposals, UAT and explicit outstanding-item disposition. |
| M5 complete agreed MVP and readiness | Review / acceptance evidence | Exact completion/readiness boundary and date remain unresolved. |
| Pilot readiness transition | Deliverable boundary | Complete approved corrections/tuning, deployment/commissioning preparation, support arrangements and updated training/documentation before pilot start. |
| Pilot readiness transition | Review / acceptance evidence | Readiness review of site/configuration, dependencies and regression/security/performance evidence for changed functions. |
| Pilot readiness transition | Review / acceptance evidence | Whether this is included in M5 or a separate December stage remains To Confirm. |
| M6 pilot | Deliverable boundary | Install/commission and validate at two TM-approved sites in different states; assess detection, prevention/response, AI/risk, operational KPIs and reliability under representative conditions. |
| M6 pilot | Review / acceptance evidence | Site/as-built records, operational run/effectiveness/model reports, failures/support records and pilot acceptance decision. |
| M6 pilot | Review / acceptance evidence | Locations, monitoring period and measures require agreement. |
| M7 support and handover | Deliverable boundary | Agreed maintenance/support, corrective actions, final findings/recommendations, configuration and inventory, technical/operating documents, applicable source deliverables and knowledge transfer. |
| M7 support and handover | Review / acceptance evidence | Service/defect history, verified handover inventory, final report/training evidence and clear remaining responsibilities. |
| M7 support and handover | Review / acceptance evidence | Support duration, licensing/source-access obligations and closure date require explicit agreement. |
All three threat families remain in full-solution scope. Animal/rodent is the first capability; the order and detailed coverage of construction and theft/vandalism require a decision. Detailed workforce rostering and equipment scheduling remain additional proposals.
2.5 Dependencies
| Input | Required to specify or verify |
|---|---|
| TM asset and incident samples | Import fields, identifiers, geometry, matching rules and usable historical information. |
| Selected device capabilities | Observation fields, evidence, command catalogue, execution confirmation, buffering and operating limits. |
| Site survey and access | Sensing coverage, installation, connectivity, power and representative test conditions. |
| TM operational input | Threat criteria, response procedures, approval responsibilities and escalation. |
| Applicable TM policies | Hosting, authentication, protected data, retention and security acceptance. |
Named owners and delivery dates are maintained in the dependency register.
2.6 Module and submodule catalogue
A module owns the stated behaviour even when it calls a shared service. Submodules below define review and implementation boundaries; they do not require separate deployable services.
| Section | Module | Submodules |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | External Interfaces | Device observations and health; command dispatch and results; offline imports; application APIs; media and live video; report downloads; optional AI API. |
| 3.2.1 | User Access and Administration | Account provisioning; authentication; role permissions; account suspension; session control. |
| 3.2.2 | Data Intake and Validation | Import preview and commit; validation and quarantine; source mappings; deduplication; asset/incident matching; data quality and provenance. |
| 3.2.3 | GIS Assets and Operational Map | Asset and route registry; map layers; spatial association; dashboard filters; historical hotspots; risk overlays. |
| 3.2.4 | Device Registration and Deployment | Device inventory; registration and authorisation; deployment history; relocation; connectivity and health; configuration portability. |
| 3.2.5 | Risk Assessment and Prediction | Threat taxonomy; historical scoring; future prediction; ranking and confidence; explanations; insufficient-data handling. |
| 3.2.6 | Workflow and Rule Management | Rule configuration and versions; priorities; approval tasks; manual/automatic/hybrid paths; pauses; cooldowns; command restrictions. |
| 3.2.7 | Events and Alerts | Event ingestion; event evidence; classification; grouping; shared queue; acknowledgement; priority; escalation; lifecycle and closure. |
| 3.2.8 | Active Deterrent Control | Command catalogue; authorised activation; device confirmation; retry and expiry; operating limits; stop and fault handling. |
| 3.2.9 | Case Management | Case creation and links; responsible Operator; field mobilisation; action/evidence records; outcomes; closure; feedback. |
| 3.2.10 | Preventive Actions and Mobilisation | Recommendation rules; supporting evidence; accept/dismiss/defer; mobilisation; intervention history; before/after review. |
| 3.2.11 | Reporting and Performance Review | Event/alert summaries; case outcomes; device availability; trends and hotspots; management view; Excel/PDF exports. |
| 3.2.12 | Audit History | User/action audit; import/configuration history; event-to-outcome trace; model/decision trace; authorised review. |
| 3.2.13 | AI Assistant | Read-only questions; bilingual on-demand summaries; permission-filtered retrieval; supporting-record citations; missing information; API failure. |
| 3.2.14 | Evidence and Media Management | Evidence identity; upload/linking; retrieval permissions; unavailable-media handling; preservation and expiry; live-view separation. |
| 3.2.15 | Notification and Escalation Management | Internal recipient selection; delivery versus acknowledgement; escalation timers; repeat handling; exceptions and audit. |
| 3.2.16 | Reference Data and Operational Configuration | Sites and zones; event mappings; closure outcomes; parameter versions; configuration validation and retirement. |
| 3.3.1 | Reliability Recovery and Retention | Fault isolation; recovery; backup and restoration; retention; interrupted communication; AI fallback. |
| 3.3.2 | Performance and Capacity | Event throughput; alert latency; monitored capacity; dashboard response; scaling and resource cost. |
| 3.3.3 | Maintenance and Diagnostics | Service monitoring; health diagnosis; planned maintenance; component replacement; controlled update and rollback. |
| 3.4 | Compliance Security and Privacy | TM policies; data protection; authentication/authorisation/accounting; third-party dependencies; threat assessment; security evidence. |
| 3.5.1 | Architecture Deployment and Portability | Component boundaries; deployment model; resource sizing; interfaces; site replication; configuration; licensing. |
| 3.5.2 | Edge Controller | Workload assessment; hardware/software dependencies; local processing; compute/storage/interface sizing. |
| 3.5.3 | Sensors Camera and Live View | Threat-to-sensor mapping; coverage and placement; calibration; animal/tamper detection; health; event media; live viewing. |
| 3.5.4 | Edge Software | Acquisition and timestamping; permitted local processing; buffering; restart recovery; synchronisation. |
| 3.5.5 | Connectivity | Site communications assessment; protocol adaptation; connection loss; acknowledgements; store-and-forward. |
| 3.5.6 | Solar and Power | Load budget; overnight operation; solar/battery sizing; power monitoring; interruption and recovery. |
| 3.5.7 | Enclosure and Mounting | Weather and thermal protection; mounting; physical security; cable entry; service access; installation drawings. |
| 3.5.8 | Hardware Assembly | Bill of materials; wiring; unit identity; assembly instructions; inspection and functional checks. |
| 3.5.9 | Testing and Commissioning | Installation method; site checks; integration and sustained-operation tests; as-built evidence; commissioning decision. |
| 3.5.10 | Passive Protection | Candidate protection design; ground-level prototype; installation records; inspection; bypass/failure observations; effectiveness evaluation. |
| 3.5.11 | Delivery Documentation and Handover | Delivery increments; dependencies and risk; deployment completion; lifecycle costs; manuals; support ownership and handover evidence. |
| 3.6.1 | Predictive Model Lifecycle | Dataset lineage; target/horizon; reproducible training; held-out evaluation; baseline comparison; registry; deployment; drift; rollback and feedback. |
| 3.6.2 | Detection Model Lifecycle | Construction/theft/animal use cases; labelling; representative data; detection evaluation; runtime compatibility; monitoring and responsible use. |
2.7 End-to-end operating scenarios
| Scenario | Trigger and main path | Result and exception handling |
|---|---|---|
| Import TM assets and incidents | Administrator selects source and mapping, previews validation/matching, reviews proposed inserts/updates and commits permitted records. | Reconcile accepted/rejected/unmatched counts; retain source provenance. Invalid fields do not become zero values; unmatched usable locations remain visible. |
| Animal/rodent response | Authorised device supplies an observation; FALCON records it, evaluates classification/risk and applies the configured rule. | Qualifying risk produces an alert; any actual deterrent requires the approved action policy and restrictions. A low-confidence or missing-input result does not justify physical action. |
| Construction near fibre | Detect supported activity and assess location/proximity against usable asset geometry and configured risk criteria. | Retain distance/zone basis and evidence where available; qualifying risk enters alert handling. Missing geometry creates an unresolved assessment rather than a fabricated distance. |
| Theft/vandalism/tampering | A deployed source detects a supported access/tamper/activity scenario; the platform evaluates its configured risk criteria. | Record suspicion, evidence and response separately from verified findings. The system does not establish criminal guilt; prosecution remains excluded. |
| Operator handling | New alert enters a shared queue; an Operator acknowledges and reviews it. Investigation, assignment or field intervention uses a linked case. | No-case closure is allowed for reviewed No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify with outcome/note. Assignment is held on the case, not duplicated on the alert. |
| Device action | Permitted automatic/manual/hybrid workflow requests a correlated command through IoT after restrictions and required approval. | Requested, Sent and Confirmed are distinct. Missing physical confirmation remains Unconfirmed; retry does not create a new logical action. Execution does not prove threat resolution. |
| Historical and predictive risk | Import usable history/context; build a traceable dataset; calculate historical factors and score an approved prediction separately. | Present period, geography, horizon, supporting factors and uncertainty. Insufficient prediction data is disclosed; historical counts are not renamed predictions. |
| Preventive intervention | A recommendation identifies action, location, reason, supporting evidence and priority; Operator accepts, dismisses or defers with reason. | Accepted work may link to a case; record mobilisation, actions and outcomes. Before/after observations include confounders and do not prove causation. |
| Device relocation | Plan a move while retaining current placement; complete the move with reason and dates under the same device identity. | At most one active deployment; prior events retain their event-time placement. Late data with ambiguous deployment is flagged for review. |
| Interrupted service or communications | IoT/device connectivity or power fails; retain available records and mark last-known/unverifiable state. | Buffer/recover where the selected equipment supports it. Reconnection does not replay stale physical actions. IoT service failure is not proof that every device is offline. |
2.8 Allocation and source conflicts
M1–M7 are proposed delivery stages; their labels do not establish approval dates. M2 requires a controlled demonstration using actual devices. A UI prototype alone is insufficient. M3 adds the integrated field workflow, cases, internal notifications, historical and initial predictive risk and Excel/PDF reports. M4 preventive recommendation and intervention review are distinct from basic mobilisation across M4–M5. Detailed rostering, workforce schedules and equipment allocation remain separate proposals.
The read-only bilingual assistant is proposed for M4. TM must still agree delivery timing for enterprise integration, AI agents, knowledge retrieval and advanced prediction, which the source marks as initial-phase capabilities. Offline imports cannot count as a passed live-system interface test. Section 5.4 records these open decisions; the capabilities remain neither Deferred nor complete unless that status is explicitly agreed or verified, respectively.
2.9 URG initial and future allocation
TM’s original table10 marks the following capabilities as initial or future/deferred. The proposed delivery stage is shown separately. TM must confirm what “initial” means before the delivery plan can be judged against that table; Q09 remains open.
| URG area | Source marking | Proposed SRS treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Data ingestion | Initial | M2 reviewed offline intake and field ingestion; extend per selected sources. |
| Enterprise system integration | Initial | Project lacks live TM production integration. Proposed offline boundary/deviation with future interface capability; TM must decide the disposition. |
| Knowledge retrieval | Initial | Read-only FALCON-record retrieval proposed M4 with permission/source controls; reconcile timing and intended knowledge scope. |
| AI-assisted analysis | Initial | M3 prediction/risk and later agreed analytics; M4 summaries are separate. Applicable data/quality/oversight requirements remain. |
| AI Agent | Initial | Initial assistant is read-only. Wider authorised task-executing agents are not assumed; applicability and allocation need TM decision. |
| Workflow orchestration | Initial | Initial integrated rules/workflows M3; controlled M2 manual action does not replace this obligation. |
| Human approval | Initial | Enforce designated action approval in delivered workflows; complete policy/authority details before operational activation. |
| Automated system action | Initial | Only approved, bounded action policies and supported device controls; M2 manual sufficiency is a milestone boundary, not removal of the source capability. |
| Advanced predictive models | Initial | M3 initial future-risk assessment remains required in the proposal; method, data and “advanced” acceptance interpretation remain To Confirm. |
| Cross-domain reuse | Future/deferred | Preserve component/interface portability; a cross-domain rollout is not a current unapproved delivery commitment. |
| Full vs Focused predictive model based on areas | Future/deferred | Retain source wording; model coverage strategy and intended distinction require TM clarification. |
| Enterprise-wide deployment | Future/deferred | Design for justified expansion and document dependencies; no enterprise-wide production rollout is included without agreement. |
3. Requirements
The six groups below follow TM’s requirement structure. Requirements share the data and state definitions in chapter 5 and verification rules in chapter 4. Their acceptance checks must be executed with the agreed parameters, permitted actors and relevant negative/error cases. All new response and refinement statuses are Proposed unless their entry records another status.
3.1 External Interfaces
Purpose: Define the logical exchange contracts and evidence required to distinguish accepted data, completed processing and confirmed physical execution.
Actors: Administrators supply approved imports; registered devices/adapters exchange observations and commands through the IoT service; authenticated users consume permitted application, media and reporting functions.
Submodules: Device observations and health; command dispatch and results; offline imports; application APIs; media and live video; report downloads; optional AI API.
Boundaries: I labels are local references, not additional TM requirement IDs or commitments to separate services. The platform may remain one modular application and use background processing where needed. The IoT service keeps its stated responsibilities regardless of where it is hosted. Exact routes, keys, topics and transport choices belong in the technical interface release before integration.
Interface catalogue
| Interface | Producer → consumer | Proposed contract and success boundary | Principal unresolved detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| I-IMPORT | Authorised Administrator/source export → platform ingestion | Submit source file and mapping for preview; reconcile per-row validation/matching, then apply reviewed changes. Successful receipt alone is not successful import. | TM files/schema, accepted formats, matching keys, size/encoding and data permissions. |
| I-OBS | Registered device/adapter → IoT service → platform | Carry a normalised versioned event envelope, preserving original identity/time/evidence. Acceptance indicates durable validation/ingestion outcome, not threat validity. | Native protocol, capability, taxonomy and exact payload schema. |
| I-HEALTH | Device/adapter → IoT service → platform | Report contact and available health readings with observation time; platform derives current/stale/unverifiable presentation under agreed thresholds. | Heartbeat, fields/units, source clock and status thresholds. |
| I-CMD | Platform → IoT service → selected device | Submit one uniquely identified, authorised and time-bounded action; service owns dispatch and limited eligible retries. | Action catalogue, adapter, device safety/duplicate controls and exact parameters. |
| I-RESULT | Device/adapter → IoT service → platform | Correlate receipt/dispatch/execution/failure evidence to the logical command, with occurrence and receipt times. | Native acknowledgement semantics and physical confirmation evidence. |
| I-MEDIA | Camera/device or import processor → controlled bucket reference → authorised consumer | Register/upload permitted media and link evidence ID to the event; retrieve only after permission check. | Storage provider, upload mechanism, formats, integrity check and retention policy. |
| I-LIVE | Authorised Administrator/Operator → platform/IoT-mediated camera session | Explicit request/start/stop, camera authorisation, inactivity termination and session audit. Session opened is separate from a usable video stream. | Camera streaming protocol, quality, bandwidth and session/concurrency limits. |
| I-APP | Authenticated web client → platform service API | Read or change only permitted records/actions; return a traceable result or machine-readable error. | Authentication technology, routes, schemas and UI response targets. |
| I-REPORT | Authorised request → reporting service → controlled Excel/PDF download | Preserve filters, period, data cutoff and permission checks in generated output. Generation success is separate from download access. | Detailed layouts, export access, row/size limits and synchronous/asynchronous execution. |
| I-AI | Permission-filtered FALCON context → selected LLM API → requesting user | Proposed M4 read-only request/summary; attach source/period context and validation/limitations; no operational write or command tool. | Provider/model, processing/data approval, retention, cost and evaluation. |
| I-TM | FALCON ↔ TM enterprise systems | No live connection in the proposed project delivery. Retain interface obligations and a proposed disposition under Q09; offline exports are I-IMPORT, not a claim of equivalent live integration. | TM approval of the deviation and future interface scope. |
Normalised message envelope
Proposed platform–IoT business messages use JSON. Reviewed adapters may translate different native payloads while preserving source lineage. Images and video use I-MEDIA/I-LIVE references; inline binary data is not mandatory.
| Field group | Required information | Processing rule |
|---|---|---|
| Identity/version | Message ID, schema version, producer/device identity and message type. | Authenticate producer; reject unsupported versions/types with a traceable reason. Application identity persists across transport retransmission. |
| Times | Source occurrence time where available, service receipt time, platform receipt time; source offset/clock-quality information. | Apply Data Dictionary time semantics. If occurrence time is missing or untrusted, flag the limitation when checking action age or selecting the event’s deployment. Do not silently substitute another time. |
| Correlation | Event/command ID, causal evaluation/request ID and deployment reference when reliable. | Validate relationship and device identity; never attach a result to another device’s command solely because its native sequence number matches. |
| Payload | Type-specific validated fields, units, classification/confidence only when supplied, status/result and error detail as appropriate. | Unknown optional fields may be retained when the documented version rules allow it. Do not activate a physical action if the meaning of any required field is unknown. |
| Evidence | Controlled evidence IDs and capture metadata where supplied. | Validate ownership/linkage and access; an arbitrary device-provided URL is not trusted as an unrestricted fetch instruction. |
| Evolution condition | Proposed compatibility rule |
|---|---|
| Additive optional field | May be accepted under the documented compatible-version policy. |
| Field removal, changed meaning/unit or new mandatory field | Require an incompatible schema version and an explicit adapter/service compatibility check. |
| Migration and historical data | Record each event/result’s schema version; never silently reinterpret historical content. |
| Product boundary | This policy does not select a schema-registry product. |
Import transaction and reconciliation
| Stage | Required behaviour | Failure / repeat handling |
|---|---|---|
| Identify input | Authenticate the Administrator; identify source namespace, file/version, import type and approved mapping. | Inspect format, encoding, required columns and source-use restrictions before calculation eligibility. |
| Preview | Show valid rows, errors, unmatched associations and proposed record changes; retain source-row locators. | File-level errors leave business records unchanged; reviewed partial-import handling permits independent valid rows after row errors. |
| Match | Use stable source keys where available. | If the same key contains conflicting data, flag it for review instead of creating two records. If suitable keys are unavailable, propose possible matches and obtain an agreed matching rule. Similar names or coordinates alone must not cause an automatic merge. |
| Apply | Check target revisions against the preview; record every applied/failed row and reconcile totals. | Proposed concurrency handling rejects stale updates for renewed preview. Retrying the same batch/application does not duplicate completed changes. |
| Preserve usable information | Keep original usable incident location when asset matching fails. | Exclude only calculations needing the missing link. Import does not automatically command devices or replay historical events as live threats. |
| Acceptance scenario | Required evidence |
|---|---|
| Identical re-import or changed source row | Correct duplicate/update outcome and source-row lineage. |
| Conflicting target revision or duplicate docket ID | Reviewable conflict without silent overwrite/merge. |
| Mixed valid/invalid rows or interrupted partial progress | Reconciled totals and no duplicated completed change after retry. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-07/Q14; numerical register “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
Delivery identity and command safety boundary
MQTT and HTTP remain the chosen protocol families under ARC-D03. The OASIS MQTT specification addresses transport delivery; packet identifiers, DUP flags and HTTP success do not establish unique application processing or physical execution.
| Exchange condition | Proposed contract |
|---|---|
| Same event identity and accepted content | Return the original ingestion result without creating another event. |
| Same event identity with conflicting content | Quarantine/flag for review; preserve received evidence and authoritative record without silent overwrite. |
| Genuine separate detections | Require separate identities even when type, time or imagery are similar. |
| Device lacks stable event identity | Test the adapter’s rule for assigning event identities against actual device behaviour. Do not assume that hashing data within a time window distinguishes every detection. |
| New command | Record requester, target, permitted action/parameters, reason or triggering evaluation, validity and required approval/restrictions. |
| Command acceptance | Accept only a supported, authorised action for a registered device. |
| Repeated command ID | Retrieve or continue the same logical delivery under the allowed retry policy; do not create a new physical action. |
| Changed payload under an existing command ID | Return a conflict. |
| Eligible dispatch or retry | IoT service rechecks restrictions and follows the platform’s action policy; it cannot independently redefine that policy. |
| Device lacks safe action correlation/deduplication | Restrict or disable retries; a device-specific safety review determines whether late/unconfirmed execution permits another action. |
| Late evidence or timeout | Append late evidence and reconcile under the Data Dictionary proposal. Timeout is not definitive evidence of non-execution. |
| Reconnection | Do not replay expired/withheld actions or automatically close cases. |
| Evidence level | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Service accepted | The service accepted the logical request. |
| Dispatched | The request was dispatched. |
| Device acknowledged | The selected device acknowledged, if supported. |
| Execution confirmed | Selected evidence confirms execution; API/broker acknowledgement alone is insufficient. |
| Final operational outcome | The operational result is recorded separately from command delivery/execution. |
Verification: Reproduce response loss, duplicate delivery, out-of-order/late acknowledgement, stale validity and service restart using a non-hazardous controlled method and selected-device confirmation.
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-04; numerical register “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)” and “Workflow and alert timing (PAR-08)”.
Availability ordering and error contract
| Error category | Required response |
|---|---|
| Unauthenticated; forbidden; unknown/unregistered device | Stable machine-readable code, safe explanation and request/correlation reference. |
| Unsupported schema/type/action; invalid/missing input | Same structured response; no blind retry. |
| Identity conflict; stale revision; action restricted; expired | Same structured response and retry eligibility where meaningful. |
| Service unavailable; resource limit reached | Same structured response with bounded retry guidance where applicable. |
| Sensitive implementation information | Never return credentials, raw stack traces or unrelated records. |
HTTP interfaces may adopt RFC9457 problem details; this remains a recommended representation, not a selected endpoint implementation.
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Ordering | Order records using the source and receipt times appropriate to the operation. Do not assume that the order messages arrive is the order events occurred. |
| Older heartbeat/result | Retain observations without silently overwriting newer validated state. |
| Ambiguous/conflicting chronology | Surface timestamps and ambiguity; do not invent ordering. Qualify sequence/clock behaviour with the adapter. |
| IoT-service outage | Show last-known information and inability to verify current device state. |
| Individual contact timeout | Show device-specific Offline only when valid source observations support that conclusion. |
| Supported edge/device buffering | Retain observations; qualify capacity, overflow/drop reporting and recovery behaviour. |
| Device lacks a required offline capability | Keep the full URG offline/recovery obligation in the RTM. |
| Retry of a mutation | Reuse its logical identity under a bounded policy; do not blindly retry invalid, forbidden or unsupported work. |
| Resource configuration | Set limits, timeouts and backoff from measured device/network/application constraints; no numeric value is approved here. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-04/OPEN-07 and the “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)” numerical entry.
Authentication authorisation and protected media
| Protected asset / boundary | Proposed enforcement | Failure handling |
|---|---|---|
| User versus device/service identity | Use separate identities and check function plus requested object/action at the server, including evidence access and live start/stop. | Changed request IDs cannot bypass permissions. |
| Record access | Apply the role permissions in section 2.2. | Field Team access is limited to assigned work; Viewer access excludes live video and operational changes. |
| Credentials | Provision/revoke by a controlled administrator procedure; exclude credentials from ordinary logs, reports and model prompts. | Compromised credentials are revoked under the selected procedure. |
| Sensitive flows and storage | Apply TM-approved encryption and data controls. | No assumed cryptographic profile or compliance claim. |
| Media retrieval | Authorise underlying record/camera and evidence type. Proposed private bucket uses service retrieval or provider-supported expiring scoped links. | A link is not a permanent grant and is not included in public reports by default. |
| Live camera capability | Issue only capability permitted for the current user. | Stop, timeout or revocation closes the authorised session through the supported media path. |
The object checks follow OWASP object-level authorisation guidance; they do not add a site-restriction feature.
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14 and OPEN-14.
LLM and external integration boundaries
| Interface | Permitted contract | Failure / scope boundary |
|---|---|---|
| I-AI input | Send only permission-filtered context needed for the selected read-only question/summary to an approved provider. | No TM data transmission before processing approval; retrieved content cannot expand permissions. |
| I-AI output | Separate source-backed facts from interpretation; retain record links/period and uncertainty. | API outage affects the assistant, while maps, alerts, cases and reports continue. |
| I-TM | Document future capability and error/version/security obligations. | Standalone delivery remains a proposed deviation; an offline adapter is not live enterprise integration. |
| Initial-phase allocation | Preserve source marks for enterprise integration, AI Agent, knowledge retrieval and advanced prediction in Delivery Allocation and the RTM. | Do not treat timing/interpretation as resolved before TM agreement. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-01/Q09 and OPEN-11.
Interface acceptance evidence
| Test scope | Evidence required |
|---|---|
| Every I label | Success, invalid/missing input, permission denial and relevant failure/recovery paths. |
| Actual event and permitted command | Correlation IDs trace each through the selected end-to-end path. |
| Identity and compatibility | Duplicate/conflicting IDs, incompatible schemas, location/time ambiguity and stale import previews have stable outcomes. |
| Availability and access | Distinguish service/device outages; test media expiry, denied live roles and LLM outage. |
| Selected adapter | Demonstrate actual confirmation and duplicate controls; simulated API replies alone are insufficient. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-07/OPEN-10/OPEN-16 and applicable numerical entries.
SRS-INT-101 — API Integration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed deviation. |
| TM source | REQ-INTSW-001; URG-T13-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall retain documented integration boundaries while identifying the proposed live-TM-integration deviation.
| Contract element | Specification |
|---|---|
| Documented contract | Purpose/direction, schema version and identifiers. |
| Data and access | Required/optional fields, authentication and supported media. |
| Failure semantics | Validation, errors, timeout and duplicate handling. |
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Document platform–IoT service exchange and approved offline source import boundaries. |
| B02 | Route device data and commands through the IoT service using the retained MQTT/HTTP direction. |
| B03 | Keep application identities distinct from supplied source identities and preserve mappings/traceability. |
| B04 | Provide controlled positive, invalid and timeout examples for each implemented interface. |
| B05 | Retain an adapter boundary for a future designated TM interface without claiming an implemented external connection. |
| B06 | The user has stated that live TM production integration is unavailable; offline import does not prove an enterprise API or cancel the source obligation. |
| B07 | Obtain TM disposition of the deviation and section 2.6 initial-phase allocation conflict before baseline sign-off. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Implemented interface review and actual selected IoT path | Purpose, contracts and schema/authentication/duplicate/unavailable-service tests match implementation. |
| AC02 | Unimplemented TM interface review | The interface is recorded as a deviation with no passing external test claimed; Q09 disposition is required. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-01/Q09; OPEN-07.
SRS-INT-102 — Event Exchange
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed deviation. |
| TM source | REQ-INTSW-003; URG-T13-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where integration with a designated operational system is required, the platform shall preserve the external event-exchange obligation and its proposed standalone deviation.
| Contract element | Specification |
|---|---|
| Proposed envelope | Event/alert identity, schema version and original/receipt times. |
| Operational context | Category, location/asset references and state. |
| Traceability | Available evidence references and update/version identity. |
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Current device-event exchange uses the FALCON IoT service and operational reports are downloadable; neither proves compliance with an external operational event interface. |
| B02 | Future adapters map authorised fields and exchange direction to the designated recipient contract. |
| B03 | Define delivery acknowledgement, retries and duplicate/update semantics for that recipient. |
| B04 | Exclude secrets and unrestricted media links from exported content. |
| B05 | Do not enable an external endpoint through this proposal. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative internal events including state updates and unavailable evidence | The proposed envelope represents each case without implying live external exchange. |
| AC02 | External system/contract/access absent | External verification is blocked/not executed. |
| AC03 | Approved designated receiver available | Test acknowledged, duplicate and failed deliveries against its contract. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-01/Q09: designated systems and standalone deviation; OPEN-07.
SRS-INT-103 — Interface Error Handling
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTSW-004; URG-T13-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Interfaces shall reject invalid or unauthorised input and recover through traceable, bounded, safe delivery handling.
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Validate schema and authorisation before operational use; return structured reason and source/correlation reference for invalid input. |
| B02 | Exclude invalid input from affected calculations/commands while allowing independent valid import records to proceed. |
| B03 | Distinguish validation/authentication failure, unavailable dependency, transport timeout and explicit device failure. |
| B04 | Show actionable internal status without credentials or raw secret-bearing payloads; timeout does not prove physical non-execution. |
| B05 | IoT service owns bounded retries under the same command identity, only for devices/actions with verified duplicate-execution controls. |
| B06 | Platform displays progress and final Failed, Expired or Unconfirmed states without independently retrying physical actions. |
| B07 | Recheck maintenance, pause, approval, cooldown and action-age restrictions before further execution. |
| B08 | If optional AI API fails, show assistant failure while maps, alerts, cases and reports continue. |
| B09 | Document actual adapter limits and transient/permanent classification; no invented numeric TM criteria. |
| B10 | On recovery reconcile acknowledged identities and current status; neither replay expired commands nor overwrite newer records with delayed responses. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Malformed input, unauthorised source and duplicates | Correct structured reasons appear; valid independent records remain and duplicates do not cause duplicate execution. |
| AC02 | Unavailable service, timeout and definite failure | States are distinct; retries are bounded and eligible, with preserved command identity and safety checks. |
| AC03 | Late acknowledgement and recovery | History reconciles without stale overwrite or expired replay. |
| AC04 | Correlated logs and optional AI outage | Logs exclude secrets; unrelated functions continue. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-04; numerical entry “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-INT-104 — API Documentation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-APINT-001; URG-T41-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Applicable integration interfaces shall be documented and versioned at the authorised service boundary.
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Proposed REST/JSON APIs expose applicable operational data; device-native protocols terminate at the IoT service. |
| B02 | Publish machine-readable OpenAPI, examples and operational constraints. |
| B03 | Separate reads, accepted submissions and permitted commands; apply authenticated scoped identities and audit. |
| B04 | Implement/test external readiness against controlled clients or agreed POC/Pilot stubs. |
| B05 | Keep stub-versus-live evidence explicit; documented interfaces and offline imports do not demonstrate successful live enterprise integration. |
| B06 | The user-confirmed lack of live TM production integration remains a proposed deviation requiring TM agreement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Contract client checks authentication, invalid input, pagination and errors | Documentation matches actual behaviour; retained requests/responses identify stubs versus live counterparts. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-01/Q09; OPEN-07/OPEN-10.
SRS-INT-105 — API Types
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-APINT-002; URG-T41-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall define applicable API resources with consistent access, validation and traceability rules.
| Contract element | Specification |
|---|---|
| Resource categories | Event submission, asset information, risk information and alert information. |
| Further categories | Workflow status, incident information, device status and operational metrics. |
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Validate event source identity/schema and retain idempotency/source references. |
| B02 | Preserve provenance and reviewable validation errors for asset and incident imports. |
| B03 | Provide identifiers, site/time filters, pagination, freshness and related-record links for reads. |
| B04 | Include model, period and uncertainty with risk; keep workflow and command states distinct; identify metrics calculation periods. |
| B05 | Reject or explicitly identify unsupported/not-approved external writes instead of silently accepting them. |
| B06 | Return consistent validation, permission, missing-record, rate-limit and unavailable errors without exposing restricted objects. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Valid and invalid case for every applicable resource category | Permissions, pagination, links, freshness and duplicate-submission semantics are correct. |
| AC02 | Applicability/evidence review | Excluded categories and controlled test counterparts are explicitly identified. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-01/Q09; OPEN-07.
SRS-INT-106 — API Parameters / payload
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-APINT-003; URG-T41-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each implemented endpoint shall have a complete, testable technical contract.
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Document method/path and purpose in the technical release, with required role/service scope and authentication. |
| B02 | For request and response fields, define data types, required fields, when null is allowed, units and the meaning of each timestamp. |
| B03 | Include successful/failing examples, correlation/idempotency fields and error codes. |
| B04 | Distinguish invalid, unauthenticated, forbidden, not-found, conflicting update/duplicate, oversized, rate-limited and unavailable-dependency outcomes. |
| B05 | Define pagination/filter/sort, timeout, payload/file maximums, rate/concurrency bounds and retry safety guidance. |
| B06 | Declare major API/schema versions, backwards compatibility and deprecation rules. |
| B07 | Keep device-native schemas behind the common IoT envelope. |
| B08 | Treat numeric limits as configuration proposals until workload review. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Machine-readable contract validation and example execution | Contract is valid and actual success/error status/body semantics match it. |
| AC02 | Negative cases and exceeded configured limits | Rejection and retry handling are clear and bounded. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-07/OPEN-10; applicable section 5.4 numerical entries.
SRS-INT-107 — API Scalability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-APINT-004; URG-T41-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Integration contracts shall support controlled expansion without exposing database or hardware-specific structures.
| Clause | Interface behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use versioned resources, stable application identities and mapped source references. |
| B02 | Add optional fields compatibly; give breaking changes an explicit migration/version path. |
| B03 | Use adapters to validate new sources and translate their data into the common message envelope. |
| B04 | Use pagination and bounded payloads/rate/concurrency. |
| B05 | Provide asynchronous job status for long imports/reports instead of unbounded synchronous requests. |
| B06 | Keep representative legacy-client contract tests and record capacity limits. |
| B07 | Do not claim limitless scale or compatibility with every proprietary system. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | New test source/adapter and optional field | Existing representative client contracts still pass. |
| AC02 | Increased request volume | Limits produce bounded failure without lost or duplicated work. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-07; numerical entries “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)” and “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
3.2 Functional Requirements
All requirement sections use a common review format. Functional modules provide module purpose, actors and boundaries, followed by individual requirements. Each requirement separates its authority/source, short statement, relevant information or behaviour, exceptions and acceptance criteria. Only relevant tables are included.
Behaviour clauses (B01, B02, etc.) and acceptance criteria (AC01, AC02, etc.) are local to their parent requirement. Cite the full reference in review comments, for example SRS-GIS-104/B05 or SRS-GIS-104/AC04. These clauses clarify the existing requirement; they are not additional top-level requirements. Decisions still required remain open, and all acceptance criteria are Not Run.
3.2.1 User Access and Administration
Purpose: Control access to operational information and sensitive actions while retaining accountability.
Actors: Superadmins manage technical settings. Administrators manage application accounts. Operators manage operational work. Field Team members update assigned work from M3. Viewers read permitted information. Devices and services use separate identities.
Submodules: Account provisioning; authentication; role permissions; account suspension; session control.
Access rules: Apply section 2.2 to all five roles. Field Team members see assigned work only. Superadmin operational access requires an additional role. Physical actions still require their safety and approval checks. TM SSO access remains To Confirm.
SH-ACC-001 — Role and action permissions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
The platform shall enforce the agreed role and action permission matrix.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Check role and action permissions for protected operations through both the user interface and direct APIs. |
| B02 | Include import, rule configuration, device commands, live media and exports in the permission matrix. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Permission denied | Refuse the operation without an unauthorised side effect. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Allowed action | The permitted operation succeeds for the applicable role. |
| AC02 | Denied UI and direct API action | No unauthorised change occurs, including for import, rules, commands, live media and exports. |
Decisions still required: See DET-001.
SRS-ACC-001 — Suspend access
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
An Administrator shall be able to suspend accounts within their approved account scope without removing historical actor references.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Allow an Administrator to suspend an account within their approved account scope. |
| B02 | Deny subsequent protected requests from the suspended account. |
| B03 | Keep previous audit entries and other historical actor references attributable to that account. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Suspend an account with recorded activity | Subsequent protected requests are denied and previous activity remains attributable. |
| AC02 | Account has an active session when suspended | Apply the agreed session-revocation policy; acceptance of revocation timing awaits that policy. |
Decisions still required: See DET-002 for session revocation and DET-076 for account-management permissions.
SRS-ACC-101 — Authentication
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-001; URG-T26-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
The platform shall authenticate end users, services and registered devices before accepting their protected access or operational data.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Require authenticated identity at browser, API, media, evidence, export and administration entry points. |
| B02 | Allow Administrators to create accounts within their approved account scope; provide no public self-registration. |
| B03 | Validate session and service credentials at the server. |
| B04 | Require device registration and authorisation before its IoT-service identity may publish accepted operational data or receive commands. |
| B05 | Keep service-to-platform authentication separate from end-user authentication. |
| B06 | Record security-relevant authentication attempts without recording secrets. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Invalid credentials | Reject access without disclosing protected record contents. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Valid identity at each protected entry point | Access proceeds subject to authorisation. |
| AC02 | Absent, expired, revoked or wrong-principal credentials | UI, API, evidence, live-view and IoT access are rejected without exposing protected records. |
| AC03 | Unregistered or disabled device; disabled account | Operational publication/command access or account access is denied as applicable. |
| AC04 | Security log inspection | Attempts are traceable and credentials are redacted. |
Decisions still required: See DET-003 for authentication and DET-076 for account creation.
SRS-ACC-102 — Authorisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-002; URG-T26-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
The platform shall authorise each protected action in its application or service handler.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Enforce permissions at the server even when a caller bypasses hidden or disabled UI controls. |
| B02 | Permit Administrators to create accounts, import data and manage rule/outcome configuration under the proposed role model. |
| B03 | Permit Operators to review alerts, manage assigned work, approve designated actions and invoke permitted commands or pauses. |
| B04 | Keep Viewers read-only; Viewer membership alone grants no live-camera access. Retain live access for Administrators and Operators. |
| B05 | Allow Administrators, Operators and Viewers to access records across sites within their permissions. Limit Field Team access to assigned work. |
| B06 | Check action-specific restrictions independently of role membership; permission to configure a rule does not establish field-safe physical-action policy. |
| B07 | Audit security-relevant forbidden-action attempts. |
| B08 | Give Superadmins access to platform security settings, system monitoring, agreed performance settings, backups, recovery and approved technical maintenance. |
| B09 | Require a separately assigned operational role before a Superadmin can access operational records or actions. |
| B10 | Allow Field Team members to view assigned work and submit progress, evidence and completion details from M3. An authorised Operator reviews the results and closes the case; Field Team members cannot close it. |
| B11 | Restrict account and role changes to the approved account types and grantable roles. No user may grant themselves unapproved permissions. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Forbidden operation | Reject with no side effect. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Role-by-endpoint allow/deny matrix | Each role receives only its permitted functions, including export, media, rules, approval, pause and case closure. |
| AC02 | Direct forbidden write | Stored state is unchanged and the security-relevant attempt is audited. |
| AC03 | All-site Viewer | Records are visible within read permissions; writes and live-camera access remain denied. |
| AC04 | Superadmin with technical access only | Technical functions are available; operational records and actions are denied through UI and API. |
| AC05 | Superadmin with a separately assigned operational role | Only that role’s operational permissions become available; action restrictions still apply. |
| AC06 | Assigned and unrelated users with only the Field Team role | Only the assigned member can view and update the field work; neither can close the case or issue device commands. |
| AC07 | Administrator-only or Field-Team-only account attempts a technical setting or unapproved role grant | The request is denied without changing settings or permissions. |
SRS-ACC-103 — Data Access
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-005; URG-T26-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
The platform shall apply consistent data-access restrictions across every representation of a record.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply role restrictions to dashboards, search, detail APIs, downloads, live streams and AI retrieval. |
| B02 | Resolve object references through authorised queries and restrict sensitive fields independently of parent-record visibility. |
| B03 | Calculate counts and exports from the same permitted dataset used for display. |
| B04 | Apply role changes and revocation to new protected requests; apply the approved session policy to active sessions. |
| B05 | Check the current field-work assignment before returning its records or evidence to a Field Team member. Remove that access from subsequent requests when the assignment ends or changes. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Restricted object or expired evidence link | Deny retrieval without revealing the object contents. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Same record through UI, API, report, evidence URL and assistant | Each path discloses only data permitted to the role. |
| AC02 | Changed object ID or expired evidence link | Restricted information is not returned or revealed by the error. |
| AC03 | Role revoked during a session | New protected requests are restricted and active-session behaviour matches the approved policy. |
| AC04 | Field work reassigned; old assignee requests its case or evidence by copied ID | Subsequent requests from the old assignee are denied; the new assignee can access the assigned work within its permissions. |
Decisions still required: See DET-004.
3.2.2 Data Intake and Validation
Purpose: Bring usable source records into FALCON with reproducible lineage, associations and quality decisions.
Actors: Administrators control imports and mapping profiles; Operators use imported information; registered devices provide observations through the IoT service; authorised internal users review limitations.
Submodules: Import preview and commit; validation and quarantine; source mappings; deduplication; asset/incident matching; data quality and provenance.
Boundaries: TM exports and registered field observations are initial source candidates. Connected production access and additional source families require their own approval. A record can remain usable even when one association or calculation is unavailable; import does not prove model readiness.
PL-DAT-001 — Traceable source import
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall import agreed records and observations with traceable source and capture time.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain source identity and capture time for each imported record or observation. |
| B02 | Reconcile import totals and prevent duplicate records when the same agreed source delivery is repeated. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Agreed asset/incident sample imported | Stored records retain source/time lineage and totals reconcile. |
| AC02 | Same sample imported again | No duplicate records are created. |
PL-DAT-002 — Invalid and missing input review
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall expose invalid and missing required input for review while retaining usable information.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Identify invalid or missing required fields and make the reasons available for review. |
| B02 | Retain usable unmatched incidents. |
| B03 | Exclude an incomplete record only from calculations that require its missing input. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Mixed valid, invalid and unmatched sample | Review identifies the affected rows and reasons; usable unmatched incidents remain available. |
| AC02 | Calculation with a missing required input | The record is excluded from that calculation without losing other valid uses. |
SRS-DAT-101 — Network Asset Data
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTSW-002; URG-T13-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall import agreed TM network assets through an Administrator-controlled, traceable process.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Lineage | Source identity, batch and capture time. |
| Asset identity and location | Required identifiers and supplied location/geometry; kept separate from device identity. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Validate required asset identifiers and location/geometry before dependent use; show accepted and rejected records with reasons. |
| B02 | Resolve existing assets by stable source identifiers where available and preview additions or updates before applying them. |
| B03 | Keep TM fibre assets distinct from FALCON devices; associate observations through deployment, location and asset relationships. |
| B04 | Allow Operators to use imported records without granting import authority through Operator membership. |
| B05 | Preserve source/batch lineage and the historical location/context of existing event associations when an asset changes. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Referenced asset absent from a later file | Flag for review; do not delete it solely because of absence. |
| Ambiguous identity or invalid spatial fields | Reject from association-dependent processing. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approved asset sample and detected event | Assets import and the event association has traceable source/batch/capture time. |
| AC02 | Repeat import and coordinate update preview | No duplicate asset is created; proposed changes and the recorded update decision remain visible. |
| AC03 | Omitted or repeated identifier | Referenced assets are not deleted; missing/ambiguous identities are flagged. |
| AC04 | Changed asset position or unusable geometry | Old events retain their context; invalid geometry cannot support a claimed proximity result. |
SRS-DAT-102 — Multi-Source Data Ingestion
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-001; URG-T14-R02. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall ingest enabled, approved sources through controlled import or registered IoT observation paths.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use Administrator-controlled imports for TM asset and incident/docket exports and the IoT service for registered field observations. |
| B02 | For each enabled input record approval, purpose, source owner role, schema/version, mapping, refresh method and quality rules. |
| B03 | Treat network, environmental, sensor, construction, incident, geographical and operational data as possible source families; add a family only when usable data and an approved mapping exist. |
| B04 | Retain source, capture time, batch/message identity and quality status for each input. |
| B05 | Allow valid independent records to proceed while preserving rejected and unmatched records and their reasons. |
| B06 | Proposed import preview shows accepted, rejected and unmatched counts and changed records before commit. |
| B07 | Retain source files in the agreed bucket and normalised records/lineage in PostgreSQL under approved retention. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Source not supplied or approved | Do not claim that it is an enabled integration. |
| Rejected/unmatched record | Keep its reason visible without blocking independent valid records. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | TM asset and incident samples plus an actual device observation | Each arrives through its distinct permitted path with complete lineage. |
| AC02 | Reconcile initial and repeated delivery | Every row/message is accounted for as accepted, rejected, unmatched or duplicate; repeat delivery does not duplicate records. |
| AC03 | Operator import or unregistered source/device | Input is denied. |
Decisions still required: See DET-005.
SRS-DAT-103 — Data Correlation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-002; URG-T14-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall correlate records using approved mapping profiles and preserve the evidence for each association.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Match using available infrastructure/source identifiers first, followed by applicable asset linkage and geographic/time criteria. |
| B02 | Use location, time, fibre asset, event type, infrastructure identifier and geographical proximity only when valid for the source. |
| B03 | Retain contributing records, matching basis and rule/version. |
| B04 | Keep usable unmatched incidents and their coordinates; mark the asset link unresolved. |
| B05 | Exclude an unmatched incident from asset-dependent calculations with an eligibility reason while permitting valid location-level analysis. |
| B06 | Use stable source IDs for repeat imports and show proposed updates; distinct dockets are not automatically distinct real-world incidents. |
| B07 | Associate field observations with the deployment valid at original event time using retained source time, clock quality and normalised instants from the central data contract. |
| B08 | Allow Administrators to maintain mapping profiles; reviewed corrections retain the prior association and correction reason. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Nearest feature alone | Present a candidate, not proof of the affected asset. |
| Tie or incompatible identifiers | Leave association unresolved for review. |
| Invalid/uncertain event time or missing deployment | Prevent automatic historical reassignment. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Exact identifier, valid proximity, conflicting ID and equal-distance cases | Exact joins and candidates are traceable; conflicts/ties remain unresolved against a reviewed reference set. |
| AC02 | Unmatched incident and repeated dockets | Usable coordinates remain available, calculation eligibility is explicit and no unapproved distinct-incident assumption is applied. |
| AC03 | Delayed pre-relocation event | It links to the event-time deployment or remains explicitly unresolved when time/deployment is uncertain. |
| AC04 | Reviewed correction | Prior association and reason remain available. |
Decisions still required: See DET-006.
SRS-DAT-104 — Historical Data
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-003; URG-T14-R04. |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The proposed M3 capability should ingest and query TM historical fibre fault/incident records for recurring-pattern analysis and predictive dataset preparation.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| History record | Observation period, source/batch, event/fault identity and available category, location/asset, severity/impact. |
| Quality context | Known source coverage and quality limitations. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Label counts and summaries as historical rather than validated future likelihood. |
| B02 | Document included records, exclusions, source coverage and preparation version for each analytical dataset. |
| B03 | Distinguish reported dockets from confirmed distinct incidents or faults. |
| B04 | Preserve update history and reproduce reviewed dataset snapshots. |
| B05 | Apply current operational-record permissions to historical evidence. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing history | Show unknown coverage, not zero incidents. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Historical sample with duplicates, absent severity and unmatched locations | The resulting summary discloses exclusions and limitations and remains traceable to sources. |
| AC02 | Known coverage gap | Coverage is unknown; it is not reported as zero incidents. |
| AC03 | Recreate reviewed snapshot | Source references and preparation version reproduce the dataset and historical summary. |
| AC04 | Simple historical counts | No future-prediction label is presented. |
SRS-DAT-105 — Data Flow
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-AIMLA-002; URG-T38-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall link approved input, model output, decisions, actions and recorded outcomes so each result can be traced to its source.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Process registered sensing/import through validation, quality/provenance checks and permitted transformation/features. |
| B02 | Submit versioned inference requests and receive typed prediction, classification, confidence and limitations. |
| B03 | Carry event/batch/source, input/version and correlation references through platform risk interpretation and configured decision/approval. |
| B04 | Link actions, Operator changes and verified outcomes to the original prediction for evaluation. |
| B05 | Keep historical incident counts separate from model predictions. A model score alone must not trigger a physical action. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Malformed model output | Reject the output. |
| Insufficient input | Show insufficiency and retain previous results with their age. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Controlled detection and historical-to-predictive sample | Source, feature, model, risk, workflow and output references form a traceable chain. |
| AC02 | Required input removed or malformed model output | The result is constrained/unavailable or rejected; no invented current score appears. |
| AC03 | Operator intervention and outcome | Each links back to the original prediction. |
SRS-DAT-106 — Additional Data Sources
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-REX-004; URG-T47-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall onboard additional offline or approved connected sources through validated source profiles.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Create a profile recording owner, access/rights, format/schema/version, cadence, source IDs, location/time/unit mapping, quality rules and retention. |
| B02 | Validate and stage input before dependent use; report accepted, rejected and unmatched records with reasons. |
| B03 | Preserve lineage and prevent duplication on repeated delivery. |
| B04 | Admit only eligible records/fields into dependent risk or model calculations and keep missing associations explicit. |
| B05 | Review schema compatibility when a source changes. |
| B06 | Keep connected production sources subject to the separate TM integration decision; a file adapter does not grant network or data access. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Schema incompatibility | Require compatibility review before changed input can corrupt established meanings. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative new source with valid, malformed, duplicate and unmatched rows | Counts, provenance and eligibility reconcile; each unusable row has a reason. |
| AC02 | Repeat delivery | No duplicate records result. |
| AC03 | Schema change and prior-source regression | Incompatible meanings are not silently applied and existing sources retain correct processing. |
Decisions still required: See DET-007.
SRS-DAT-107 — Data Quality
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-002; URG-T52-R03. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall apply versioned data-quality checks during import, feature preparation and inference.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Check missing required fields; duplicate IDs/content; invalid formats/ranges; conflicting values; outliers; impossible/future/out-of-order timestamps; sensor fault/health indications; and incomplete/corrupted records. |
| B02 | Record affected source records, check/reason, treatment and potentially impacted models/use cases. |
| B03 | Keep accepted, rejected and unmatched outcomes distinct; allow valid records to proceed. |
| B04 | Exclude incomplete records only from calculations requiring the missing input. |
| B05 | Preserve original and receipt times during normalisation; document imputation/transformation so it can be reproduced. |
| B06 | Constrain or block an affected automated decision when required fields, freshness or health fail the applicable inference guardrail; retain the underlying observation. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unrecoverable payload | Quarantine and retain an auditable rejection reference. |
| Outlier | Flag for review; do not automatically delete an unusual threat. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | At least one example of each of the eight quality classes | Each produces a traceable reason and treatment with the source retained as applicable. |
| AC02 | Mixed valid/incomplete data and repeat import | Partial acceptance is correct and no duplicate scoring occurs. |
| AC03 | Outlier versus corrupted record | The outlier is flagged for review; unrecoverable data is quarantined with a rejection reference. |
| AC04 | Material inference-quality failure | The affected automated decision is prevented under its guardrail. |
SRS-DAT-108 — Data Quality Guardrail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-001; URG-T53-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall evaluate versioned input-quality guardrails before inference and before releasing inference into an action workflow.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Check the model-required quality, completeness, freshness and source-health rules and retain outcomes with inference/decision records. |
| B02 | Proposed handling withholds the affected automatic action when a mandatory input, validity/freshness bound or required health condition fails. |
| B03 | Mark an available advisory result as constrained and explain its missing or stale inputs. |
| B04 | Preserve raw observations and notify authorised internal users of the limitation. |
| B05 | Allow historical analysis for its stated period when its model inputs do not depend on the offline live sensor. |
| B06 | On recovery allow new valid evaluations; do not replay stale or previously withheld deterrent actions. |
| B07 | Apply each independent approved workflow’s own input and safety checks. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Evidence unavailable | Never substitute an assumed safe or low-risk value. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Valid, missing, incomplete, stale and unhealthy inputs | The configured guardrail outcome is retained; constrained/unavailable results are explicit and prohibited commands are withheld. |
| AC02 | Source recovery | New valid evaluations proceed without replaying previously withheld or stale deterrence. |
| AC03 | Independent historical/reporting function | It remains usable where its required inputs are available. |
3.2.3 GIS Assets and Operational Map
Purpose: Present supplied infrastructure, observations and assessment results in linked geographical and list views.
Actors: Authorised users inspect permitted records; Viewers remain read-only; Administrators manage reviewed spatial configuration. Field surveyors provide placement and site evidence.
Submodules: Asset and route registry; map layers; spatial association; dashboard filters; historical hotspots; risk overlays.
Boundaries: Display only supported geometry and approved assessment units. Historical hotspots, future predictions, device positions and sensor coverage remain distinct. Spatial display does not establish field suitability or authorise physical actions.
PL-GIS-001 — Asset and route registry
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall maintain agreed asset and route records with identifiers and locations.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Store asset/route identifiers, supplied geometry and site associations. |
| B02 | Keep infrastructure asset records separate from FALCON device records. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approved asset/route sample | Identifiers, geometry and site associations match the sample; device identities remain separate. |
PL-GIS-002 — Linked operational map
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall display linked events, devices and available evidence on the asset map.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link mapped devices and events to their source records, status and available evidence. |
| B02 | Show the applicable site and preserve historical event location when presenting past events. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Select a mapped device and event | Status and evidence trace to the source records and the displayed site/location matches the applicable deployment history. |
SRS-GIS-101 — Operational Dashboard
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTUI-001; URG-T11-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The dashboard shall present the operational information available at the applicable delivery milestone.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | In M2 show monitored asset/location status, device status and detections. |
| B02 | In M3 add active alerts, cases and separately identified historical/predictive risk; in M4 add risk-linked preventive recommendations. |
| B03 | Apply the authorised user’s site and period selection to panel results. |
| B04 | Open the linked asset, event, alert, assessment or recommendation from a populated panel. |
| B05 | Identify each panel’s data period or last update and distinguish loading, no records, unavailable and stale states. |
| B06 | Permit Viewers to inspect information; require the applicable operational permission for action controls and APIs. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Capability awaiting its milestone | Label unavailable in this release; do not represent it as zero risk. |
| Service failure | Retain labelled last-known values. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Populated panels filtered by site/period | Every displayed result reconciles to its linked record. |
| AC02 | No-record period and unavailable-data period | Different labels distinguish the two states. |
| AC03 | IoT-service interruption | Last-known values are labelled stale; all devices are not automatically shown Offline. |
| AC04 | Viewer via UI and direct API | Inspection is allowed and operational actions are denied. |
SRS-GIS-102 — Fibre Network Visualisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTUI-002; URG-T11-R03. |
| Source modality | shall/should; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall provide a geographical view of relevant supplied fibre infrastructure and risk locations.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Layer support should include usable supplied fibre routes, distribution cabinets, manholes, poles, monitored infrastructure, construction areas, detected threats, historical incidents and risk levels. |
| B02 | Retain each feature’s source identity and geometry type; distinguish an unavailable layer from a supplied layer containing no features. |
| B03 | Open feature identifiers, source and related records on selection. |
| B04 | Use filters and a legend that distinguish assets, devices, observations and risk outputs. |
| B05 | Display usable unmatched incidents at supplied coordinates with unresolved asset associations. |
| B06 | After relocation, update current device placement while retaining historical markers at their event-time deployment and coordinates. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Invalid geometry | Flag the feature and exclude it from spatial calculations until corrected. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Available layers, point and route in an approved reference sample | Positions match the approved coordinate transformation; record unavailable optional layers separately. |
| AC02 | Invalid geometry and located unmatched incident | Invalid geometry is flagged and excluded from spatial calculations; the usable incident remains mapped with an unresolved asset link. |
| AC03 | Device relocation | Current placement changes and previous event markers remain at their original locations. |
Decisions still required: See DET-008.
SRS-GIS-103 — Fibre Proximity Assessment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-021; URG-T16-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall establish construction-to-fibre proximity only from usable geometry and an approved spatial method.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Calculation basis | Activity geometry/version and asset geometry/version. |
| Result | Calculation time, units, nearest relevant feature or zone relationship, and positional limitations. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Calculate the relationship between a construction point/area and relevant imported route/asset geometry using the approved coordinate system and distance method. |
| B02 | Proposed point observations use shortest point-to-route distance; proposed area observations use intersection or nearest separation. |
| B03 | Keep a sensor coverage zone distinct from the precise activity location. |
| B04 | Use distance or protection-zone membership as inputs to approved risk rules; neither independently establishes an alarm threshold. |
| B05 | Preserve the geometry/context used by each historical assessment. |
| B06 | Allow Administrators to manage reviewed spatial configuration; deny Viewer changes. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing/incompatible geometry, unknown coordinate system or insufficient precision | Return Proximity not established with reasons and Operator review. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reviewed on-route, intersecting, near and distant geometries | Units and distances reconcile within the agreed tolerance. |
| AC02 | Area observations and uncertain coverage zone | The applicable relationship/limitation is displayed without inventing a precise activity point. |
| AC03 | Invalid coordinates, unknown CRS or insufficient precision | Proximity is not established; no zero-distance or safe-result substitution occurs. |
| AC04 | Historical assessment and Viewer configuration attempt | The stored geometry context is retained and configuration changes are denied. |
Decisions still required: See DET-009.
SRS-GIS-104 — Risk Visualisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-053; URG-T19-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall show available risk assessments by monitored asset or location on a map and in a ranked dashboard list.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Asset/location | The monitored asset or location to which the assessment applies. |
| Assessment type | Historical or predictive, explicitly labelled. |
| Threat category and risk | Category, level and applicable legend/scale; readable labels accompany colour. |
| Time context | Historical data period or future prediction horizon, plus last assessment time. |
| Availability and freshness | Insufficient-data or stale indicator; age and failure/unknown-current-state information where applicable. |
| Supporting information | Drill-down links to contributing factors and source records subject to permission. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use the same assessment snapshot and selected filters for the map and ranked list. |
| B02 | Keep historical assessments and predictive assessments identifiable in both views. |
| B03 | Apply the displayed legend/scale and include readable risk labels; colour alone must not convey risk level or missingness. |
| B04 | Allow an authorised user to open an assessment and inspect its factors and supporting records. |
| B05 | Represent risk only within the approved spatial unit; do not interpolate precise risk at unobserved points. |
| B06 | Keep unlocated and unassessed records visible in the appropriate list state without inventing a map position or numeric risk. |
| B07 | Enforce read permissions on assessment details and downloads. |
| B08 | Keep asset, device and event views accessible when the risk calculation/model service fails. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Calculation or model failure with a prior result | Retain the last labelled assessment, show its age and disclose failure/unknown current state. |
| No usable assessment | Show insufficient-data/unavailable state rather than an inferred risk level. |
| No usable location | Retain the record in the list; do not fabricate spatial precision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Same snapshot with selected filters | Map features and ranked list reconcile to the same eligible assessment set; unlocated records remain identifiable in the list. |
| AC02 | Historical and predictive examples | Type, category, level, data period or future horizon, assessment time and legend are correct. |
| AC03 | Select an assessment | Permitted factors and supporting records open; restricted details/downloads remain denied. |
| AC04 | Unassessed, stale and spatially bounded results | Readable states distinguish missingness and age; the view does not imply risk beyond the approved unit. |
| AC05 | Scoring/model-service failure | The previous assessment remains labelled with age and unknown current state; asset/device/event views remain accessible. |
SRS-GIS-105 — Hotspot Identification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-092; URG-T23-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall identify historical hotspots by aggregating eligible distinct fibre-related incidents under an approved recurrence method.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Hotspot summary | Incident count, threat mix, period, supporting records and available severity/impact. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Group incidents by the agreed infrastructure unit, location/zone or segment and period. |
| B02 | Apply the approved distinct-incident policy before aggregation; do not count every docket or detection as a separate fault. |
| B03 | Identify and rank recurring hotspots using the approved criterion. |
| B04 | Allow located unmatched incidents in eligible location-level calculations while excluding them from asset-specific calculations. |
| B05 | Save grouping/method version and source snapshot or equivalent reproducible input reference. |
| B06 | Label a hotspot as historical concentration; do not claim that it is future probability or proof of unsafe infrastructure. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unlocated, duplicate-review or insufficient-coverage records | Show outside the hotspot map/count where appropriate so omissions remain visible. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Repeated segment incidents, single event, duplicate dockets and located-unmatched records | Grouping, ranking and counts match the reviewed sample and distinct-incident policy. |
| AC02 | Unlocated or insufficient-coverage data | Excluded records remain visible with their limitations; no unsupported hotspot count is claimed. |
| AC03 | Changed spatial unit | The result identifies its applied method/grouping version and supporting records. |
Decisions still required: See DET-010.
SRS-GIS-106 — Deployment Location
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-PHY-002; URG-T32-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each proposed device position shall have a documented placement and coverage rationale.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Position | Coordinates/reference datum, associated asset and risk zone. |
| Installation proposal | Elevation/orientation where relevant, proposed mounting and placement rationale. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Evaluate proximity, visibility and access in relation to fibre routes, FDCs, manholes, poles, construction areas, road crossings, high-risk locations and other relevant infrastructure. |
| B02 | Explain the threat approach or measurement zone covered, potential occlusion/interference, network/power availability and maintenance/physical-security constraints. |
| B03 | Keep the device point location distinct from its coverage extent. |
| B04 | If access or geometry prevents adequate coverage, identify the uncovered area and redesign placement or seek explicit acceptance of the limitation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Survey/drawing reviewed against site photos and mapped assets | Coordinates, placement rationale and coverage overlays are traceable to the placement decision. |
| AC02 | Representative threat approaches | Coverage and blind spots are recorded; inadequate coverage triggers redesign or explicit limitation acceptance. |
SRS-GIS-107 — Centralised Dashboard
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-APP-001; URG-T39-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall provide one authenticated operational web interface with common navigation and linked records.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide site/asset/device status, detections, alerts, risk and case/workflow review with common site/date filters. |
| B02 | In M2 show imported assets, manually registered device locations/status and received events. |
| B03 | In M3 add historical/predictive risk, initial workflows/cases and basic downloadable summaries. |
| B04 | Display last-update, source and quality information; distinguish empty, stale, unavailable and assessed low-risk states. |
| B05 | Keep record-only detections searchable even when no alert exists. |
| B06 | Open on-demand live view separately for permitted roles through the IoT service, with explicit start/stop and session audit. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Each role follows a device event | Navigation connects dashboard/map, evidence and permitted action/case without bypassing role restrictions. |
| AC02 | Site/date selection across views | Results consistently respect selected filters. |
| AC03 | Empty, stale and service-failure examples | States remain distinguishable with linked source records. |
| AC04 | Record-only event and permitted live session | Event remains searchable; live start/stop is explicit and audited. |
SRS-GIS-108 — Parameters
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-APP-002; URG-T39-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall display the required operational record categories without merging their distinct identities.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Fibre infrastructure | Asset/route records and geometry where supplied. |
| Sensors | Locations from active and historical deployments. |
| Detected events | Source, time and evidence. |
| Predicted risks | Period, model, reasons and uncertainty; distinct from historical hotspots. |
| Alerts | Acknowledgement and priority. |
| Incidents/cases | Owner, status and outcome. |
| Workflows | Decision, approval, action and result. |
| Historical information | Explicit date scope. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link each representation to its source detail and related records. |
| B02 | Preserve separate event, alert and incident/case identities. |
| B03 | Apply time/role filters consistently to display and export. |
| B04 | Keep otherwise valid records in list views when geometry or risk is missing. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing geometry or risk | Show unavailable/unresolved; do not suppress an otherwise valid list record. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Examples of all eight categories | Displayed parameters and linked details match source records. |
| AC02 | Delayed event and relocated sensor | Historical deployment/time context remains correct. |
| AC03 | Missing geometry/risk | The state is unavailable/unresolved while the valid record remains listed. |
| AC04 | Filtered display and export | Both contain the same permitted, time-scoped data and distinguish history from prediction. |
SRS-GIS-109 — Geographical View
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-APP-003; URG-T39-R04. |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The proposed geographical view should display supplied fibre geometry, registered sensor positions and validated risk spatial units.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide selectable layers, a legend, source period and detail links for points, areas or segments. |
| B02 | Calculate proximity only when coordinate reference, geometry and an appropriate spatial method are known. |
| B03 | Show observed sensor coverage separately from the area estimated to be at risk. State any location uncertainty that affects how the result should be interpreted. |
| B04 | Keep unsupported or missing locations in a non-map list with an unresolved marker. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Known points, routes and risk areas | Map placement and overlays match the agreed reference dataset at relevant zoom levels. |
| AC02 | Reference proximity cases | Distances match the agreed method and reference data. |
| AC03 | Missing or invalid coordinates | Records remain in the non-map list with unresolved location; no unsupported distance is produced. |
Decisions still required: See DET-011.
SRS-GIS-110 — Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-SITE-001; URG-T44-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each field site shall undergo a documented physical and infrastructure assessment before deployment.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Survey record | Date, surveyor, site/map/photos, measurements and assumptions. |
| Open follow-up | Unavailable information and responsible follow-ups. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Assess fibre infrastructure and authoritative asset references. |
| B02 | Assess physical setting, access and nearby activity. |
| B03 | Assess candidate sensor placement and coverage. |
| B04 | Assess available power and distribution. |
| B05 | Measure or validate connectivity. |
| B06 | Assess environmental exposure. |
| B07 | Assess theft, tamper, privacy and safety risks. |
| B08 | Assess mounting, structural, electrical, permission and installation constraints. |
| B09 | Record unavailable information and responsible follow-ups; controlled M2 observations do not replace the field-site assessment. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Critical assessment gap | Prevent dependent installation decisions until resolved. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Survey reviewed across all eight categories | Evidence includes observations/measurements and identifies assumptions or unknowns. |
| AC02 | Material physical condition remains unknown | Desktop-map evidence alone does not approve the site; dependent installation decisions wait for critical gaps to be resolved. |
3.2.4 Device Registration and Deployment
Purpose: Maintain device identity, deployment history, equipment traceability and evidence-based operational health.
Actors: Administrators manage device registration, relocation and operational health settings. Superadmins manage platform monitoring and technical diagnostics. Operators and Viewers inspect permitted records. Field Team members view device information needed for assigned work.
Submodules: Device inventory; registration and authorisation; deployment history; relocation; connectivity and health; configuration portability.
Boundaries: Connectivity is Online, Offline or Unknown with last-contact time and independently timed health readings. An IoT-service outage makes current state unverifiable, not automatically Offline. Initial location comes from registration; per-event GPS is not required. Inventory tracking does not imply an unapproved theft tracker or offline deterrence.
PL-DEV-001 — Device registration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall register devices separately from infrastructure assets and associate them with a location or asset.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Create a distinct identity for an authorised device. |
| B02 | Record its site and asset/location association for map placement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Register an authorised device | Its separate device identity, linked asset/location/site and map position are correct. |
PL-DEV-002 — Connectivity and health status
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall show connectivity and health with explicit freshness and availability.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Distinguish initial Unknown, current-contact Online and timeout-driven Offline states. |
| B02 | Show stale or unavailable health readings independently of connectivity. |
| B03 | During IoT-service interruption preserve last-known device information and mark current status unverifiable. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Unknown, current contact and contact timeout | The correct connectivity state is displayed. |
| AC02 | IoT-service interruption | Last-known/unverifiable state appears without declaring all devices Offline. |
PL-DEV-003 — Device relocation history
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | User discussion, 2026-10-02 — relocation may follow successful deterrence or be planned for another reason. |
The platform shall support planned relocation for any reason and preserve completed deployment history under the same device identity.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Deployment history | Location/asset, coordinates, start/end dates. |
| Move record | Destination, reason, planned date, recording actor and any recorded outcome. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record intended destination, reason and planned date without changing the current deployment. |
| B02 | On completion close the previous deployment and create the new deployment under the existing device identity. |
| B03 | Allow at most one active deployment for a device. |
| B04 | Preserve each previous deployment’s coordinates and associated events. |
| B05 | Keep each event’s original deployment and event-time coordinates unchanged. |
| B06 | Permit planning and completion without requiring successful deterrence. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Plan A-to-B relocation unrelated to deterrence | Destination, reason and date are saved while A remains current. |
| AC02 | Complete the move | A closes, B becomes the sole active deployment, and device identity remains unchanged. |
| AC03 | Inspect history and previous events | A’s coordinates/events, deployment dates, reason, actor and any recorded outcome remain available. |
SRS-DEV-101 — Device Identification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTHW-002; URG-T12-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall register each device with a unique identity and an auditable deployment history.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Manually register the unique FALCON identity and relevant supplied hardware identity separately from TM asset records. |
| B02 | Record site, location/coordinates, monitored-infrastructure link and explicit adapter mapping to the device-side identifier. |
| B03 | Require registration before joining; unknown devices cannot join automatically. |
| B04 | Implement planned/completed relocation under PL-DEV-003, retaining coordinates, events, dates, actor, reason and any outcome. |
| B05 | Administrators control device registration and relocation. Record each change in the audit history. |
| B06 | Associate delayed observations with the deployment containing original event time. |
| B07 | Neither planning nor completing relocation implies successful deterrence. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Duplicate identity or conflicting active deployment | Reject the conflicting registration/deployment. |
| Uncertain clock or event-time boundary | Flag the deployment link as uncertain instead of automatically linking the event to a different deployment. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Registration and duplicate attempt | The device registers once; duplicate identities are rejected. |
| AC02 | Plan and complete A-to-B move for another reason | A remains current until completion; then B is the sole active placement with the same identity and preserved A history. |
| AC03 | Late A observation after relocation | It links to A where event time supports the match; uncertain clock/boundary cases are explicitly flagged. |
Decisions still required: See DET-012.
SRS-DEV-102 — Device Health
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTHW-003; URG-T12-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where device information is available, the platform shall show connectivity and health as separately evidenced states.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Show Online, Offline or Unknown with last-contact time. |
| B02 | Retain device-supplied health values and measurement times; distinguish unavailable and stale readings. |
| B03 | Proposed state rules are Unknown before valid contact, Online after authenticated contact within the freshness interval, and Offline after the agreed contact timeout while monitoring remains available. |
| B04 | During an IoT-service outage retain last observed state as last-known and mark current status unverifiable. |
| B05 | After recovery reconcile fresh contacts before presenting current device state. |
| B06 | Allow Administrators to configure supported fields/thresholds and Operators/Viewers to inspect under read permissions. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Online connectivity | Do not infer good battery, power or sensor health. |
| Unsupported field | Show a capability limitation, not a healthy value. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Initial state, authenticated contact and timeout boundary | Unknown, Online and Offline follow the agreed configuration. |
| AC02 | Current contact with stale battery reading | Connectivity is current while battery freshness remains stale. |
| AC03 | IoT-service outage and recovery | No blanket Offline transition occurs; current state returns only after fresh contact reconciliation. |
| AC04 | Unsupported health field | Capability is shown as unsupported/unavailable without an invented healthy reading. |
Decisions still required: See DET-013.
SRS-DEV-103 — Loss of Connectivity
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-INTHW-004; URG-T12-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where connectivity information is available, the platform shall record contact-loss episodes and recovery for each monitored device.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Compare valid contact with the configured timeout while monitoring remains available. |
| B02 | Record device, last contact, detection time and monitoring basis for the loss condition; show an internal operational indication. |
| B03 | Update one episode during repeated outage polls instead of generating an alert flood. |
| B04 | Record restoration time after authenticated current contact. |
| B05 | Distinguish historical communication gaps from confirmed device-side failure. |
| B06 | Where selected edge/device capability supports buffering, forward retained original-time observations after reconnection and label delayed events. |
| B07 | Apply configured permitted event age to prevent automatic stale deterrence. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Central IoT-service outage | Mark current status unverifiable, preserving last-known data. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Device stops communicating while service remains healthy | One correctly timed loss episode appears. |
| AC02 | Authenticated contact restored | The episode records recovery. |
| AC03 | IoT service stopped separately | Last-known information remains and current status is unverifiable; no individual-device outages are fabricated. |
| AC04 | Supported buffering delivers delayed observations | Records reconcile with original times; stale events do not issue automatic deterrent commands. |
Decisions still required: See DET-014.
SRS-DEV-104 — System Monitoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-OBS-001; URG-T29-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall expose component health and freshness sufficient to identify actionable operational faults.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Proposed monitoring signals | Last successful check/contact, observed status, queue age/backlog, error counts, storage pressure and component version. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Monitor the IoT service/broker, device contacts, platform/API, ingest/workflow queues, database, bucket access, background jobs, analytics and live-media service where present. |
| B02 | Distinguish healthy, degraded/unavailable and unknown observations. |
| B03 | Keep device Online/Offline/Unknown separate from central-service health. |
| B04 | Route actionable monitoring faults to authorised maintainers with the affected component and evidence. |
| B05 | Advance freshness only from actual observations; do not claim unmeasured sensors are healthy. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative component stopped | The relevant component condition and fault timestamp are visible. |
| AC02 | Test queue/storage limit exhausted | A specific backlog/storage condition appears. |
| AC03 | Component restored | Recovery is visible and monitoring freshness reflects actual checks. |
SRS-DEV-105 — Physical Monitoring & Tracking
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-PHY-006; URG-T32-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall maintain physical equipment, deployment and maintenance traceability.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Equipment | Identity, owner/custodian, serial/model/version and purchase/warranty reference where available. |
| Lifecycle | State, active placement, installed accessories and maintenance/replacement history. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Keep inventory ownership/location separate from Online/Offline/Unknown, last-contact and supplied health/power readings. |
| B02 | Implement PL-DEV-003 planning without changing active placement until completion. |
| B03 | On completed relocation close the old interval and create the new deployment under the same device ID, retaining reason, actor, destination and any outcome. |
| B04 | Preserve original event placement/coordinates and source links. |
| B05 | Treat tracking as inventory, deployment and health traceability without assuming GPS or an unapproved theft-tracker purchase. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Register/install and maintain a unit | Inventory reconciles with the equipment and maintenance/cost references. |
| AC02 | Plan and complete relocation unrelated to deterrence | Only one active deployment remains; identity and historical event locations are preserved. |
SRS-DEV-106 — Sensor Health
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-SENS-006; URG-T33-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where sensor information is available, the platform shall distinguish sensor health from contact and central-service availability.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Receive available heartbeat/contact and health fields through the IoT service with last-contact and reading times. |
| B02 | Use configured contact timeout for Offline, initial/no trustworthy observation for Unknown and valid current contact for Online. |
| B03 | Validate supplied readings against the selected sensor range/status. |
| B04 | Flag abnormal, stuck or error-coded signals where data supports that check. |
| B05 | Distinguish sensor failure, communication loss, stale measurement and central-service uncertainty. |
| B06 | Retain unavailable status for missing or unsupported fields; Online does not prove every sensor channel valid. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Disconnect device or suppress heartbeat | Configured connectivity transitions and last-contact times are correct. |
| AC02 | Invalid, stuck or error-coded sensor values | Distinct health reasons appear where the selected sensor supports validation. |
| AC03 | IoT-service interruption and recovery | Last-known values, central uncertainty and recovery remain distinct from sensor failure. |
| AC04 | Unsupported field | No fabricated normal reading appears. |
SRS-DEV-107 — Inventory
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INST-003; URG-T43-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each installed equipment item shall have a unique inventory identity that preserves its lifecycle history.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Item identity | Component, serial, manufacturer and version. |
| Ownership and installation | Owner, site/placement, installation date and installer. |
| Assembly/configuration | Configuration reference and parent assembly. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Include applicable sensors/cameras, controller/gateway, deterrent, power/battery/solar equipment, enclosure and passive protection. |
| B02 | Keep TM infrastructure assets distinct from FALCON devices/equipment. |
| B03 | Preserve identity and historical associations during replacement and relocation; do not reuse identifiers in a way that confuses history. |
| B04 | Record spare, replaced and retired states and physical labels where feasible. |
| B05 | Exclude credentials from inventory records. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Installed items and labels reconciled to BOM | Each applicable physical item has a unique inventory record. |
| AC02 | Component replacement and device relocation | Current and historical associations/serials remain traceable without identity reuse. |
| AC03 | Inventory inspection | No credentials are stored. |
SRS-DEV-108 — Documentation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-INST-004; URG-T43-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
After installation, an as-built package shall document the actual deployed configuration and handover evidence.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Placement | Actual coordinates/locations and deployment intervals. |
| Arrangement | Final drawings and cable, power and network arrangement. |
| Installed configuration | BOM/serials; firmware, software, model and configuration versions. |
| Interfaces | Endpoint/configuration references without secrets. |
| Sensor setup | Settings, calibration and coverage. |
| Assurance | Accepted changes/deviations and commissioning/test results. |
| Handover | Operations, maintenance and backup references. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record the package checker, revision and completion date. |
| B02 | Reconcile actual deviations against the approved design without silently replacing that baseline. |
| B03 | Update the package after material relocation, replacement or configuration change. |
| B04 | Retain checked package and unresolved exceptions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | As-built walkdown and configuration export comparison | Every installed item and observed deviation is traceable to the package. |
| AC02 | Representative replacement/recovery | The operation can be reproduced from the package. |
| AC03 | Material deployment change | The package revision reflects the changed installation and retained baseline deviations. |
SRS-DEV-109 — Full Diagnostics
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-O&M-002; URG-T46-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall provide authorised diagnostics that distinguish evidence of failures across the field-to-platform path.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Diagnostic context | Component/version, last successful observation and error/reason. |
| Supporting evidence | Correlation IDs, queue/backlog and relevant redacted configuration/health readings. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Distinguish device acquisition/health, power, bearer/contact, authentication/adapter, upload/queue, IoT service, application/workflow, database/bucket and model-service layers. |
| B02 | Provide a next permitted check or runbook reference. |
| B03 | Limit bundles to authorised operational evidence, redact credentials/personal content and audit access/export. |
| B04 | Retain the relevant failure interval under the agreed retention policy so diagnostics remain useful after recovery. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Only contact loss is known | Preserve unknown cause rather than inferring power or hardware failure. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative device, communication and central-service faults | Diagnostics identify the evidenced failed layer, correlate to logs and show recovery. |
| AC02 | Contact loss without device-side evidence | Cause remains unknown; no unsupported power/device diagnosis appears. |
| AC03 | Exported diagnostic bundle | Relevant failure evidence is retained, secrets/personal content are redacted and export is audited. |
Decisions still required: See DET-015.
SRS-DEV-110 — Configuration Portability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-PORT-003; URG-T48-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where technically applicable, the platform shall transfer versioned site configuration through validated, staged bundles.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Export/import assets/reference mappings, location/geometry, sensor/channel/capability mappings, validated thresholds, rule/workflow versions and internal notification settings. |
| B02 | Validate schema, identifier collisions, required capabilities and parameter ranges before staged application. |
| B03 | Show proposed changes and audit who approved and applied them. |
| B04 | Rebind environment-specific endpoint/credential references through secure provisioning; do not export secrets. |
| B05 | Preserve configuration history and existing event/deployment associations. |
| B06 | Apply new configuration prospectively without replaying withheld historical deterrent commands. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unsupported setting or unsafe hardware mismatch | Block activation and report the error. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Round-trip into a clean test site | Semantic settings and permissions match the approved configuration. |
| AC02 | Missing capability, conflicting ID or unsafe hardware mismatch | Activation is blocked with explicit errors and rejected partial activation leaves history intact. |
| AC03 | New configuration activated | Existing associations are unchanged and historical withheld commands are not replayed. |
3.2.5 Risk Assessment and Prediction
Purpose: Produce explainable historical and predictive risk assessments to support reviewed preventive decisions.
Actors: Authorised users inspect assessments and evidence; Operators review uncertain results and intervention decisions; Administrators publish reviewed risk-threshold configurations; TM agrees assessment definitions and acceptance measures.
Submodules: Threat taxonomy; historical scoring; future prediction; ranking and confidence; explanations; insufficient-data handling.
Boundaries: Historical exposure is separate from future prediction. M3 frequency, recency and severity/impact factors remain provisional assumptions dependent on supplied data. Missing evidence is not low risk. Scores, ranks and confidence never independently authorise physical action; unresolved source wording and model acceptance remain explicit.
PL-RSK-001 — Explainable risk priorities
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
The platform shall produce risk priorities with reasons and explicit uncertainty.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link historical priorities to supporting records. |
| B02 | Keep future prediction separately labelled from historical risk. |
| B03 | Evaluate prediction against an agreed dataset, horizon and baseline. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Ranked historical result | The priority reconciles to supporting records and shows uncertainty. |
| AC02 | Future prediction evaluation | Its label, horizon, dataset and baseline are separate from historical scoring. |
Decisions still required: See DET-016.
SRS-RSK-101 — Risk Identification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-010; URG-T15-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
For each eligible monitored asset or location, the platform shall calculate an assessment using its approved input profile.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Assessment identity | Assessment ID, spatial unit, category and assessment time. |
| Calculation basis | Data period, method/model version and contributing records. |
| Outcome | Risk result and eligibility state. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Calculate the applicable historical indicator or predictive assessment for each eligible unit in a risk run. |
| B02 | Rank and display potentially exposed locations with reasons and supporting records. |
| B03 | For M3 begin with TM incident/docket and asset data and provisional frequency, recency and severity/impact factors where available. |
| B04 | Assess input-field suitability and disclose calculation exclusions; do not invent weights, thresholds or missing severity. |
| B05 | Keep historical exposure separate from prediction. |
| B06 | Escalate predictive data insufficiency for a decision instead of silently replacing prediction with historical counts. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| No usable input | Show Not assessed/Insufficient data, never an inferred low risk. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recurring incidents, quiet observed location and missing-coverage location | Reasons/source links reconcile; assessed low risk remains distinct from insufficient data. |
| AC02 | Repeat run from stored input/method versions | The assessment can be reproduced. |
Decisions still required: See DET-017.
SRS-RSK-102 — Risk Classification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Clarification required. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-011; URG-T15-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall classify identified risks, while the complete minimum category obligation remains subject to TM clarification.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Preserve the source omission: REQ-FUNC-011 ends after “At minimum, the solution shall support:” without its list. |
| B02 | Pending clarification, use Construction, Theft/vandalism and Animal/rodent as a proposed interpretation drawn from URG-T11-R04 and the explicitly covered threat scenarios. |
| B03 | Retain classification source/method and category mapping with each result. |
| B04 | Keep the unresolved source list in the review register; do not mark the complete source obligation satisfied by inference. |
| B05 | Test any additional categories when TM supplies the missing list. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unmapped/uncertain classification | Show the limitation and require review before category-specific physical action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | One assessment for each independently required threat family | Shared labels, mapping and source/method are retained. |
| AC02 | Unmapped or uncertain input | Classification is visibly unresolved and cannot trigger category-specific physical action without review. |
| AC03 | Review of source-row completion | The missing list remains open; full completion awaits TM clarification and any additional-category tests. |
Decisions still required: See DET-018.
SRS-RSK-103 — Risk Level
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-012; URG-T15-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall assign eligible threat assessments to versioned risk levels under an approved configuration.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Assessment result | Raw measure where meaningful, applied category/threshold version and resulting level. |
| Context | Evidence period and available uncertainty/limitations. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Propose configurable ordered levels with labels and boundaries approved during POC. |
| B02 | Keep unassessed data outside the risk-level scale. |
| B03 | Allow Administrators to publish reviewed threshold configurations. |
| B04 | Apply changed thresholds to new assessments without silently relabelling historical results. |
| B05 | Validate usefulness for intended response decisions as well as arithmetic correctness. |
| B06 | Store validation evidence and approval state with the configuration; identify unvalidated trial levels as provisional. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Below, equal to and above each approved boundary | Risk levels follow the agreed comparison and can be reproduced from the stored version. |
| AC02 | Missing input or invalid scale | No unsupported assessed level is presented. |
| AC03 | Threshold changed | New assessments use the new configuration and old results remain traceable. |
| AC04 | POC validation review | Evidence records decision usefulness, approval state and unresolved limitations. |
Decisions still required: See DET-019.
SRS-RSK-104 — Rodent Risk Identification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-042; URG-T18-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall assess rodent risk for eligible fibre assets or locations using supplied evidence and a reviewed method.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Consider rodent-related incident history, repeated observed activity and relevant supplied site/infrastructure characteristics. |
| B02 | Use initial historical frequency, recency and severity/impact factors where agreed; include other characteristics only when supplied and validated. |
| B03 | Preserve factor values, source periods, method version, supporting events/incidents and outcome. |
| B04 | Show eligible locations with rodent-risk level/ranking and reasons. |
| B05 | Distinguish location characteristics and historical exposure from future-fault prediction. |
| B06 | Use POC-agreed factors/thresholds for elevated-risk decisions; label unvalidated trials provisional. |
| B07 | Do not treat a rodent-risk assessment alone as authority for deterrence. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unavailable site/environmental characteristics | Do not invent values or imply use. |
| Insufficient evidence | Show missing/insufficient data, not low risk. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recurring rodent location and non-rodent animal location | Classification and factors reproduce from evidence without treating every animal event as a rodent. |
| AC02 | Missing observation coverage | Insufficient data remains separate from low risk. |
| AC03 | Historical versus future output | Labels and reasons distinguish exposure from future prediction. |
Decisions still required: See DET-020.
SRS-RSK-105 — Preventive Alert
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-043; URG-T18-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall evaluate validated animal/rodent risk against its configured intervention threshold and produce the qualifying preventive alert.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain the assessment, rule/version and threshold decision. |
| B02 | At a qualifying threshold create or update the alert with supporting reasons, location and evidence. |
| B03 | Retain a below-threshold assessment without requiring an alert. |
| B04 | The proposed rule triggers when risk equals or exceeds the threshold. Confirm this comparison when approving the configuration. |
| B05 | Route the alert to the configured Operator, automatic or hybrid workflow without treating the alert itself as deterrent authorisation. |
| B06 | Apply permission, designated approval, maintenance prohibition, pause, cooldown, availability and permitted event age before action. |
| B07 | Keep M2 manual operation sufficient; M3 automatic activation requires the specific action policy to be agreed. |
| B08 | Record command result separately from the Operator’s threat outcome. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing mandatory input | Flag for review rather than treating the assessment as a valid threshold decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Below, equal and above approved threshold | Alert behaviour matches the approved comparison and threshold provenance is retained. |
| AC02 | Incomplete input and repeated qualifying detections | Missing mandatory data is flagged; alert creation/update/grouping follows the configured rule. |
| AC03 | Maintenance, pause, cooldown or stale replay | Alerts can remain visible while prohibited automatic deterrence is withheld. |
| AC04 | Permitted command completed | Command result and threat outcome are separately recorded. |
Decisions still required: See DET-021.
SRS-RSK-106 — Fibre Fault Risk Prediction
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-050; URG-T19-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall predict a defined fibre fault or fibre-related incident for an approved spatial unit and future monitoring period.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Prediction definition | Target, approved unit/geometry and future horizon. |
| Run basis | As-of time, input cutoff and method/model version. |
| Output | Likelihood output and scale, available uncertainty and limitations. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use only eligible input available by the prediction run’s cutoff. |
| B02 | Label the output Prediction and keep it separate from historical frequency/hotspot indicators. |
| B03 | Prepare candidate model and baseline results against reviewed outcomes and held-out time/location conditions under MD-PRED-001–008. |
| B04 | Evaluate against TM-agreed acceptance measures and retain per-category errors and limitations. |
| B05 | Do not describe an uncalibrated score as probability. |
| B06 | Preserve the required prediction deliverable when evidence is insufficient; raise a scope decision instead of silently substituting counts. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Insufficient labelled history or unsuccessful validation | Show an explicit limited/not-ready result and raise a scope decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Frozen inputs and model version | The run reproduces and records target, horizon, as-of time and cutoff; later outcomes do not leak into inputs. |
| AC02 | Held-out cases against approved baseline | Acceptance evidence includes agreed measures, per-category errors and limitations. |
| AC03 | Insufficient labelled history or failed validation/model path | The result is limited/not-ready with an explicit decision need; historical counts are not relabelled as accepted prediction. |
Decisions still required: See DET-022.
SRS-RSK-107 — Risk Ranking
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-052; URG-T19-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall rank eligible locations only when their approved risk measures can be compared.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Ranked item | Rank, risk level/score, reason and assessment freshness. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply selected site/area, threat family, assessment type and period/horizon. |
| B02 | Compare only compatible units and method versions; otherwise display separate labelled groups. |
| B03 | Keep historical frequency scores separate from predictive probabilities. |
| B04 | Give equal measures the same risk rank; use a stable identifier only to order display within a tie. |
| B05 | Keep unassessed locations visible outside numeric ranking. |
| B06 | Open contributing incidents/factors and any recommendation when a ranked location is selected. |
| B07 | Refresh the current view for new assessments while retaining the assessment referenced by an Operator decision/intervention. |
| B08 | Treat rank as decision support; it neither issues a physical command nor establishes urgency outside agreed policy. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Ordered risks, ties and insufficient-data locations | Ordering, equal ranks, stable tie display and unranked states are correct. |
| AC02 | Incompatible horizons or methods | Separate groups prevent misleading cross-comparison. |
| AC03 | New assessment after a preventive decision | Current ranking refreshes while the decision still traces to the assessment originally shown. |
SRS-RSK-108 — Prediction Confidence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-005; URG-T51-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where technically applicable, the platform shall retain and display the model-supplied confidence, probability or equivalent indicator with its interpretation.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Distinguish probability of the target outcome, detector confidence and operational risk priority. |
| B02 | Identify indicator meaning, scale, model/version and applicable future horizon or observation period. |
| B03 | Restrict prediction details and supporting records to authorised users. |
| B04 | Prevent missing confidence from passing a decision rule that requires confidence. |
| B05 | Do not fabricate numerical probabilities for historical rankings, deterministic rules or assistant answers. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Source supplies no confidence | Show Not available and the known limitation; do not substitute zero. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Applicable prediction with authorised and denied users | Indicator/scale/version/time context is correct; protected details remain restricted. |
| AC02 | Missing, boundary and invalid confidence values | Missing is distinct from zero and cannot satisfy a required confidence threshold. |
| AC03 | Probability claim | A defined outcome and validation evidence support the interpretation rather than its numeric format alone. |
Decisions still required: See DET-023.
SRS-RSK-109 — Risk Scoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-006; URG-T51-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
For applicable threats, the platform shall calculate a documented score or category for an identified spatial unit and assessment time.
Information displayed / data fields
| Field | Specification |
|---|---|
| Assessment unit | Identified asset, location or segment and assessment time. |
| Scoring explanation | Method/version, period, used/missing factors and source records. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Publish the scoring method/version, input period, used and missing factors, and supporting source records. |
| B02 | Evaluate relevance and availability of historical faults, location, environment, construction activity, prior theft/vandalism, animal/rodent activity, sensor observations, network/fibre characteristics, temporal patterns and other justified sources. |
| B03 | Disclose unavailable factors rather than claiming their use. |
| B04 | Initially consider frequency, recency and severity/impact as user-confirmed provisional M3 historical assumptions. |
| B05 | Exclude missing severity or unresolved asset association only from calculations requiring that input; retain usable location-based records. |
| B06 | For future-risk outputs identify the target and horizon. |
| B07 | Keep unknown/insufficient evidence distinct from assessed low risk; a score alone does not authorise deterrence. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Sample score/category and ranked result | The output reconciles to the method/version and underlying records. |
| AC02 | Missing impact, unresolved asset, duplicate dockets and no history | Omitted factors/coverage and calculation eligibility remain explicit without unsupported low-risk substitution. |
| AC03 | Historical and future-risk outputs | Labels, target/horizon where applicable and evidence distinguish them. |
| AC04 | Risk result without action authority | No unauthorised action follows. |
Decisions still required: See DET-024.
SRS-RSK-110 — Model Explainability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-007; URG-T51-R08. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall present an operationally readable explanation with each prediction or risk assessment.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Identify principal contributing factors and the result’s meaning and limitations. |
| B02 | Where technically applicable include contributing features, detected patterns, risk factors, confidence, prediction timestamp and relevant historical/contextual records. |
| B03 | For historical risk show actual source counts, recency and impact inputs used. |
| B04 | For prediction show the model-supported explanation method, target, horizon and data coverage. |
| B05 | Apply normal permissions to supporting record links. |
| B06 | Do not treat feature association or before/after change as proof of causation. |
| B07 | If the proposed assistant is delivered, ground its explanation in linked results; it must not invent factors, confidence values or observations. |
Exceptions
| Condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Explanation item unavailable from the method | Mark it unavailable with a reason; an unexplained number is not sufficient operational justification. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative operational users review known examples | Principal factors, timestamps, context and applicable confidence trace to scoring/model records. |
| AC02 | Unsupported factor or missing context | The explanation states a limitation and reason. |
| AC03 | Assistant explanation, if delivered | Narrative matches underlying records without invented claims. |
SRS-RSK-111 — Confidence Guardrail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-002; URG-T53-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall apply versioned model/use-case-specific confidence or prediction thresholds to dependent decisions.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Allow authorised configuration of the indicator/scale, comparison operator and below-threshold behaviour. |
| B02 | Retain the threshold version with every decision. |
| B03 | Proposed default uncertain-result handling presents the result for review without its dependent automatic physical action; retain result and reason. |
| B04 | Keep missing/invalid confidence distinct from a genuine low value; neither may pass a confidence-required rule. |
| B05 | Apply evidence, approval, maintenance, cooldown and event-age controls even above the threshold. |
| B06 | Keep classification confidence, predicted likelihood and risk-category thresholds distinct. |
| B07 | Validate the relevant decision boundary when thresholds change; apply new evaluations without replaying historical predictions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Below, equal and above configured boundary | Disposition follows the configured comparison and retains configuration audit/version. |
| AC02 | Null, out-of-range or wrong-scale input | No confidence-required action passes; missing/invalid state remains distinct from low confidence. |
| AC03 | Review-only disposition | Result and reason are visible without the dependent automatic action. |
| AC04 | Above threshold with an independent restriction | Evidence/approval/maintenance/cooldown/event-age restrictions remain enforced. |
| AC05 | Threshold changed | Boundary validation is recorded and new evaluations use the change without historical replay. |
3.2.6 Workflow and Rule Management
Purpose: Evaluate validated events and model outputs, select permitted responses and retain the decision-to-outcome history.
Actors: Administrators configure rules and guardrails; authorised Operators review, approve and control operational responses; the IoT service delivers device commands.
Submodules: Rule configuration and versions; priorities; approval tasks; manual/automatic/hybrid paths; pauses; cooldowns; command restrictions.
Boundaries: Platform owns rule evaluation, priorities, approval, cases and closure. IoT service owns device connection/authentication, payload translation, delivery and bounded eligible command retries. The platform does not independently repeat an action during IoT delivery retry. Automatic deterrent policy and device-specific operating parameters remain subject to agreement.
PL-WFO-001 — Event rule evaluation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Delivery / open scope | Initial M3 |
| Provenance | URG-derived with user refinement; REQ-WFO-001, URG-T40-R02; REQ-FUNC-070, URG-T21-R02. |
The solution shall evaluate validated events against configured conditions and select the configured response, including recording without operator notification or routing to an operator.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Record-only match | Event is retained without an Operator notification. |
| AC02 | Operator-routing match | The configured Operator item/notification is produced. |
PL-WFO-002 — Rule conditions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Delivery / open scope | Initial M3 |
| Provenance | Supporting refinement of REQ-WFO-001; user animal-at-midnight example and assistant condition proposal. |
Rules shall support event type and time-window conditions.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Site/device and detection-confidence conditions are proposed initial refinements, subject to available event fields and agreement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Matching and non-matching types and time boundaries, including a midnight-crossing window | Evaluation follows the agreed type and time conditions. |
| AC02 | Optional conditions after the meaning of each field is agreed | Site/device and confidence conditions produce their agreed results. |
Decisions still required: See DET-025.
PL-WFO-003 — Manual automatic and hybrid execution
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Delivery / open scope | Initial M3; action policy To Confirm |
| Provenance | REQ-FUNC-071/072, URG-T21-R03/R04; REQ-WFO-003, URG-T40-R04; user workflow direction. |
Workflows shall support manual, automatic and hybrid handling.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Actions designated as requiring human approval shall not execute before approval. |
| B02 | Automated steps shall execute only where approved. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approval pending or rejected | The human-approval action does not execute. |
| AC02 | Approved automatic and hybrid paths | Execution follows configured permissions. |
Decisions still required: See DET-026.
PL-WFO-004 — Traceable response sequence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Delivery / open scope | Initial M3; detailed lifecycle To Confirm |
| Provenance | REQ-WFO-002/004, URG-T40-R03/R05. |
The workflow shall support Event → Validation → Risk Assessment → Decision → Action → Confirmation → Closure.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Execution and outcomes shall be traceable and auditable. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying response sequence | Evidence links validation, assessment, decision, action, confirmation and closure. |
| AC02 | Failed or unconfirmed action | Its outcome is distinguishable from success. |
Decisions still required: See DET-027.
SRS-WFO-001 — Rule versions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
Administrators shall configure and enable rules.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Condition/action changes shall create a new version used for new evaluations. |
| B02 | Existing decisions shall retain the version applied. |
| B03 | Publishing a rule shall not replay historical events. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Enabled rule changed; new and historical events submitted | New evaluations reference the new version; existing decisions retain their applied version, with no unsolicited historical replay. |
SRS-WFO-002 — Action restrictions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
Before an automatic or manual device command, FALCON shall enforce authorisation, required approval, maintenance prohibition, device availability, command validity and cooldown.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Automatic actions shall also respect pauses and permitted event age. |
| B02 | Maintenance prohibitions take precedence. |
| B03 | Unresolved conflicting actions shall be held for Operator review. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Any command restriction fails | Withhold the command and record the reason; initial M3 manual action cannot override cooldown. |
| Unresolved conflicting actions | Hold for Operator review; maintenance prohibition takes precedence. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Otherwise matching rule combined with each command restriction | The prohibited action is withheld with its reason. |
| AC02 | Manual command during cooldown in initial M3 | Cooldown cannot be overridden. |
SRS-WFO-003 — Pause and resume
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
An authorised Operator shall be able to pause automatic action for a permitted site/device with a reason and expiry.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | After expiry, new events shall be evaluated under remaining restrictions. |
| B02 | Withheld commands shall not be replayed automatically. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Pause expires | Evaluate new events under remaining restrictions; do not replay withheld commands. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Event received during an authorised pause, then a new event after expiry | Pause history is retained; the new event is evaluated under remaining restrictions and the withheld command is not replayed. |
SRS-WFO-004 — Missing inputs
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
An unmatched event shall be retained without automatic physical action.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A rule evaluation missing a required input shall record the missing field and be made available for internal review. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unmatched event | Retain without automatic physical action. |
| Required input missing | Record the missing field and make the evaluation available for internal review. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Unmatched event and event missing required context | Both are retained without physical commands; the missing field and internal-review reason are recorded. |
SRS-WFO-101 — Response Workflow
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-070; URG-T21-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
A qualifying validated event selects its configured rule/workflow version and progresses through validation, risk assessment, decision, action, confirmation and closure as applicable.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record each selected or withheld step and reason. |
| B02 | The platform owns rules, priorities, approval, cases and closure. |
| B03 | The IoT service owns device delivery/results. |
| B04 | A record-only event does not require a case. |
| B05 | Investigation, assignment or field intervention requires a linked case with one responsible operator. |
| B06 | Selected high-severity rules may create a case automatically only where configured and agreed. |
| B07 | Create one execution record per accepted qualifying decision, linking input events/alert, version, step state and results. |
| B08 | A step waiting for approval or external result remains pending. |
| B09 | Failure, cancellation and unconfirmed command result are explicit. |
| B10 | Dependent steps do not run before successful prerequisite completion. |
| B11 | Independent record/notification steps may continue when a physical action is withheld. |
| B12 | Resume after restart from stored state without repeating completed physical steps. |
| B13 | This is a minimal persisted workflow contract, not a requirement for a separate workflow-engine product. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Record-only, manual and hybrid flows, including waiting approval, failed device action and successful command with unresolved threat | Applicable stages, pending/failure states, selected version and outcomes are linked; command success remains distinct from threat resolution. |
| AC02 | Processing restarted mid-flow | Stored version/step history remains intact without duplicate case creation or physical action. |
SRS-WFO-102 — Automated Workflow
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-071; URG-T21-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
An Administrator enables a reviewed rule; only steps explicitly approved for automatic execution run without an operator decision.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Before a device action check valid inputs, applicable priority, maintenance prohibition, automatic-action pause, approval policy, device/service availability, permitted event age and cooldown. |
| B02 | Unresolved conflicts are held for operator review. |
| B03 | The IoT service alone performs bounded eligible command-delivery retries with the same command identity and verified duplicate-execution control. |
| B04 | An operator can pause automatic actions for an authorised site/device with reason and expiry while recording/alert handling continues. |
| B05 | Expiry restores evaluation for new events only, subject to remaining restrictions. |
| B06 | Withheld commands are not replayed. |
| B07 | A rule change applies to new evaluations. |
| B08 | Manual commands continue to require their own authority and respect maintenance, availability and cooldown. |
| B09 | Initial M3 includes no manual cooldown override. |
| B10 | No automatic deterrent policy is selected by this SRS response. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Duplicate-execution control is unproven | Disable delivery retry under the selected policy. |
| Offline deterrence | Remain To Confirm pending device selection. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approved automatic step with each guard independently activated | Eligible execution proceeds; each blocking guard retains the event/alert and records the withheld reason. |
| AC02 | Pause expiry and rule change | New evaluations use applicable restrictions/version without historical replay. |
| AC03 | Lost acknowledgement | IoT retries are bounded and retain command identity without duplicate physical execution; retry is disabled when this safety property is unproven. |
Decisions still required: See DET-028.
SRS-WFO-103 — Human Approval
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-072; URG-T21-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
For a designated human-intervention action create a pending approval showing event/alert, target device/asset, requested action, supporting evidence/risk, rule/version, restrictions and expiry where configured.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Context | Event/alert, target device/asset, requested action. |
| Decision basis | Supporting evidence/risk, rule/version and restrictions. |
| Expiry | Show where configured. |
| Approval record | Actor/time; reason where required; specific action identity and material parameters. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | An authorised operator approves or rejects with recorded actor/time and reason where required. |
| B02 | While pending or rejected no associated physical execution occurs. |
| B03 | Approval is bound to the specific action identity and material parameters. |
| B04 | Changed target/action or expired request requires renewed approval. |
| B05 | Before dispatch verify the approved request remains current and maintenance, pause where applicable, cooldown, device availability and action-age conditions still permit it. |
| B06 | Approval does not override a prohibition. |
| B07 | Concurrent approve/reject attempts yield one recorded decision. |
| B08 | Subsequent attempts receive current status. |
| B09 | A withheld, expired or cancelled approved request remains visible with reason and does not become an implied failed threat response. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Target/action changes or request expires | Require renewed approval. |
| A restriction blocks an approved request | Withhold dispatch and retain visible reason; approval does not override prohibition. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Pending, approved, rejected, expired and changed-target requests | Only a current permitted approval for the exact action/target can reach execution; changed target or expired request requires renewed approval. |
| AC02 | Concurrent approval/rejection attempts | One decision is recorded; later attempts receive current status. |
| AC03 | Maintenance or cooldown imposed after approval before dispatch | No prohibited command is dispatched. |
| AC04 | Viewer approval attempt and approved identity tracing | Viewer approval is denied; the authorised action identity remains linked through IoT command/result. |
SRS-WFO-104 — Workflow Engine
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-WFO-001; URG-T40-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Persist validated events and evaluate the applicable enabled rule version against agreed event type/time and other approved available inputs.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply priorities and restrictions, then record only, route internally, request human approval or request an authorised action. |
| B02 | Unmatched events are retained without automatic physical action. |
| B03 | Incomplete inputs and unresolved conflicts are held for review. |
| B04 | Group qualifying detections under one active alert without deleting individual events. |
| B05 | The platform owns rules/decisions/cases. |
| B06 | The IoT service delivers identified commands and owns eligible bounded retries. |
| B07 | Rule changes apply to new evaluations, not automatic historical replay. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Matched record-only, review and approved-action fixtures | Selected rule version, event/alert links and action or withheld reasons match the configured route. |
| AC02 | Unmatched, incomplete and conflicting fixtures | Events remain retained; no automatic physical action occurs for unmatched input and incomplete/conflicting inputs are available for review. |
| AC03 | Maintenance and duplicate-event cases, using actual selected-device integration where applicable | Maintenance prohibits activation and duplicate controls preserve the agreed event/action identities. |
SRS-WFO-105 — Structural Process
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-WFO-002; URG-T40-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Persist the chain Event → Validation → Risk Assessment → Decision → Action → Confirmation → Closure with identities and status/reason/time at each applicable stage.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Validation may reject/quarantine incomplete input. |
| B02 | Assessment may show insufficient data. |
| B03 | Decision may be record-only, pending approval, withheld or authorised. |
| B04 | Device commands retain Requested, Sent, Confirmed, Failed, Expired or Unconfirmed distinct from case Open/In Progress/Closed. |
| B05 | Confirmation uses defined device-specific execution evidence. |
| B06 | Successful dispatch or execution does not establish threat resolution. |
| B07 | M3 operators close a case with configured outcome and note, optional evidence. |
| B08 | Record-only events need no artificial physical action or case solely to complete a diagram. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Successful, rejected, pending-approval, failed/unconfirmed and record-only paths | Applicable stage identities, states, reasons and times reconstruct each path without artificial actions/cases. |
| AC02 | Successful command with unresolved threat | Command success neither closes the case by itself nor labels the threat resolved. |
SRS-WFO-106 — Automation and Human-in-the-loop.
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-WFO-003; URG-T40-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Support automated, human-approved and hybrid workflow steps using configured action permissions.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | An approval-required action remains pending until an authorised approval of the specific request. |
| B02 | Rejection/expiry does not execute it. |
| B03 | Automatic steps run only when the rule/action has been explicitly authorised and all required inputs, device availability, event-age, maintenance, pause and cooldown checks pass. |
| B04 | Recheck restrictions at delivery/retry. |
| B05 | Manual commands also respect cooldown, with no initial M3 manual override. |
| B06 | Pause expiry resumes new evaluations without replaying withheld commands. |
| B07 | This architecture does not choose deterrent type, operating hours/limits or an offline/field-safe action policy. |
| B08 | Those remain approval gates for actual actuation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Automatic, pending/approved/rejected, hybrid, expired, paused, maintenance-blocked and cooldown-blocked cases | Each path respects its configured permissions and restrictions. |
| AC02 | Restriction changed between approval and dispatch | The changed restriction is honoured; no prohibited command executes. |
| AC03 | Actual device outcome observation | Evidence is collected only under the agreed controlled test policy. |
SRS-WFO-107 — Decision Guardrail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-003; URG-T53-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Route AI/ML outputs into platform-owned decision rules.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A prediction may create an advisory display or review item. |
| B02 | An operational action is eligible only when its action type, conditions, target scope and mode have been explicitly authorised and enabled. |
| B03 | Retain prediction and rule/version identifiers with the decision, including a blocked/no-action reason. |
| B04 | Apply the existing workflow priorities: maintenance restrictions prohibit activation, unresolved conflicts go to operator review, designated actions require approval, and pauses, cooldowns, device availability and permitted event age continue to apply. |
| B05 | Manual commands also respect cooldowns in initial M3. |
| B06 | The platform requests permitted device actions through the IoT service, which owns delivery retries. |
| B07 | The model never calls devices directly. |
| B08 | The M4 chatbot remains read-only even for an otherwise authorised operator. |
| B09 | New automatic uses require a recorded decision, not merely a high confidence score. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Same prediction with advisory-only, enabled automatic and approval-required rules | Each decision follows the authorised mode and retains prediction/rule-version references. |
| AC02 | Disabled/unconfigured action; maintenance, conflict, pause, cooldown, stale-data or unavailable-device condition | No prohibited command issues and the blocked/no-action reason is retained. |
| AC03 | Permitted device action and chatbot execution attempt | The action passes through platform and IoT service; the read-only chatbot cannot execute it. |
SRS-WFO-108 — Guardrail Configuration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-008; URG-T53-R09 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Expose guardrail thresholds, decision/corroboration rules and approval requirements only to users with the relevant configuration permission.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Proposed initial allocation follows existing rule administration: Administrators configure/enable. |
| B02 | Operators review and exercise authorised operational decisions without acquiring rule-edit permission. |
| B03 | Viewers cannot change controls. |
| B04 | Specialist model-release authority is separately assigned and is not inferred from a job title. |
| B05 | Validate required fields, scales/ranges, references and conflicts before enabling a configuration. |
| B06 | Store the previous and new values, version, actor/time and reason. |
| B07 | Every evaluation retains the version it used. |
| B08 | Changes apply to new evaluations and do not retroactively replay actions. |
| B09 | A configuration with unresolved safety conflicts cannot enable automatic execution. |
| B10 | Ordinary verification checks are required, but this does not add the user-rejected in-product rule-testing feature. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unresolved safety conflict | Do not enable automatic execution. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Administrator, Operator and Viewer configuration attempts | Permission-appropriate changes succeed or are denied, with audit evidence. |
| AC02 | Invalid scale/range, missing approval role or conflicting actions | Invalid configuration is not enabled; unresolved conflicts receive the required review treatment. |
| AC03 | Evaluation before and after an authorised change | Each result retains its version; historical decisions stay unchanged and actions are not replayed. |
SRS-WFO-109 — Human Override
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-HITL-004; URG-T55-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Permit an appropriately authorised user to reject, defer or replace an AI/ML recommendation within the allowed operational workflow and record the original recommendation, chosen treatment, reason, actor/time and linked outcome.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Preserve model output and the override as separate records. |
| B02 | Proposed M3 overrides apply to review/classification and permitted response choices. |
| B03 | M4 operators may accept/dismiss/defer preventive recommendations with reasons. |
| B04 | An override does not confer new permissions or bypass maintenance prohibitions, unsupported device operations, action-age validity or other mandatory restrictions. |
| B05 | Initial M3 manual commands still respect cooldowns. |
| B06 | If the desired response is outside the user’s permission or currently blocked, retain the request/reason for authorised review without executing it. |
| B07 | Overridden recommendations can inform evaluation but do not automatically become ground truth or cause model retraining. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Requested response lacks permission or is blocked | Retain request/reason for authorised review without executing it. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Permitted rejection/replacement and Viewer or otherwise unauthorised attempt | Allowed treatment retains original and revised decisions/reasons; unauthorised treatment is denied. |
| AC02 | Override requesting a maintenance-blocked or cooldown-blocked command | No command executes. |
| AC03 | Permitted response followed to outcome | Workflow/outcome remains traceable separately from prediction correctness. |
SRS-WFO-110 — Automated Preventive Action
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-MLIN-002; URG-T57-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Where explicitly configured and authorised, a qualifying model result can initiate the relevant preventive/mitigation workflow.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Persist links for the full Prediction → Risk Assessment → Decision → Action → Outcome chain, including no-action, rejected, failed or unconfirmed branches. |
| B02 | If the model result already contains the risk assessment, link to that assessment; do not create a second one solely to represent the same result. |
| B03 | Initial preventive logic uses configured risk-to-approved-action rules. |
| B04 | A workflow can present a recommendation/create a permitted follow-up case or request a designated approval. |
| B05 | It does not imply unattended physical execution. |
| B06 | Before any allowed action, recheck rule version, evidence/confidence, authorisation, maintenance, pause, cooldown, age and availability constraints. |
| B07 | Execute device commands only through the IoT service. |
| B08 | The read-only chatbot is not an action trigger and does not gain tool execution through this row. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Configured authorised route; automation disabled; approval denied; safety restriction active | Only the permitted route proceeds, with explicit pending/no-action or blocked treatment for the others. |
| AC02 | Prediction-to-outcome trace | The record links all five stages and identifies any stage that is pending or requires no action. Device commands still follow the required controls. The final outcome is recorded separately from service or device acknowledgement. |
3.2.7 Events and Alerts
Purpose: Retain genuine detections, group qualifying activity into alerts and support traceable Operator handling.
Actors: Operators use the shared queue, acknowledge and review alerts; authorised users inspect evidence; Administrators maintain permitted configuration.
Submodules: Event ingestion; event evidence; classification; grouping; shared queue; acknowledgement; priority; escalation; lifecycle and closure.
Boundaries: Acknowledgement is separate from case ownership. Investigation, assignment or field intervention uses a linked case; a reviewed No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify alert may close without one, with outcome and note. RWD-001–006 are confirmed for drafting only; all requirements remain Proposed for TM review. Alert state representation and remaining transition/grouping details are subject to section 5.3.
PL-EVT-001 — Event records
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
Register events with location, time, source, and supporting evidence.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Known detections received and one retransmitted | Source, time, location and available evidence match the detections; retransmission creates no duplicate event. |
PL-EVT-002 — Alert handling
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
Support duplicate review, prioritisation, notification, and acknowledgement.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Configured grouping, priority, notification, acknowledgement and internal escalation | Handling follows configuration and retains every underlying detection. |
SRS-EVT-001 — Individual detection records
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-001; REQ-INTHW-001/002; REQ-FUNC-090. |
FALCON shall retain each accepted genuine detection as an individually identifiable event with its originating device, event time and location association.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Two distinct detections from one device | Two event records are retrievable, each with its originating device, time and location association. |
SRS-EVT-002 — Original and receipt timestamps
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-001; existing delayed-event drafting decision; REQ-SENS-007. |
FALCON shall retain the original event time separately from the IoT service receipt time.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Delayed event delivery | Original event time and IoT receipt time retain their separate respective values. |
SRS-EVT-003 — Source-event retransmission
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-001/002; supporting refinement of REQ-FUNC-064. |
Retransmission of the same accepted source event shall not create an additional event record.
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Repeated source identity and payload | Retain one event under the adapter-specific identity rule. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Same source identity and payload submitted twice | Only one event record exists, using the identity rules specified per adapter. |
SRS-EVT-004 — Record-only event retention
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-001/002; PL-WFO-001; existing drafting decision. |
For an event evaluated as record-only, FALCON shall retain the event without creating an operator alert notification.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Record-only rule applied | The event remains available and no Operator alert notification is created for it. |
SRS-EVT-005 — New alert creation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-FUNC-060. |
FALCON shall create an alert when an event meets a configured alert rule and does not qualify for an existing active alert’s grouping rule.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Alert-rule match with no eligible active alert | One alert is created and linked to the event. |
SRS-EVT-006 — Cross-device alert grouping
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; existing grouping decision; proposed treatment of REQ-FUNC-064, whose source modality is should. |
| Source modality | REQ-FUNC-064: should; detailed grouping treatment remains Proposed. |
FALCON shall link genuine detections with the same configured event type and location/zone within the grouping window to one eligible active alert, including detections from different devices.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying detections from two devices | One eligible active alert links both separately retained events under SRS-EVT-015; exact boundary, late-arrival and competing-alert rules remain in section 5.3. |
Decisions still required: See DET-029.
SRS-EVT-007 — Alert details and evidence access
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-001/002; REQ-INTUI-004. |
An authorised user shall be able to open an alert and access its linked event details and available evidence.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Authorised user opens a known alert | Device, location, time, category and available evidence links match the originating records. |
SRS-EVT-008 — Acknowledgement audit
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-INTUI-005; REQ-FUNC-063. |
FALCON shall record acknowledgement of an alert with the acknowledging Operator and acknowledgement time.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Operator acknowledgement; Viewer-only acknowledgement attempt | Operator actor/time is recorded; Viewer acknowledgement is denied. |
SRS-EVT-009 — Shared Operator queue
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-FUNC-062; user decision RWD-002. |
FALCON shall present new qualifying M3 alerts in a shared in-application Operator queue.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying new M3 alert before case assignment | Two Operator accounts can find and open the same alert in the shared in-application queue. |
SRS-EVT-010 — Acknowledgement independent of ownership
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-INTUI-005; user decision RWD-002. |
Acknowledging an alert shall record acknowledgement independently of case assignment.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Acknowledgement without a case and with an assigned case | Actor/time is recorded independently; existing case ownership does not change. |
SRS-EVT-011 — Reviewed closure without a case
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-INTUI-005; REQ-FUNC-063; user decision RWD-001. |
An authorised Operator shall be able to close a reviewed alert without a case when the recorded outcome is No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Closure shall require an outcome and note. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Outcome or note missing | Reject closure and preserve previous state. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reviewed alert without a case closed with each permitted outcome and a note | No threat found, Duplicate and Unable to verify each produce Closed status with saved outcome/note. |
| AC02 | Missing outcome or closure note | Closure is rejected and previous alert state is preserved. |
SRS-EVT-012 — Case-required handling
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-CAS-002/005; REQ-FUNC-070; user decision RWD-001. |
Alert handling that requires investigation, assignment or field intervention shall use a linked case.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Investigation, assignment and field-intervention examples | Each handling path uses a case linked to the originating alert. |
SRS-EVT-013 — Case-derived alert ownership
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-CAS-004; REQ-INTUI-005; REQ-FUNC-063; user decision RWD-003. |
An alert linked to a case shall display that case’s responsible Operator and shall not maintain a separate editable alert assignee.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Case assigned/reassigned; alert ownership inspected through UI and API | The alert shows current case ownership and cannot store a separate conflicting editable assignee. |
SRS-EVT-014 — Non-resolution closure outcomes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-CAS-008; REQ-FUNC-063/101; supporting refinement of RWD-001 and the existing outcome distinction. |
Closing an alert as No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify shall not record the threat as addressed or resolved.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Alert closed as No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify | No threat-resolved finding or threats-addressed count is created by any of these outcomes. |
SRS-EVT-015 — Fixed grouping window
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-FUNC-064; user decision RWD-004. |
FALCON shall group qualifying detections within a configurable fixed window starting at the first qualifying detection.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Later detections shall not extend that window. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Test duration W; first qualifying detection t0; matching detection before t0+W | The later detection joins the alert and the grouping end remains t0+W. W is test configuration, not an approved production value. |
SRS-EVT-016 — New detections after closure
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-EVT-002; REQ-FUNC-060/063/064; user decision RWD-005. |
A new qualifying detection occurring after an alert has closed shall create a new alert rather than reopen or modify the closed alert.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | New qualifying detection of the same type/zone after alert closure | A new alert identity is created and closed-alert history is unchanged. Existing-event retransmission follows SRS-EVT-003. |
SRS-EVT-017 — Optional linked-alert closure
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-CAS-006/008; REQ-INTUI-005; REQ-FUNC-063; user decision RWD-006. |
When an Operator closes a case with a linked alert, FALCON shall offer “Also close linked alert”.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | If selected, alert closure shall require the Operator to confirm the alert outcome. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Alert outcome is not confirmed | Do not close the alert; combined-closure transaction policy remains To Confirm. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Case closure with Also close linked alert selected and alert outcome confirmed | The linked alert closes with that confirmed outcome. |
| AC02 | Combined closure without confirmed alert outcome | The alert cannot close. |
Decisions still required: See DET-030.
SRS-EVT-018 — Independent case closure
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | PL-CAS-008; REQ-FUNC-063; user decision RWD-006. |
Closing a case without the Operator selecting “Also close linked alert” shall leave the linked alert in its existing state.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Case closure without Also close linked alert selected | The case closes and the linked alert retains its prior state. |
SRS-EVT-101 — Threat Classification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-INTUI-003; URG-T11-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Every classified observation, alert and risk result carries a threat-family value: Construction, Theft/vandalism, or Animal/rodent.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Display the family as text as well as any visual marker and identify whether the record represents detected activity, assessed historical risk or a future prediction. |
| B02 | Applicable category is derived from approved source mapping or reviewed model/rule output. |
| B03 | An unmapped input remains Unclassified with the raw source label preserved. |
| B04 | Unclassified is a review condition, not a fourth supported threat family. |
| B05 | Administrators may maintain reviewed source-label mappings under configuration control. |
| B06 | Individual operator corrections retain the original value, reason and actor as a proposed audit refinement. |
| B07 | This response does not infer the missing list in REQ-FUNC-011. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unmapped input | Keep Unclassified and the raw label; do not silently invoke a category-specific automatic action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | One accepted example per family, a future-risk result and an unmapped source label | Labels propagate consistently through map, details, alerts and reports; result kind is distinguishable and the raw unmapped label remains visible as Unclassified. |
| AC02 | Unclassified record evaluated for category-specific automatic action | It cannot silently enter that action. |
Decisions still required: See DET-031.
SRS-EVT-102 — Event Details
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-INTUI-004; URG-T11-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
An event detail view exposes event identity, registered device/source, original event time, IoT-service receipt time, threat/type and available evidence, using the applicable deployment/location rather than a relocated device’s current coordinates.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Identity and source | Event identity and registered device/source. |
| Time and location | Original event time, IoT receipt time and applicable event-time deployment/location. |
| Classification and assessment | Threat/category; supplied confidence and risk separately labelled with scale/basis; absent confidence is not zero. |
| Context and evidence | Affected fibre asset, evidence, recommended action and event status where available; unresolved/unavailable data explicit. |
| Related records | Alert, action/command and case links, with their separate states. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Source-provided confidence is optional and absent confidence is not zero. |
| B02 | Show related alert, action/command and case records separately. |
| B03 | Include location, date/time, threat category, detection source, confidence/risk level, affected fibre asset, evidence, recommended action and event status where available. |
| B04 | Confidence and risk are separately labelled with their scale/basis. |
| B05 | Unresolved asset association and unavailable evidence are explicit. |
| B06 | Event receipt/assessment state, alert lifecycle, command state and case outcome must not be collapsed into one status. |
| B07 | Evidence access follows record permissions. |
| B08 | Unavailable media does not erase the event. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Evidence unavailable or denied | Keep the event; show unavailable evidence explicitly and deny unauthorised access. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Full data, absent confidence, absent evidence, unresolved asset and delayed delivery | Fields show their source or explicit absence; confidence is not replaced by zero and record links/states remain distinct. |
| AC02 | Evidence access without permission | Access fails. |
| AC03 | Device relocated after the event | Event detail retains its event-time placement. |
SRS-EVT-103 — Alert Acknowledgement
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-INTUI-005; URG-T11-R06 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
An Operator shall acknowledge an active alert, escalate it with a reason and record a permitted closure outcome and note.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Acknowledgement records the actor/time. |
| B02 | It does not assign ownership. |
| B03 | When investigation, assignment or field intervention is needed, handling shall use a linked case. |
| B04 | The alert shall display the linked case’s responsible Operator without storing a separate alert assignee. |
| B05 | The platform shall reject forbidden or stale concurrent lifecycle updates without overwriting history. |
| B06 | No threat found, Duplicate and Unable to verify permit reviewed closure without a case. |
| B07 | None establishes Threat addressed. |
| B08 | A confirmed command alone shall not resolve or close an alert. |
| B09 | RWD-001–003 and RWD-006 govern the detailed rules below. |
| B10 | This is the proposed case-based interpretation of TM’s alert-assignment obligation and requires TM agreement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Acknowledgement using two Operator accounts; case assignment/reassignment | Actor/time is retained, ownership follows the linked case and no separate alert-assignment field is editable. |
| AC02 | Escalation, no-case closure, Viewer action and stale lifecycle update | Permitted handling succeeds with history; denied or stale updates cannot overwrite it. |
| AC03 | Command completion | The alert does not close solely because the command completed. |
SRS-EVT-104 — Construction Risk Alert
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-022; URG-T16-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
When a validated construction observation satisfies an enabled rule using applicable activity, proximity/zone, asset context and other approved inputs, create or update the qualifying active alert and record the matched rule/version, risk level, supporting events and affected location/asset.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A non-qualifying detection remains recorded. |
| B02 | If required proximity or activity data is missing, flag the assessment for review. Do not automatically classify it as safe or as meeting the alert rule. |
| B03 | Apply agreed type/location/time grouping while preserving individual observations, and route qualifying alerts to internal operator handling. |
| B04 | When investigation, assignment or field intervention is needed, a linked case is required. |
| B05 | Any reuse of an existing case follows the agreed linkage rules. |
| B06 | The source does not authorise a physical intervention. |
| B07 | Any automatic or approved action uses the shared permissions, restrictions and outcome distinctions. |
| B08 | Construction detector availability remains separate from the earlier reusable workflow framework. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Required proximity/activity input missing | Flag review rather than an automatically safe or qualifying result. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approved construction-rule boundaries below/at/above, missing proximity, repeated matches and non-match | Alert count, retained evidence, rule/version and internal queue match the approved rule; missing inputs receive review treatment and no unapproved physical action occurs. |
SRS-EVT-105 — Supporting Evidence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-023; URG-T16-R05 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
Where technically feasible, retain and present image/video, sensor observation, activity location, timestamp, affected fibre route and distance from fibre infrastructure.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record which evidence fields are supplied, calculated, unavailable or failed to retrieve, with source/time and links to the originating event. |
| B02 | A calculated distance carries the spatial basis from URG-T16-R03. |
| B03 | No route or distance is fabricated where geometry is absent. |
| B04 | Event evidence uses the bucket/file reference boundary with authorised access. |
| B05 | Evidence failure is visible on the event and alert and can route an operator to review. |
| B06 | It must not erase the alert or be presented as evidence of no threat. |
| B07 | Preserve original evidence identity and capture time. |
| B08 | Add later evidence as linked material rather than replacing the original silently. |
| B09 | Live viewing is a separate user-requested capability and does not imply retained continuous video. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Evidence failure or absent geometry | Show the limitation, preserve the alert and do not fabricate route/distance or absence of threat. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Full evidence, no camera, unavailable media and no usable distance | Availability reasons and original references remain visible; alerts remain traceable and absent geometry produces no fabricated distance. |
| AC02 | Permission-denied evidence access | Access is denied. |
| AC03 | Captured media/time and calculated distance compared with actual sources | Values and spatial basis reconcile with the sources. |
SRS-EVT-106 — Theft/Vandalism Alert
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-033; URG-T17-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Assess classified activity using an enabled rule and its approved inputs, such as asset context, supported tamper condition, supplied access context, recurrence or corroborating observations where available.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A qualifying result creates/updates a linked alert with severity/risk, rule/version and evidence. |
| B02 | Missing required inputs flag review and do not trigger automatic physical action. |
| B03 | Non-qualifying observations remain accessible. |
| B04 | Consolidate qualifying repeated detections under the approved grouping settings while retaining each device/source observation. |
| B05 | Notify the internal operator queue, support acknowledgement, assignment, escalation and recorded outcome. |
| B06 | Open a case when investigation or field response is required. |
| B07 | Legal/prosecution actions remain outside scope. |
| B08 | No external security/police communication or device action is authorised merely by producing an alert. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Required assessment input missing | Flag review; do not trigger automatic physical action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying, benign/authorised, incomplete-input and repeated-source scenarios | Approved rules determine severity and alert handling; events are preserved, qualifying items reach the internal queue and required handling uses case links. |
| AC02 | Viewer handling attempt and external transmission inspection | Unauthorised action is denied; producing the alert implies no external transmission. |
SRS-EVT-107 — Evidence Capture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-034; URG-T17-R06 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
Where deployed technology supports capture, retain relevant images/clips, sensor observations and other supplied evidence linked to the originating event, source/device, capture time and available location.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Preserve original references and record subsequently added investigation material separately. |
| B02 | Store files in the agreed bucket with metadata/record associations in PostgreSQL. |
| B03 | The source says should and where supported. |
| B04 | No continuous-recording or forensic chain-of-custody certification is implied. |
| B05 | An authorised reviewer can open retained evidence. |
| B06 | Denial, incomplete upload, expired retention or unavailable media is displayed explicitly. |
| B07 | A missing attachment does not delete the event or imply a false alarm. |
| B08 | An operator may close a case using the agreed outcome and note with optional attachments. |
| B09 | Retention/deletion behavior must preserve a traceable record of what evidence is no longer available under approved policy. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Incomplete upload, retention expiry or unavailable media | Show the availability limitation and preserve traceability under approved policy. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Supported selected-device evidence captured and retrieved | Identity/time correlates to the originating event. |
| AC02 | Restricted access and failed retrieval | Denial or unavailability is explicit without deleting the event. |
| AC03 | Later investigation evidence added | Original provenance remains available separately. |
| AC04 | Case closed without an attachment | Required outcome/note remain available and closure succeeds. |
SRS-EVT-108 — Alert Generation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-060; URG-T20-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Record every genuine detection and evaluate applicable enabled rule versions against event type/time window and other approved available conditions.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | An alert-generating match creates or updates the qualifying active alert. |
| B02 | A record-only or unmatched event stays recorded without automatic physical action. |
| B03 | Missing required inputs flags internal review. |
| B04 | Retain the evaluation, matched rules, priority/restrictions and selected/withheld actions. |
| B05 | Rule changes apply to new evaluations without historical replay. |
| B06 | Record a unique decision/result association so retransmission or resumed processing of the same event/rule evaluation cannot create duplicate alerts or duplicate workflow starts. |
| B07 | Genuine repeated detections can join the active alert under the approved grouping policy. |
| B08 | Expose rule-evaluation failure separately from a successful non-match. |
| B09 | Retrying evaluation must not bypass action guards. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Rule evaluation fails | Distinguish failure from a successful non-match; retry does not bypass action guards. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Alert-rule, record-only, unmatched and missing-input fixtures | Alert/evaluation results, input retention and review treatment follow the configured route, retaining applied versions. |
| AC02 | Same processing decision replayed after interruption | Only one alert/workflow start results. |
| AC03 | Genuine repeated detections and unauthorised rule edit | Genuine events remain identifiable and group according to policy; unauthorised rule edits are denied. |
SRS-EVT-109 — Alert Prioritisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-061; URG-T20-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
On qualifying alert generation, apply the configured category/scenario severity or assessed-risk mapping and record its version and basis.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Display readable priority and support queue ordering/filtering. |
| B02 | If no valid mapping exists, flag Needs review rather than assign a fabricated low priority. |
| B03 | Propose ordering by priority and then oldest unresolved qualifying time within an equal-priority group. |
| B04 | Any operator override requires appropriate permission, reason and recorded old/new values. |
| B05 | When new qualifying evidence joins an active alert, re-evaluate priority under the approved rule and retain the change history. |
| B06 | Notification/re-notification remains governed by the separately agreed channel/escalation policy. |
| B07 | Device-command urgency never bypasses maintenance, approval, age or cooldown restrictions. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| No valid priority mapping | Flag Needs review rather than a fabricated low priority. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Different/equal priorities and missing severity | Readable priority, ordering and recorded basis follow the proposed/approved mapping; missing mapping is Needs review. |
| AC02 | Grouped evidence changes priority | Change history is retained without an unapproved notification exception. |
| AC03 | Unauthorised priority override | Override is denied. |
SRS-EVT-110 — Notification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-062; URG-T20-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Qualifying alert notifications appear in the internal system alert queue for the approved operational recipients; an authorised operator can open the alert and acknowledge it.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Configure internal escalation for unacknowledged items. |
| B02 | Email, SMS and other external channels are not included in the initial M3 proposal, and the URG’s approved-channel requirement remains subject to TM acceptance of that channel choice. |
| B03 | Each notification references its alert, intended role/user audience, creation time and applicable rule. |
| B04 | Show new/acknowledged handling state based on recorded user action. |
| B05 | Creation of a queue item is not proof a user read it. |
| B06 | Failures to create/serve notifications remain visible internally and may be retried idempotently without duplicating the same notification. |
| B07 | Read/acknowledgement permissions are checked server-side. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Notification creation/service failure | Keep failure visible internally; retry idempotently without duplicating the same notification. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Alert generated for approved internal audience | Notification reaches the correct queue/audience and opens the right alert. |
| AC02 | Authorised acknowledgement and Viewer attempt | Operator acknowledgement succeeds; Viewer acknowledgement is denied. |
| AC03 | Queue-service failure and recovery | Failure remains visible and recovery creates no duplicate notification. |
| AC04 | Unacknowledged escalation and external-send inspection | Configured internal escalation occurs without unconfigured external sends. |
SRS-EVT-111 — Alert Lifecycle
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-063; URG-T20-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
FALCON shall retain evidence for the source stages Detected, Assessed, Acknowledged, Assigned, Actioned, Resolved and Closed.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | These stages describe operational progress and do not establish seven independent editable alert states. |
| B02 | Acknowledged records attention, Assigned derives from the linked case’s responsible Operator, Actioned records an attempted response, and Resolved requires a recorded finding of Threat addressed. |
| B03 | Preserve applicable actor/time/reason for each stage. |
| B04 | An Operator may close a reviewed alert without a case for No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify with an outcome and note. |
| B05 | Such closure does not manufacture an Assigned, Actioned or Resolved stage. |
| B06 | Case closure alone leaves the alert unchanged. |
| B07 | When the Operator selects “Also close linked alert”, a confirmed alert outcome is required. |
| B08 | If the Operator selects “Also close linked alert” but does not confirm the alert outcome, do not close that alert. |
| B09 | A new qualifying detection after alert closure shall create a new alert. |
| B10 | Closed history is retained. |
| B11 | Case and command states remain separate. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Complete handled path and each permitted no-case closure | Applicable source-stage evidence and case-derived ownership are retained; skipped stages are not fabricated. |
| AC02 | Case closure with and without combined-closure selection | Only selected linked-alert closure with a confirmed outcome closes the alert; absent confirmation cannot close it and no selection leaves it unchanged. |
| AC03 | New qualifying event after closure | A different alert identity is created and closed history remains unchanged. |
Decisions still required: See DET-032.
SRS-EVT-112 — Duplicate Events
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-064; URG-T20-R06 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
Retransmission of the same accepted source event identity shall not create another event record.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Separate genuine detections shall remain individually identifiable with device, time and evidence. |
| B02 | Qualifying detections of the same configured event type and location/zone, including across devices, shall join an eligible active alert within a configurable fixed window starting at its first qualifying detection. |
| B03 | Later detections shall not extend that window. |
| B04 | Outside-window detections and new qualifying detections after closure shall create a new alert. |
| B05 | Where a source has no stable identity, approve a source-specific deduplication key. |
| B06 | Uncertain similarity must not merge distinct detections automatically. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Source has no stable event identity | Agree a source-specific deduplication key; uncertain similarity cannot merge distinct detections automatically. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | One source identity replayed; distinct detections from two devices in configured window | Replay retains one event; genuine detections remain separate and group under one eligible alert without extending its window. |
| AC02 | Outside-window and new post-closure detections | New alerts are created. |
| AC03 | Exact boundary and late-arrival tests before acceptance | Results follow the approved parameter/transition decision; these details are not fixed by this response. |
Decisions still required: See DET-033.
SRS-EVT-113 — Escalation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-074; URG-T21-R06 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Configure escalation conditions for applicable risk/severity and unresolved handling, including an unacknowledged alert or pending operational response past an agreed threshold.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record the triggering condition/time, current alert state, rule/version, intended internal recipient role/user and escalation level. |
| B02 | Create an internal escalation item linked to the same alert. |
| B03 | Do not create a duplicate threat event or mark escalation as resolution. |
| B04 | Acknowledgement alone does not prevent escalation of a still-unresolved high-risk condition if the approved rule requires it. |
| B05 | Propose one escalation record per satisfied stage/alert unless a separately configured repeat condition becomes due. |
| B06 | Re-evaluate closure/resolution before issuing the escalation. |
| B07 | Record cancellation/no-longer-applicable decisions. |
| B08 | Missing or inactive recipients and failed internal notification are visible to an authorised operational administrator. |
| B09 | External email/SMS/security escalation is not enabled by the M3 internal proposal. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Recipient missing/inactive or internal notification fails | Make failure visible to the authorised operational administrator. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Unacknowledged, acknowledged-but-unresolved high-risk and resolved alerts | Escalation follows the approved rule/time basis; stage notification/record is not duplicated and escalation does not resolve the threat. |
| AC02 | Missing recipient and repeated scheduler execution | Recipient failure is visible; one applicable stage record/notification remains unless the configured repeat condition is due. |
| AC03 | Authorised manual escalation and Viewer attempt | Permitted escalation succeeds; Viewer action is denied. |
Decisions still required: See DET-034.
SRS-EVT-114 — Incident History
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-090; URG-T23-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Retain detected threat events, alert/lifecycle history, interventions and imported/reported fibre faults within the agreed scope.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link events to source devices/deployments, alerts to their contributing events, cases/actions to alerts and interventions to originating risks/recommendations where known. |
| B02 | Distinguish imported dockets, separate incidents, detections, alerts and confirmed faults when counting records. Do not automatically count linked records as separate occurrences. |
| B03 | Include original/receipt/recorded times and source/batch references as applicable. |
| B04 | Keep significant actor/time actions, assignments, configuration, command results and closure changes traceable. |
| B05 | Device relocation preserves prior coordinates, deployment dates and associated events under PL-DEV-003. |
| B06 | Closing a case/alert does not delete its evidence or rewrite outcome. |
| B07 | Corrections retain history. |
| B08 | PostgreSQL stores structured records and the bucket stores associated files. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Imported fault/source, detection, alert, case, command and intervention chain; subsequent closure/correction and device relocation | Original associations and actor/time history remain queryable with correct event-time location. |
| AC02 | Counts by record type and permission/retention checks | Counts reconcile without conflating record concepts; access and evidence-availability limitations are explicit. |
Decisions still required: See DET-035.
SRS-EVT-115 — Additional Threats
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-REX-002; URG-T47-R03 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
The architecture should support additional fibre fault causes/threat scenarios through a versioned taxonomy, declared observation/features, model/rule definition, risk explanation and action mapping, with historical unknown/retired types preserved.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A new threat must provide representative evidence, ground truth/metrics, required input fields and authorised response conditions before enablement. |
| B02 | Unsupported types may be retained for review rather than silently mapped to a known threat or automatically actuated. |
| B03 | Extensibility is a design capability. |
| B04 | It does not add unrequested threat implementation or waive existing three-family coverage. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unsupported threat type | May be retained for review rather than silently mapped to a known threat or automatically actuated. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative test-only threat definition/adapter fixture | Storage, display and routing work without core-schema redesign. |
| AC02 | Unknown or invalid type | Record remains visible and cannot bypass approval controls. |
SRS-EVT-116 — Escalation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-HITL-003; URG-T55-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Configure escalation conditions and recipients for risk level, confidence, threat severity, location criticality, repeated detection and absence of operator acknowledgement, singly or in agreed combinations.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each enabled rule record trigger, time basis, recipient/role, notification method and audit/result. |
| B02 | Proposed M3 delivery uses internal system notifications and links escalated items to the existing alert/case. |
| B03 | Escalation does not itself authorise physical action. |
| B04 | Retain every genuine detection even when an alert is grouped. |
| B05 | Repeated detections may contribute to escalation under the configured policy. |
| B06 | Confidence-based escalation may route uncertain events for review rather than increase risk indiscriminately. |
| B07 | Maintain acknowledgement separately from case resolution. |
| B08 | If an intended recipient is unavailable or notification fails, show the pending/failed status and retain it for authorised operational review. |
| B09 | Notification timings remain To Confirm. External SMS/email channels require separate agreement. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Recipient unavailable or notification fails | Show pending/failed status for authorised review; do not fabricate receipt. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | All six configured escalation factors, including grouped repeats and missing acknowledgement | Recipient permissions, internal notification and status are traceable under the configured policy. |
| AC02 | Acknowledgement | It neither closes the case nor authorises physical action. |
| AC03 | Notification delivery failure | Pending/failed unresolved status is visible without fabricated receipt. |
3.2.8 Active Deterrent Control
Purpose: Request permitted deterrent actions and distinguish device execution evidence from observed intervention outcomes.
Actors: Authorised requesters and Operators initiate permitted actions; the platform checks restrictions; the IoT service and selected hardware deliver commands and feedback.
Submodules: Command catalogue; authorised activation; device confirmation; retry and expiry; operating limits; stop and fault handling.
Boundaries: Selected hardware determines supported commands, stop/fault behaviour and physical confirmation. IoT owns eligible bounded delivery retries. Service receipt, dispatch and physical confirmation do not establish threat resolution. Device-specific limits remain To Confirm.
FE-DET-001 — Supported hardware commands
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Connect the selected intervention hardware and define its supported commands and feedback.
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unsupported command | Reject the command. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Every agreed command exercised on selected hardware; unsupported command attempted | Supported feedback reconciles to the interface catalogue and unsupported commands are rejected. |
FE-DET-002 — Activation authority
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Define who or what may request activation, and under which conditions.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Authorised, denied-actor, pending-approval and prohibited-condition requests | Only an approved permitted request reaches dispatch. |
FE-DET-003 — Operating limits and stop controls
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Define permitted operating limits, stop controls, and behaviour when conditions are unsuitable or a fault occurs.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Agreed stop, duration, repetition, cooldown and fault boundaries under controlled conditions | Selected limits and observed hardware behaviour are retained for comparison. |
FE-DET-004 — Execution and intervention outcomes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Distinguish requested, executed, failed and observed intervention outcomes.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Requested, dispatched, confirmed, failed and unconfirmed commands compared with intervention outcomes | Execution states and observed intervention outcomes remain separate; no automatic effectiveness claim is made. |
SRS-DET-001 — Correlated command execution
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
Each authorised action request shall have one logical command ID through platform, IoT service and supported device acknowledgements.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | IoT shall own bounded delivery retries. |
| B02 | The platform shall not independently retry the same physical action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Acknowledgement interrupted under selected safe retry policy using actual equipment | Dispatch attempts reconcile to one logical command ID, bounded IoT retries and verified duplicate-execution control. |
SRS-DET-002 — Execution evidence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall distinguish Requested, Sent, Confirmed, Failed, Expired and Unconfirmed command outcomes.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Service receipt or dispatch shall not be shown as confirmed physical execution. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Physical execution evidence missing | Do not show service receipt/dispatch as Confirmed execution. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Accepted, dispatched, physically confirmed, failed, expired and missing-acknowledgement cases | Displayed Requested, Sent, Confirmed, Failed, Expired and Unconfirmed states agree with evidence; receipt/dispatch is not physical confirmation. |
SRS-DET-003 — Stop and fault response
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
For each selected deterrent, document and implement the approved stop control, activation duration limits, fault response and unsuitable-condition restrictions before enabling operational use.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | A remote stop request shall not be shown as executed without the required device evidence. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Remote stop requested without required device evidence | Do not show stop as executed. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Approved controlled activation, stop and fault cases on selected device | Command IDs, measured duration and required physical confirmation are retained against approved controls; device-specific limits remain To Confirm. |
Decisions still required: See DET-036.
3.2.9 Case Management
Purpose: Manage investigation, assigned response, field reports and closure with a recorded outcome.
Actors: Operators own cases, assign field work, review results and close cases. Field Team members record progress and evidence for assigned work from M3. Administrators manage closure outcomes.
Submodules: Case creation and links; responsible Operator; field mobilisation; action/evidence records; outcomes; closure; feedback.
Boundaries: Initial case states are Open, In Progress and Closed. One responsible Operator is recorded on an assigned case with reassignment history. Closure requires outcome and note, with optional attachments. Case closure leaves a linked alert unchanged unless the Operator selects Also close linked alert and confirms its outcome; transaction details remain To Confirm.
PL-CAS-001 — End-to-end case handling
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
Support verification, action assignment, field evidence capture, and case closure with a recorded outcome.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | End-to-end execution of PL-CAS-002–008 | Each child acceptance criterion has retained lifecycle evidence. |
PL-CAS-002 — Case creation and alert links
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
Create a case linked to originating alerts/events when investigation, assignment or field intervention is required; configured agreed high-severity rules may create cases automatically.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Record-only event; manually created case; agreed high-severity automatic rule | Record-only handling needs no case; created cases link their originating alerts/events without silently closing an alert. |
PL-CAS-003 — Case states
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
Support Open, In Progress and Closed case states, retaining transition history.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative Open, In Progress and Closed lifecycle | Transition history is retained; reopening and automatic closure policy remain To Confirm. |
Decisions still required: See DET-037.
PL-CAS-004 — Responsible Operator and reassignment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
Maintain one responsible operator per assigned case and retain reassignment history.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Keep the responsible Operator separate from the Field Team assigned to carry out work. |
| B02 | Record field assignment and reassignment history without changing the responsible Operator or the owner shown on a linked alert. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Case assigned then reassigned | One current responsible Operator is distinguishable from previous assignment history. |
| AC02 | Assign or reassign field work | Field assignment history changes; case ownership and the linked alert owner still identify the responsible Operator. |
PL-CAS-005 — Field-response recording
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
Allow Field Team members to report assigned work directly from M3. Operators assign the work and review its results.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Show Field Team members their assigned work and the information needed to perform it. |
| B02 | Allow assigned members to record progress, work performed, evidence and completion details. |
| B03 | Keep the person who performed the work separate from the user who recorded it. Operators may also record reported field actions. |
| B04 | Submit completion details to the responsible Operator for review. Submission does not close the case or confirm that the threat was addressed. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Assigned Field Team member submits progress, evidence and completion details | Records retain the performer, recording user and time; the responsible Operator can review them. |
| AC02 | Operator records work reported by a field responder | The record distinguishes the performer from the Operator who entered it. |
| AC03 | Field Team submits completion or attempts case closure | Completion is available for review. The case retains its current Open or In Progress state; Field Team closure is denied. |
PL-CAS-006 — Closure outcome and note
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
An authorised Operator reviews submitted field results before closing the case. Closure requires an outcome and note; attachments are optional.
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Required closure information missing | Reject closure; attachments remain optional. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Closure with outcome/note and no attachment | Closure succeeds. |
| AC02 | Missing outcome/note; optional evidence supplied | Missing required information prevents closure; supplied evidence stays linked. |
| AC03 | Field completion submitted, then reviewed by an authorised Operator | Submission alone does not close the case. The Operator can close it after review with the required outcome and note. |
PL-CAS-007 — Closure-outcome configuration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
Allow Administrators to maintain closure outcomes and retire unused outcomes while preserving historical records.
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Outcome retired | Preserve the meaning of historical case records. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Closure outcome retired | Prior closed cases retain their recorded meaning. |
| AC02 | Unprivileged configuration change | Change is denied. |
PL-CAS-008 — Command case and threat distinctions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Decomposition of PL-CAS-001 and its existing refinements, 9 October 2026. |
Keep command dispatch, confirmed execution, case closure and threat-resolution outcome distinct.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Sent/confirmed commands and Duplicate/Unable to verify closures | Commands do not automatically resolve cases; these closure outcomes do not count as Threat addressed. |
SRS-CAS-101 — Operator Feedback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-HITL-002; URG-T55-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Capture structured feedback and recorded operational outcomes linked to prediction, model/version, alert/case and action where applicable.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Proposed feedback fields | Feedback type; accepted/rejected/corrected assessment; reason; author/time; evidence reference; outcome status. |
| Links where applicable | Prediction, model/version, alert/case and action. |
| Initial case outcomes | Threat addressed; No threat found; Duplicate; Unable to verify. |
| Closure support | Operator note required; attachments optional; classification feedback separate. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Proposed fields include feedback type, accepted/rejected/corrected assessment, reason, author/time, evidence reference and outcome status. |
| B02 | Preserve “Unable to verify” and incomplete observation as uncertainty instead of converting them into false alarms or successful prevention. |
| B03 | Use the initial case outcomes Threat addressed, No threat found, Duplicate and Unable to verify with operator notes and optional attachments. |
| B04 | Keep classification feedback separate. |
| B05 | Make reviewed feedback available for error analysis and, where appropriate, a validated retraining dataset. |
| B06 | Initial feedback need not trigger automatic model learning. |
| B07 | Later intervention outcomes also link to recommendations and risk history. |
| B08 | A before/after change is not automatically attributed to the intervention. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Unable to verify or incomplete observation | Preserve uncertainty rather than labelling a false alarm or successful prevention. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Feedback with and without optional evidence | Original output/version and author/time remain linked. |
| AC02 | Duplicate and Unable to verify cases | Neither silently becomes a labelled positive/negative. |
| AC03 | Validated correction and unreviewed correction | The validated correction can enter analysis data; unreviewed correction remains excluded from automatic training. |
SRS-CAS-102 — Outcome Feedback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLIN-003; URG-T57-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
Capture the observed result of a preventive/mitigation action and link it to its original prediction, risk assessment, decision and action.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Action and responsibility | Action/date and responsible party. |
| Observation | Result/outcome, observation period, reporter/time, uncertainty and available evidence. |
| Origin | Original prediction, risk assessment, decision and action. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record action/date, responsible party, result/outcome, observation period, reporter/time, uncertainty and available evidence. |
| B02 | M3 operators record field-reported outcomes using the case workflow. |
| B03 | Field staff need no accounts and attachments remain optional. |
| B04 | Make linked records available for performance assessment, false-positive/false-negative analysis, operational effectiveness review and future model improvement. |
| B05 | These analyses apply only when the recorded outcome supports the relevant inference. |
| B06 | “Unable to verify” remains unknown. |
| B07 | A threat prevented by an intervention is not automatically a false-positive prediction because no later incident occurred. |
| B08 | A closed case or command confirmation alone is not proof of prevention. |
| B09 | Include observed incidents with no preceding prediction in missed-event analysis when the monitoring coverage supports that comparison. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Outcome does not support the analytic inference | Exclude unsupported truth labels; Unable to verify remains unknown. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Completed, ineffective and Unable to verify action outcomes | Each traces to its prediction, retains reporter/time and optional evidence handling, and distinguishes execution from outcome. |
| AC02 | Outcome analytics and eligible missed incident without prior prediction | Unsupported truth labels are excluded; missed-event analysis includes the incident where monitoring coverage permits comparison. |
| AC03 | Effectiveness comparison | Recorded limitations remain visible. |
3.2.10 Preventive Actions and Mobilisation
Purpose: Turn reviewed risks into preventive recommendations, record mobilisation and interventions, and support outcome review.
Actors: Operators accept, dismiss or defer recommendations and record responding parties and reported work; authorised users maintain the relevant rules and action catalogue.
Submodules: Recommendation rules; supporting evidence; accept/dismiss/defer; mobilisation; intervention history; before/after review.
Boundaries: Detailed scheduling, rostering and equipment allocation remain separately Proposed; basic resource mobilisation and recorded intervention outcomes do not imply those functions. Recommendation acceptance, dismissal and deferral retain actor/time/reason. Recorded mobilisation does not prove an external party accepted or was dispatched; before/after change does not establish causation.
PL-PRV-001 — Additional detailed work planning
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01; additional proposed detailed planning functions, separately assessed below. |
Support scheduling inspections or protective work and assigning responsible teams and required resources.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Additional planning proposal adopted; representative work scheduled | Team/resource assignments match the entered plan; scope and allocation remain To Confirm until agreed. |
Decisions still required: See DET-038.
PL-PRV-002 — Preventive recommendations
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | REQ-FUNC-080, URG-T22-R02; user refinement, 8 October 2026. |
Recommend preventive actions based on identified risk, with affected asset/location, reason, supporting incidents/risk and priority.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Risk condition matches configured recommendation rule | Suggested action, affected location, priority and supporting records are shown. |
PL-PRV-003 — Recommendation decisions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Supporting refinement of REQ-FUNC-080/081; user agreement, 8 October 2026. |
Support operator acceptance, dismissal or deferral of recommendations with recorded reasons, and creation of a linked follow-up case on acceptance where needed.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recommendation accepted, dismissed and deferred | Decision/reason history is retained; any created follow-up case links to its accepted recommendation. |
PL-PRV-004 — Resource mobilisation records
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | REQ-FUNC-073, URG-T21-R05 (source modality should); user refinement, 8 October 2026. |
| Source modality | should |
Support mobilisation records identifying responding team/contact, requested action and mobilisation status.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Mobilisation record entered | Team/contact, requested action and mobilisation status link to relevant follow-up work. |
PL-PRV-005 — Intervention history
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | REQ-FUNC-081, URG-T22-R03; user refinement, 8 October 2026. |
Record intervention action, date, responsible party and outcome with links to originating risk/recommendation and optional evidence.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Intervention recorded with and without optional evidence | Action, date, responsible party and outcome trace to originating risk/recommendation. |
PL-PRV-006 — Before-and-after review
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | REQ-FUNC-082, URG-T22-R04 (source modality should); user refinement, 8 October 2026. |
| Source modality | should |
Support operator review of incident/risk history before and after an intervention without assuming causation.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Representative before/after periods compared | Values reconcile to source records; coverage and limitations are visible without an automatic causal claim. |
SRS-PRV-101 — Resource Mobilisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-073; URG-T21-R05 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
The solution should support mobilisation based on event type/severity by recording the responding team/contact, requested action and mobilisation status linked to the alert/case/recommendation.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Core record | Responding team/contact, requested action, mobilisation status and link to alert/case/recommendation. |
| Proposed state record | Requested, Accepted, In progress, Completed or Cancelled; actor/time, responding party, requested work and linked outcome. |
| Potential resources | Field workforce, patrol teams, drones, security personnel, network operations teams or relevant third parties, as applicable. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Operators record mobilisation requests and assign field work. They review submitted results and record the case outcome. |
| B02 | From M3, Field Team members use their accounts to update assigned work and submit evidence and completion details. |
| B03 | Detailed calendars, personnel rostering and equipment allocation remain the separate PL-PRV-001 additional proposal, not implied mandatory scope. |
| B04 | Propose mobilisation states Requested, Accepted, In progress, Completed and Cancelled, with actor/time, responding party, requested work and linked outcome. |
| B05 | Acceptance/completion is recorded only when reported, not inferred from a saved request. |
| B06 | Resource type may represent field workforce, patrol teams, drones, security personnel, network operations teams or relevant third parties as applicable. |
| B07 | These are potential resources and do not mandate procurement, drone control or direct third-party messaging. |
| B08 | A FALCON record of mobilisation is not evidence that an external party was dispatched or accepted a commitment. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying event mobilisation with applicable resource type and reported acceptance/progress/completion | Record history preserves responding party and reported status; requested and accepted/completed counts remain distinct. |
| AC02 | Another mobilisation cancelled; external-send/device inspection | Cancellation is retained without implying external transmission or a drone command. |
Decisions still required: See DET-039.
SRS-PRV-102 — Preventive Action Recommendation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-080; URG-T22-R02 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
Use configurable rules linking reviewed risk conditions to approved preventive action types.
| Field / record | Specification |
|---|---|
| Recommendation | Asset/location, suggested action, reason, supporting incidents/risk assessment and priority. |
| Action catalogue | Applicability, prerequisites and permission/approval boundary for each action. |
| Operator decision | Accept, dismiss or defer with reason; linked follow-up case when needed. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Each recommendation shows asset/location, suggested action, reason, supporting incidents/risk assessment and priority. |
| B02 | An operator accepts, dismisses or defers with a reason. |
| B03 | Acceptance can create a linked follow-up case when needed. |
| B04 | Initial recommendations need not be AI-generated and do not authorise physical execution simply by being accepted. |
| B05 | The catalogue can include site inspection, patrol, camera deployment, sensor deployment, rodent deterrent, physical protection, fibre route inspection and other approved preventive measures. |
| B06 | Record each action’s applicability, prerequisites and permission/approval boundary. |
| B07 | Avoid duplicate active recommendations for the same assessment/action. |
| B08 | Preserve prior accepted/dismissed/deferred decisions when a new assessment arrives and show its new basis rather than overwrite the old decision. |
| B09 | Missing risk inputs or no eligible action yields an explained review/no-recommendation result. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing risk input or no eligible action | Provide an explained review/no-recommendation result. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reviewed risk condition produces applicable recommendation | Required recommendation fields and supporting source links are present. |
| AC02 | Accept, dismiss and defer with reasons; follow-up case selected | Decisions/reasons are retained and selected case links to the recommendation. |
| AC03 | Same/new assessment refreshed | Active recommendation duplication is controlled and prior decisions/new basis remain distinguishable. |
| AC04 | Unavailable prerequisite and unauthorised catalogue edit | Ineligible action receives an explained review/no-recommendation result; unauthorised edit is denied. |
SRS-PRV-103 — Intervention Tracking
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-081; URG-T22-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
For preventive work taken in response to risk, an authorised operator records the action actually performed, its date, responsible party, reported outcome and links to the originating risk/recommendation and case where present.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Evidence attachments are optional. |
| B02 | Preserve requested/accepted work separately from performed work. |
| B03 | A planned action or sent deterrent command is not automatically a completed intervention or a resolved threat. |
| B04 | Propose retaining creator/time, source of the reported field outcome and change history with correction reason. |
| B05 | Allow a performed action to be recorded even when no earlier recommendation exists, linking the relevant risk/event where known and identifying absent origin. |
| B06 | A completed intervention may reference one or more device-command attempts as evidence, but manual confirmation and physical outcome remain distinguishable. |
| B07 | Administrators/viewers do not acquire operational edit permission solely through read access. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recommended and unplanned reported interventions | Each retains performed action/date/party/outcome and available origin link; absent prior recommendation is identified. |
| AC02 | Optional attachment and correction | Attachment is optional; correction history and reason remain distinguishable from requested work/command status. |
| AC03 | Completed intervention report reconciled | Counts derive from recorded completed interventions. |
SRS-PRV-104 — Effectiveness Monitoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-082; URG-T22-R04 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution should support an operator reviewing incident/risk history before and after a recorded intervention, linked to the affected asset/location and intervention date.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Show relevant incidents, assessment versions, observation coverage and available outcomes. |
| B02 | Preserve the operator’s conclusion and limitations. |
| B03 | A reduction after work is an observed association, not proof that the work caused it. |
| B04 | Propose selectable before/after periods showing incident counts and, only where monitored exposure duration is known, comparable rates. |
| B05 | Display period lengths, data gaps, changed detector/deployment/model conditions and unavailable evidence. |
| B06 | Do not silently compare unequal observation coverage or treat missing post-intervention data as zero incidents. |
| B07 | A reassessed risk score is labelled separately from observed fault/event outcomes. |
| Exception / condition | Required handling |
|---|---|
| Missing post-intervention data | Do not treat it as zero incidents or a confirmed reduction. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Complete history, unequal periods, coverage outage and changed device/model conditions | Displayed counts/rates reconcile; coverage, comparison limitations and changed conditions remain visible. |
| AC02 | No data after intervention | No confirmed reduction is shown. |
| AC03 | Operator conclusion recorded | Conclusion and limitations remain attributed to the Operator. |
3.2.11 Reporting and Performance Review
This module supports operational and management review of recorded alerts, incidents, responses, outcomes and device availability. Authorised operational users review their permitted site and date scope; management users may use the existing Viewer role to inspect maps, dashboards and reports.
Submodules: Event/alert summaries; case outcomes; device availability; trends and hotspots; management view; Excel/PDF exports.
Boundaries: Reports use traceable source records and distinguish historical facts from predictive results. M3 downloads are Excel and PDF. AI operator summaries are a separate M4 proposal, and preventive-effectiveness components follow their M4 delivery. A closed case, dispatched command or confirmed device activation does not establish that a threat was addressed or an incident prevented.
PL-RPT-001 — Operational summaries and exports
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-01 |
Report agreed measures of alert quality, response, completed work and recurring incidents from traceable operational records.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Present the agreed measures for the selected site and date scope. |
| B02 | Retain traceability from reported measures to contributing events, cases and outcomes. |
| B03 | Provide Excel and PDF output for the selected scope. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Filter representative site/date records and produce Excel/PDF output. | Displayed and exported measures reconcile with the contributing events, cases and outcomes. |
Decisions still required: See DET-040.
SRS-RPT-101 — Trend Analysis
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-091; URG-T23-R03 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution should show historical trends by selected period and site/location, including recurring threat categories and high-risk periods.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Aggregate eligible historical records by the selected period and site/location. |
| B02 | Provide readable category/location breakdowns and links to contributing records; selectable time buckets suited to the available history are proposed. |
| B03 | Label the measure being counted as detections, distinct incidents, alerts or confirmed faults. |
| B04 | Group occurrence trends by original event/incident occurrence time and disclose delayed-entry and source limitations. |
| B05 | Show the selected time basis, coverage period, missing intervals, unmatched/unclassified counts and material detector, deployment or method changes. |
| B06 | Compare periods using like-for-like definitions. |
| B07 | Present future predictions separately from historical incident records. |
Exceptions: Zero means no eligible records within known coverage; it does not demonstrate absence where coverage is unknown. Disclose unknown occurrence times and any exclusions from time buckets.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review known recurring locations, threat types and periods. | Buckets and drill-down reconcile with the raw reviewed dataset. |
| AC02 | Include delayed imports and unknown occurrence times. | Known occurrence times determine occurrence grouping; limitations and exclusions are explicit. |
| AC03 | Include a monitoring gap and changed monitoring methods. | Coverage limitations and material changes remain visible; unknown coverage is not represented as evidence of no incidents. |
| AC04 | Compare periods and include predictive results. | Comparable definitions are used and predictions remain separate from historical counts. |
Decisions still required: See DET-041.
SRS-RPT-102 — Operational Reporting
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-100; URG-T24-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall provide source-based operational reports filtered by date and site, with corresponding Excel and PDF downloads.
| Output or definition | Required content |
|---|---|
| Operational summary | Events/alerts, case statuses/outcomes, device availability and historical hotspots; predictive results identified separately. |
| Indicator definition | Entity counted, inclusion/exclusion rules, time field, filter semantics and denominator where relevant. |
| Proposed report metadata | Generation time, data cutoff/period, filters and metric version. |
| Download scope | Selected site/date scope and the same authorised data scope as the report. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply the selected date/site filters to the report and its downloads. |
| B02 | Use one consistent snapshot so on-screen, Excel and PDF totals reconcile. |
| B03 | Derive case outcomes from recorded evidence; do not treat every closed case as Threat addressed or imply prevention from closure. |
| B04 | Display unknown values and coverage gaps, including device status that cannot be verified during an IoT-service outage. |
| B05 | Enforce download authorisation and exclude unprotected evidence links from downloads. |
| B06 | Keep the separate M4 AI operator-summary proposal distinct from these source-based reports. |
Exceptions: Unknown, zero and unavailable values retain their different meanings. Availability calculations must not conceal unknown/offline states or service outages. No percentage target is established by this requirement.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile each filtered indicator against reviewed source records and export Excel/PDF. | Totals match across the report and exports; headers, scope and applicable metadata are readable. |
| AC02 | Include unknown/zero/unavailable values, case closures and an IoT-service outage. | Calculations and labels preserve those distinctions; closure does not imply Threat addressed or prevention. |
| AC03 | Attempt an unauthorised download and direct-file access. | Access is denied and protected evidence is not exposed through unprotected links. |
Decisions still required: See DET-042.
SRS-RPT-103 — Threat Reporting
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-101; URG-T24-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall allow authorised users to filter and group threat reports across the six specified dimensions while preserving distinct counts and source traceability.
| Dimension | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| Threat category | Preserve category definitions and show unclassified threats. |
| Geographical location | Preserve location information and show missing locations. |
| Time period | Retain the selected reporting period. |
| Severity/risk | Identify the source/method of each measure; do not silently equate the scales. |
| Affected infrastructure | Retain infrastructure relationships and show unresolved assets. |
| Outcome | Use recorded findings, closure or interventions; show unavailable outcomes. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Support filtering and grouping by all six dimensions without discarding records with missing dimension values. |
| B02 | Preserve category/level definitions and label severity and risk according to their source/method. |
| B03 | Derive outcomes from recorded findings, closure and interventions rather than command dispatch. |
| B04 | State the base measure and use distinct entity identities for totals. |
| B05 | Provide drill-down showing the relationships between contributing records. |
| B06 | Where a record spans multiple dimensions, disclose non-additive groupings as a proposed reporting treatment; overlapping groups must not be summed as a unique incident total. |
| B07 | Retain selected dimensions, filters, period and unknown categories in Excel/PDF exports using the display snapshot. |
Exceptions: Missing location, unresolved asset, unclassified threat and unavailable outcome remain explicit report categories. Several linked alerts or actions do not automatically constitute several distinct incidents.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Use records covering all six dimensions and missing fields. | Filters/groupings operate as defined and unknown categories remain visible. |
| AC02 | Include linked alerts/actions and an incident affecting multiple infrastructure records. | Distinct totals reconcile with source identities; overlapping groups are disclosed. |
| AC03 | Export the selected report in Excel/PDF and inspect drill-down. | Dimensions, filters, period, unknown categories and totals reconcile with the same source snapshot. |
Decisions still required: See DET-043.
SRS-RPT-104 — Management View
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-102; URG-T24-R04 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
The management view should present six management topics with defined scope, freshness and supporting-record drill-down.
| Topic | Proposed initial measure or treatment |
|---|---|
| Overall risk exposure | Eligible assessed locations by risk level. |
| Incidents detected | Distinct detected incidents under the agreed counting rule. |
| Incidents prevented | Not established until TM agrees an evidential definition; separately show recorded Threat addressed outcomes and completed preventive interventions. |
| Response performance | Acknowledgement, action and closure elapsed times where timestamps exist. |
| High-risk locations | Ranked hotspots supported by source records. |
| Emerging threats | Newly observed or increasing categories under an approved comparison rule. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Show scope/period, data freshness, source-based breakdowns and supporting-record drill-down. |
| B02 | Label unknown or unavailable metrics rather than estimating unsupported values. |
| B03 | Keep recorded Threat addressed outcomes and completed preventive interventions separate from any claim of incidents prevented. |
| B04 | Assess emerging threats using agreed comparison periods, monitoring coverage and criteria; a newly connected sensor or new classification does not by itself establish an emerging threat. |
| B05 | Allow management users to be assigned the existing Viewer role; job title creates neither a new role nor additional permissions. |
| B06 | Require existing operational permissions for operational actions. |
| B07 | Apply the M3 Excel/PDF download contract and the M4 delivery allocation for preventive-effectiveness components; show incomplete later measures as unavailable in earlier releases. |
Exceptions: Device activation and absence of later detections do not prove prevention. Missing timestamps, unverified closure and absent prevention evidence cannot support a prevented-incident count.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review all six topics and reconcile available measures. | Each topic is represented and each available measure traces to its defined source records. |
| AC02 | Include unknown timestamps, unverified closure and no prevention evidence. | Unsupported measures remain unknown/unavailable; no example becomes a prevented incident. |
| AC03 | Access the view as a Viewer and attempt an operational action. | Review access follows the Viewer role and the action is denied. |
| AC04 | Compare genuine changes with changes caused by a new sensor or classification. | Emerging-threat criteria distinguish the changes in monitored threats from changes in monitoring sources. |
Decisions still required: See DET-044.
3.2.12 Audit History
This module enables authorised reviewers to reconstruct operational changes, workflow decisions and AI/ML results. Users, services, devices and adapters supply identifiable actions or source references; authorised reviewers search and export the resulting history.
Submodules: User/action audit; import/configuration history; event-to-outcome trace; model/decision trace; authorised review.
Boundaries: Business audit history remains distinct from diagnostic logs. Source, platform, transport and correlation identities retain their separate meanings. A command result, a physical device result and an operator-assessed threat outcome are different stages of evidence. Retention, protected-data handling and critical-action logging-failure policy require agreement.
SH-AUD-001 — Traceable operational changes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
Record who or what performed each significant operational action, when it occurred and which record it affected.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Identify the user or service responsible for the significant action. |
| B02 | Record the action time and affected record. |
| B03 | Cover representative import, configuration, approval, command, assignment and closure actions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Perform the listed significant actions. | Actor, time and affected-record audit evidence can be retrieved for each action. |
SRS-AUD-101 — Audit Trail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-004; URG-T26-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall retain linked audit entries for significant security and operational actions, including their failed or rejected outcomes.
| Audit content | Specification |
|---|---|
| Covered actions | Account/security administration; imports and disposition; configuration/rule versions; approvals/rejections; commands and each returned status; pauses; assignments/reassignments; closure/outcome changes; live-view start/stop/timeout. |
| Entry identity | Actor or service, action, affected record and correlation ID. |
| Entry timing | UTC occurrence time and recording time. |
| Result and change | Outcome and changed version or redacted change details. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record each covered action and its outcome using the specified audit content. |
| B02 | Link asynchronous command results to the original request. |
| B03 | Restrict audit search/export and preserve historical labels and versions. |
| B04 | Prevent normal application-role update/delete of audit entries through the proposed application permission controls. |
| B05 | Surface logging failures and apply the agreed critical-action policy; do not silently report audit completion. |
Exceptions: Failed and rejected actions remain auditable. A logging failure must remain distinguishable from a successfully recorded action.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Perform every listed significant action, including rejection/failure and asynchronous command results. | Each action has a retrievable linked entry; returned command statuses link to the request. |
| AC02 | Attempt audit edits with normal application roles and inspect changed rules/outcomes. | Edits are denied and historical meanings remain reconstructable. |
| AC03 | Review audit and permission-test evidence. | Redacted extracts demonstrate the required fields, access controls and historical links. |
Decisions still required: See DET-045.
SRS-AUD-102 — Event Logging
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-OBS-002; URG-T29-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall provide protected structured diagnostic logs for component activity and operational faults without replacing business audit history.
| Log content | Specification |
|---|---|
| Covered events | Component start/stop; input validation; event/alert creation; rule/workflow transition; command dispatch/result; access failures; job completion/failure; recovery. |
| Required fields | Timestamp, component/version, severity, correlation ID, operation/result and bounded error code/context. |
| Repeated events | Retained counts and first/last occurrence while repetitive volume is limited. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Produce structured logs for the covered events using the required fields. |
| B02 | Keep diagnostic logs separate from audit records so rotation cannot erase required business history. |
| B03 | Limit repetitive log volume while retaining repetition counts and first/last occurrence. |
| B04 | Protect logs and redact credentials, unnecessary personal information and full media payloads. |
| B05 | Expose logging-pipeline failure as an observable operational fault. |
Exceptions: Repeated faults must not cause unbounded growth or lose their aggregate occurrence evidence. Logging interruption remains visible as a gap or fault.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace successful and failed end-to-end flows. | Readable, linked structured records cover the relevant operations without exposing credentials. |
| AC02 | Induce repeated errors and a logging interruption. | Repetition is bounded with counts/first/last occurrence retained, and interruption is observable. |
| AC03 | Inspect redacted examples, rotation configuration and gap indicators. | Diagnostic rotation preserves required business history and protected content remains redacted. |
SRS-AUD-103 — Traceability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-OBS-003; URG-T29-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall preserve event identities and correlation links across applicable processing stages so reviewers can reconstruct causal chains.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Carry an event/correlation identifier through applicable device/adapter intake, platform validation, risk/model request, alert, workflow, command/result and case/outcome records. |
| B02 | Retain source-provided event IDs separately from platform identities and transport message IDs. |
| B03 | Preserve each member event link when an alert or workflow groups multiple genuine events. |
| B04 | Give imported records batch, row and source references. |
| B05 | If the selected device cannot return the command/event correlation ID, use an adapter mapping that consistently identifies the matching record. Otherwise mark the result as uncorrelated/unconfirmed. |
| B06 | Treat correlation identifiers as metadata, not secrets or authorisation tokens. |
Exceptions: A result that cannot be matched to its command must not be presented as confirmation of physical execution. Grouping events must preserve each event’s identity.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Select one event, one multi-event alert, one import row and one command response. | Each causal chain is reconstructable through the relevant logs/records, with separate identities and member links retained. |
| AC02 | Process an uncorrelatable device result. | A tested adapter mapping supports correlation, or the result remains explicitly uncorrelated/unconfirmed without invented physical confirmation. |
| AC03 | Retain the trace export and adapter mapping test. | The evidence demonstrates the reconstructed chains and the handling of unsupported correlation. |
SRS-AUD-104 — Auditability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-COMP003; URG-T30-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall retain sufficient linked operational and audit evidence to reconstruct who or what acted, the inputs and versions used, the time and the outcome.
| Evidence group | Required content |
|---|---|
| Source and import | Original source identifiers/timestamps and import disposition. |
| Supporting evidence | Evidence references/checksums. |
| Decision context | Configuration/model/version, decision history and human-intervention history. |
| Execution and outcome | Device-command stages and closure reasons. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Preserve linked evidence sufficient to reconstruct the action, input, configuration/model/version, time and outcome. |
| B02 | Provide authorised search/export by time, site, record and correlation ID. |
| B03 | Include an export manifest and audit the export. |
| B04 | Apply the agreed retention/hold policy and explicitly identify missing or expired evidence. |
| B05 | Preserve the literal source identifier REQ-COMP003; this response does not rename it. |
Exceptions: Missing or expired evidence is declared as a reconstruction limit rather than silently omitted.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconstruct an investigation from import/detection to outcome and export its linked records. | The linked chain is recoverable; source/export counts and checksums reconcile with the manifest. |
| AC02 | Attempt prohibited audit edits and inspect an investigation with missing evidence. | Edits fail and missing evidence is explicitly declared. |
Decisions still required: See DET-046.
SRS-AUD-105 — Audit trail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-WFO-004; URG-T40-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall preserve each workflow execution’s decision and execution history through to its case/outcome reference.
| Execution evidence | Required content |
|---|---|
| Origin and assessment | Origin event/prediction, validation/quality result and risk inputs/result. |
| Decision | Matched rule/version/priority, applicable restrictions, selected/withheld action and reason. |
| Human intervention | Approval/intervention actor and time. |
| Device execution | IoT command identity, attempt and result. |
| Outcome | Final case/outcome reference. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain the specified evidence for each execution, including blocked and failed paths. |
| B02 | Store changes as history so configuration edits cannot rewrite earlier decisions. |
| B03 | Distinguish delivery attempt counts from separate actions. |
| B04 | Distinguish physical results from operator-assessed threat outcomes. |
| B05 | Allow authorised reviewers to traverse the chain in both directions and export it under audit permissions. |
| B06 | Identify missing or expired evidence explicitly. |
Exceptions: Later rule changes or device relocation must not replace the original versions or locations needed to reconstruct earlier execution.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Select normal, blocked and failed workflows, then change a rule and relocate a device. | Each complete causal chain remains reconstructable with its original versions and locations. |
| AC02 | Review redacted trace extracts in both directions. | Execution evidence retains its links and distinguishes attempts, actions, physical results and threat outcomes. |
SRS-AUD-106 — Audit Trail
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-007; URG-T53-R08 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall correlate operational AI/ML results with their inputs, versions, guardrail decisions, human interventions and subsequent actions/outcomes.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link each operational AI/ML result to the model/configuration version, relevant inputs/references and timestamp, guardrail checks, decision/rule version, human intervention and resulting action/outcome. |
| B02 | Preserve rejected, constrained and no-action paths as well as successful actions. |
| B03 | Record actor, time and reason for human approval, classification correction and override without overwriting the original prediction. |
| B04 | Maintain stable links through prediction, alert/case and any command ID. |
| B05 | Distinguish Requested/Sent/Confirmed device statuses from observed threat resolution and operator case closure. |
| B06 | Restrict audit access and route record changes through controlled application paths. |
| B07 | Retain source references or approved snapshots sufficient for review under the agreed retention policy; full raw payload or prompt retention is not automatically required. |
| B08 | Where protected input cannot be retained, record its identifier, transformation and approved reproducibility limitation. |
Exceptions: Protected-input limits must remain visible. Command confirmation cannot establish threat resolution, and human intervention cannot erase the original prediction.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace accepted, rejected, low-confidence and failed-action examples end to end. | Each path retains the required links, original prediction and applicable intervention reasons for authorised review. |
| AC02 | Attempt to rewrite history using normal application functions and attempt unauthorised access. | History rewrites and unauthorised access are denied. |
| AC03 | Inspect a confirmed device command and its subsequent case/outcome. | Confirmation remains distinct from threat resolution and case closure. |
Decisions still required: See DET-047.
SRS-AUD-107 — Auditability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-ETRES-003; URG-T54-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
The solution shall retain technically available inference/decision evidence and explicitly disclose limits on traceability and reproducibility.
| Information group | Required evidence |
|---|---|
| Model identity | Technically available model/version identifier actually used. |
| Prediction time | Prediction timestamp. |
| Inputs | Input/reference data. |
| Result | Inference/decision result. |
| Score | Available confidence/risk score. |
| Threshold | Configured threshold. |
| Action | Subsequent action. |
| Intervention | User intervention. |
| Hosted LLM evidence | Available provider/model revision, prompt-template/retrieval configuration, permitted source references, request/result reference and generation time. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain the eight inference/decision information groups where technically available. |
| B02 | Link to the common prediction contract, guardrail/decision record and lifecycle package instead of duplicating unconstrained sensitive data in each log. |
| B03 | For each unavailable field, record why it is missing and what can no longer be traced. Do not invent a confidence value when none is supplied. |
| B04 | Preserve the model/configuration identity actually used for historic results after deployment changes. |
| B05 | Record the available hosted LLM evidence for hosted output. |
| B06 | If the provider cannot identify a fixed model revision or reproduce the same output from the same input, state that limitation. Retain enough permitted evidence to review the answer. |
Exceptions: Do not invent details about the provider’s internal operation. If repeatable generation is unavailable, do not promise identical wording when an answer is generated again.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a sample inference/decision record. | All eight information groups are represented by available evidence or applicable absence reasons. |
| AC02 | Trace an older prediction after model replacement. | Its original package, inputs, decision and model/configuration identity remain identifiable. |
| AC03 | Inspect a hosted API sample against returned provider metadata and supporting records. | Available metadata reconciles without requiring unavailable provider internals, exposing secrets or promising unsupported replay. |
3.2.13 AI Assistant
This module proposes a read-only assistant for authorised FALCON users to ask questions and request operational summaries. It retrieves permitted records, explains available information and links answers to their supporting records.
Submodules: Read-only questions; bilingual on-demand summaries; permission-filtered retrieval; supporting-record citations; missing information; API failure.
Boundaries: This is additional scope for TM review, with conditional URG narrative coverage. M4 allocation, LLM processing approvals and evaluation remain To Confirm. The initial proposal excludes operational writes, autonomous commands, scheduled summaries and AI-summary export. English and Bahasa Malaysia support applies to assistant answers and summaries; it does not establish a bilingual requirement for all reporting.
Module open decisions: Named LLM providers, processing regions, retention arrangements, data-processing approval and evaluation remain unresolved. An approved provider or processing arrangement is not established by this proposal.
PL-AST-001 — Permission-filtered read-only questions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing AI Assistant Proposal; N12/N13/N15 |
Retrieve and explain FALCON information through read-only queries within the requesting user’s permissions.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Support questions about permitted assets, devices/status, events/alerts, cases, imported incident history and available risk results. |
| B02 | Apply the requesting user’s permissions to retrieved information and returned record links. |
| B03 | Explain only the information available within that authorised scope. |
Exceptions: Denied records and links must not be returned through the assistant.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Query known records in permitted and denied contexts. | Only authorised records and links appear in read-only answers. |
PL-AST-002 — On-demand operational summaries
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing AI Assistant Proposal |
Produce an operational summary on request for a selected site and period.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply the selected site and period to the summary. |
| B02 | Summarise outstanding alerts/cases, recent incidents, device problems and recorded responses/outcomes. |
| B03 | Base included counts, statuses and outcomes on the underlying records and selected filters. |
Exceptions: Scheduled summaries and AI-summary export are outside the initial proposal.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Request a summary for a selected site and period. | Each included count, status and outcome reconciles with underlying records and the selected filters. |
PL-AST-003 — English and Bahasa Malaysia
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing AI Assistant Proposal |
Support English and Bahasa Malaysia for assistant answers and summaries.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide assistant answers in English and Bahasa Malaysia. |
| B02 | Provide assistant operational summaries in English and Bahasa Malaysia. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Evaluate an agreed set of questions and summaries in both languages against reviewed expected information. | Answers and summaries convey the expected information under the agreed evaluation criteria. |
Decisions still required: See DET-048.
PL-AST-004 — Supporting records and uncertainty
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing AI Assistant Proposal |
Make assistant answers reviewable through permitted supporting-record links and explicit limits on what the records establish.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link answers to supporting records within the user’s permissions. |
| B02 | Identify the period covered and relevant data limitations. |
| B03 | Distinguish recorded facts from interpretations. |
| B04 | State when records cannot support an answer and disclose uncertainty or missing information. |
Exceptions: Unsupported or conflicting records must not produce an unqualified factual answer.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Ask questions with supporting records. | Answers include permitted source links, period and applicable limitations. |
| AC02 | Ask unsupported or conflicting-data questions. | Uncertainty and missing information are disclosed; facts and interpretations remain distinguishable. |
PL-AST-005 — No operational writes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing read-only proposal and AI response specification |
Keep the assistant read-only and prevent retrieved content from expanding its permissions.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Prevent the assistant from executing device commands, case changes and rule edits. |
| B02 | Retrieved content shall not expand permissions. |
| B03 | Apply the read-only boundary to direct requests and instructions embedded in retrieved content. |
Exceptions: A request or retrieved instruction to activate a device or change an operational record does not authorise assistant execution.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Request device activation, case changes and rule edits directly. | No write or action capability executes. |
| AC02 | Embed equivalent instructions in retrieved content. | Permissions remain unchanged and no write or action capability executes. |
PL-AST-006 — LLM API failure isolation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Existing AI Assistant Proposal |
Use an approved LLM API while keeping core FALCON functions independent of assistant service availability.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use an approved LLM API for assistant processing. |
| B02 | Display explicit assistant unavailability when the LLM service fails. |
| B03 | Allow maps, alerts, cases and reports to continue operating independently during that failure. |
Exceptions: LLM API unavailability affects the assistant without disabling the core functions listed above.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Make the LLM API unavailable. | An explicit assistant-unavailable response appears while maps, alerts, cases and reports continue operating. |
Decisions still required: See DET-049.
3.2.14 Evidence and Media Management
Purpose: Keep evidence identifiable, retrievable by authorised users and meaningful throughout its retention period.
Actors: Operators and assigned Field Team members attach or retrieve permitted evidence. Field Team access starts in M3. Devices supply event evidence.
Submodules: Evidence identity; upload/linking; retrieval permissions; unavailable-media handling; preservation and expiry; live-view separation.
Boundaries: Evidence availability does not establish a threat outcome. Live viewing remains distinct from stored evidence; retention follows the agreed data-class schedule.
SRS-MED-001 — Evidence provenance
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall retain the identity and provenance of evidence associated with an event or case.
Required information
| Information | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Identity and association | Evidence identity and associated event/case. |
| Source | Source device or uploader. |
| Times | Capture time where supplied, and receipt time. |
| Media reference | Media type and storage reference. |
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain the required information in the preceding table for each evidence record. |
| B02 | When correcting an association, preserve the previous association and the actor responsible for the correction. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Device event evidence | Identity, times and source match the supplied evidence and its event association. |
| AC02 | Operator case evidence | Uploader, receipt time and case association remain traceable. |
| AC03 | Correct an association | The corrected association, previous association and correction actor can be reconciled. |
SRS-MED-002 — Protected retrieval
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Drafting decision | ROLE-001–003; user agreed, TM review pending. |
FALCON shall enforce permission for the underlying record whenever evidence is accessed or downloaded.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Enforce the permission check at the service boundary. |
| B02 | Apply the same check to a guessed or copied file reference; possession of a reference shall not bypass permission. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Authorised access and download | The permitted evidence is returned. |
| AC02 | Denied direct retrieval using a guessed or copied reference | Evidence content is not returned. |
| AC03 | Access removed after a reference was obtained | A subsequent denied retrieval does not return the content. |
| AC04 | Field Team retrieves evidence for assigned work, unrelated work and work reassigned away | Assigned evidence is available within its permissions; unrelated or reassigned evidence is denied even through a copied reference. |
SRS-MED-003 — Unavailable evidence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall show the applicable limitation when referenced evidence cannot be retrieved.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Identify whether evidence is pending, missing, corrupt, unavailable or expired, as applicable. |
| B02 | Retain the associated event/case metadata when evidence cannot be retrieved. |
| B03 | Do not present missing evidence as proof that no threat occurred. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Referenced media is inaccessible | The event/case remains readable and shows the applicable limitation. |
| AC02 | Pending, missing, corrupt and expired evidence | Each applicable condition is identified without implying that no threat occurred. |
SRS-MED-004 — Retention and preservation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall apply the agreed evidence retention schedule and authorised preservation restrictions.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply the agreed schedule for the evidence data class. |
| B02 | Retain evidence subject to an authorised preservation restriction. |
| B03 | Make each purge auditable while retaining required provenance and the meaning of retained case outcomes. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Eligible evidence reaches expiry under an agreed short test schedule | The eligible object expires; required metadata and auditable purge evidence remain. |
| AC02 | Protected evidence reaches the same expiry point | The preservation restriction prevents its removal. |
| AC03 | Review retained records after purge | Permissions remain enforced and retained case outcomes retain their meaning. |
Decisions still required: See DET-050.
3.2.15 Notification and Escalation Management
Purpose: Notify the intended internal audience and execute configured escalation without confusing delivery with operational acknowledgement.
Actors: Operators receive and view internal notifications; authorised operations staff inspect delivery failures.
Submodules: Internal recipient selection; delivery versus acknowledgement; escalation timers; repeat handling; exceptions and audit.
Boundaries: External notification channels require separately agreed interfaces and delivery scope. Per-user read indicators remain proposed.
SRS-NTF-001 — Internal notification record
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
A qualifying workflow shall create an internal notification linked to its alert and intended Operator audience.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain the link between the notification, alert and intended Operator audience. |
| B02 | Keep notification creation, delivery, per-user viewing and shared alert acknowledgement as distinct facts. |
| B03 | Merely opening a notification shall not acknowledge the alert. Per-user read indicators remain a proposal. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying workflow creates an alert | The notification references that alert and its intended Operator audience. |
| AC02 | Two Operators view the notification | Viewing alone does not change shared alert acknowledgement. |
SRS-NTF-002 — Escalation execution
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall execute enabled escalation rules once per qualifying escalation step.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Evaluate the qualifying state, elapsed-time basis and stop condition specified by the enabled rule. |
| B02 | Apply the configured recipient and priority. |
| B03 | Retain the rule version and reason for each escalation. |
| B04 | Prevent duplicate execution of the same step, including on retry. |
| B05 | Cancel escalation when its agreed stop condition occurs. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Qualifying state reaches an agreed short timer | One escalation executes with the configured recipient and priority, recorded rule version and reason. |
| AC02 | Retry the same escalation step | No duplicate execution occurs. |
| AC03 | Agreed stop condition occurs | The escalation is cancelled in accordance with that condition. |
Decisions still required: See DET-051.
SRS-NTF-003 — Delivery exception
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall retain a visible internal delivery failure without erasing or closing the associated alert.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Make delivery failure visible to authorised operations staff. |
| B02 | Keep the associated alert actionable after delivery failure. |
| B03 | Treat external notification channels as separately agreed interface and delivery scope. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Internal delivery fails | The failure is recorded and visible to authorised operations staff; the alert remains actionable. |
| AC02 | Review delivery test evidence | An internal-queue test is not used to pass external-channel delivery. |
3.2.16 Reference Data and Operational Configuration
Purpose: Control operational reference values and apply reviewable, validated configuration changes.
Actors: Administrators manage approved reference values; configuration changes retain the responsible actor.
Submodules: Sites and zones; event mappings; closure outcomes; parameter versions; configuration validation and retirement.
Boundaries: Numerical defaults require explicit agreement. Configuration changes preserve historical meaning and do not replay physical commands.
SRS-CFG-001 — Controlled reference values
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
Administrators shall manage approved operational reference values while preserving their historical meaning.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Support approved site/zone definitions, input-category mappings and closure outcomes. |
| B02 | Prevent new selection of a retired value. |
| B03 | Preserve the meaning of historical records referencing a retired value. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Retire a previously used outcome and site reference | Historic records still resolve to the applicable meaning. |
| AC02 | Attempt a new selection of a retired value | The invalid selection is rejected. |
SRS-CFG-002 — Parameter change validation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall validate configuration changes before activating them.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record the value, unit, scope, effective version, actor and time. |
| B02 | Reject invalid types, contradictory ranges and missing mandatory parameters before activation. |
| B03 | Leave the active version unchanged when validation fails. |
| B04 | Use numerical defaults only after explicit agreement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Submit a valid setting | The accepted configuration retains its value, unit, scope, version, actor and time. |
| AC02 | Submit an invalid type, inverted time range or missing mandatory parameter | Activation is rejected and the active version remains unchanged. |
Decisions still required: See DET-052.
SRS-CFG-003 — Reviewable change effect
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
FALCON shall show the affected scope before applying changes to live rules or device associations.
Functional behaviour
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Show the affected scope before applying the change. |
| B02 | Retain the previous configuration version. |
| B03 | Do not silently rewrite past events or replay physical commands as a result of a configuration change. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Change a rule parameter | The affected scope is shown and the previous version remains available. |
| AC02 | Change a device association | The affected scope and prior history remain reviewable. |
| AC03 | Inspect already-recorded events and commands after either change | Past events are not silently rewritten and physical commands are not replayed. |
3.3 Quality of Service
Purpose: Define resilience, measurable operating quality and maintainable recovery. Boundary: Source targets remain unapproved until section 5.4 agreement; test measurements are evidence, not invented acceptance values.
3.3.1 Reliability Recovery and Retention
Submodules: Fault isolation; recovery; backup and restoration; retention; interrupted communication; AI fallback.
Actors: Superadmins manage platform backups and recovery. Operational users view permitted records. Checks: Record data acceptance, physical execution, service status and historical evidence separately.
SH-REL-001 — Fault and recovery behaviour
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
The platform shall preserve records and expose limitations during device, power, communication and service faults.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define and verify behaviour during device faults, power loss, connection loss, and service recovery. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Device fault, power loss, connection loss and service recovery | Records remain preserved where captured; limitations are visible and no stale automatic action replays. |
SRS-REL-101 — Fault Tolerance
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-REL-001; URG-T27-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Accepted events shall survive the responsible intake’s restart, and partial failures shall remain traceable.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Acknowledge accepted events only after the responsible intake has made the accepted payload durable; retain retryable work and a deduplication key across process restart. |
| B02 | Proposed platform writes commit event state and its pending downstream work together, then reconcile asynchronous delivery using idempotent consumers. |
| B03 | Store binary evidence with checksum/size and a pending/available/failed reference so partial bucket/database failure cannot create a fictitiously available file. |
| B04 | Recover interrupted jobs or mark them failed with reason; isolate failed ingestion/media/model workers so unrelated authorised functions remain usable. |
| B05 | State when data can be lost, including before it is saved durably on the device or edge. Do not promise zero data loss. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Terminate intake/workers before/after receipt and commit | Unique accepted records reconcile; no acknowledged event silently disappears. |
| AC02 | Interrupt bucket/database storage and replay submissions | Evidence state remains pending/failed where appropriate; downstream alerts/actions are not duplicated. |
| AC03 | Inspect fault-injection evidence | Logs and reconciliation counts identify retained work and declared loss boundaries. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10; numerical entry “Availability and recovery (PAR-04)”.
SRS-REL-102 — Communication Failure
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-REL-002; URG-T27-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Communication loss shall preserve usable information and prevent prohibited or duplicated physical actions.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | During sensor/external-service connectivity loss, preserve last-known data with timestamps and stale/unverifiable labels. |
| B02 | A failed IoT service does not prove that every device is Offline. |
| B03 | Evaluate individual device contact timeout only with valid service observations. |
| B04 | Continue authorised record review and unaffected platform functions. |
| B05 | Withhold actions that cannot satisfy availability, event-age, approval, maintenance, pause or cooldown checks; the IoT service alone performs eligible bounded retries of the same command identity. |
| B06 | Reconnection must not replay withheld/stale physical actions automatically. |
| B07 | Designated edge functions continue as specified in URG-T36-R03; offline deterrence requires a device-specific decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Disconnect a device, IoT service and external dependency separately | Distinct status displays identify the affected boundary; records and unaffected authorised functions remain usable. |
| AC02 | Reconnect with queued/delayed events | No prohibited stale action replay or duplicate physical execution occurs. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-04; numerical entry “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-REL-103 — Data Protection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-REL-003; URG-T27-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The solution shall recover the agreed service and data within agreed recovery targets.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Measurement boundary | Failure declaration → restoration of agreed service; recovery point references last recoverable committed data. |
| Unit / target status | Elapsed recovery time and permitted data loss: values/units To Confirm. |
| Test workload | Representative failed deployment, database/evidence/configuration/model set and pending work. |
| Evidence | Isolated restore drill, reconciliation, integrity checks and defects. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain recovery procedures for database, bucket evidence, IoT service, application/workers, configuration and model artefacts. |
| B02 | The proposed backup set records version, creation/consistency point, checksums, encryption/access conditions and restore dependencies. |
| B03 | Restore to an isolated environment, reconcile record-to-file links and pending events/commands, then resume only valid current work; do not replay old actuator commands as a by-product of restore. |
| B04 | Measure recovery time from declared failure to restored agreed service and recovery point from the last recoverable committed data. |
| B05 | The solution shall meet agreed RTO/data-loss targets; the source title “Data Protection” is answered by its recovery description. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Restore representative deployment from backup in isolation | Integrity and sampled record/evidence/rule/model links reconcile. |
| AC02 | Reconcile pending work and post-backup loss | Valid current work resumes without old actuator replay; loss is measured. |
| AC03 | Compare drill measurements with approved targets | Elapsed recovery and recovery point are evidenced; report and defects are retained. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q10; numerical entry “Availability and recovery (PAR-04)”.
SRS-REL-104 — Operational Availability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-AVAIL-001; URG-T28-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Operational availability shall measure agreed usable functions rather than endpoint reachability alone.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Measurement boundary | Agreed usable service time ÷ agreed operational time; approved maintenance exclusions identified. |
| Unit / target status | Availability ratio; percentage, observation window and support commitment are not assumed. |
| Workload | Event ingestion, current status, required alerts and permitted response functions; component probes explain partial outage. |
| Evidence | Synthetic operations, incident intervals and restoration proof. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define the operational service as the agreed ability to ingest events, view current status, generate required alerts and perform permitted response functions; measure component availability separately to explain partial outages. |
| B02 | Record outage start/end, affected function/site, cause and restoration evidence. |
| B03 | Calculate availability as agreed usable service time divided by agreed operational time, identifying any approved maintenance exclusions explicitly. |
| B04 | Monitor dependency degradation so a reachable login page does not establish full availability. |
| B05 | Hosting redundancy and failover are sized to the approved target; no availability percentage or round-the-clock support commitment is inferred. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Health probes and synthetic operations during agreed observation window | Evidence establishes usable operational functions and component availability. |
| AC02 | Partial/full failure injection | Incident start/end and restoration records reconcile with the availability calculation and approved exclusions. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/OPEN-15/Q10; numerical entry “Availability and recovery (PAR-04)”.
SRS-REL-105 — Data Retention
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-COMP-004; URG-T30-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each data category shall have an approved retention policy and traceable expiry handling.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain retention policy per category: raw observations/health, detection/event/alert records, incident/case/outcome history, images/clips, import originals/rejections, model/dataset artefacts, audit/security/diagnostic logs, generated reports and backups. |
| B02 | Each policy states retention trigger, duration, storage tier, hold condition and approved final treatment. |
| B03 | Proposed expiry jobs respect linked-record dependencies and holds, record deletion/anonymisation outcome and expose failures. |
| B04 | Expired evidence references retain a permitted tombstone/status so history is not misleading; restored data re-enters current retention policy. |
| B05 | No numeric retention or deletion schedule is approved in this SRS response. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Boundary-aged data with/without holds; authorised test expiry | Policy treatment is correct, permitted reference tombstones remain and deletion failures are visible. |
| AC02 | Restore older backup | Restored data is reconciled to current retention policy. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10; numerical entry “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
SRS-REL-106 — Fallback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-006; URG-T53-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Each failed model/service dependency shall enter a defined fallback state without bypassing action restrictions.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define fallback per model/service and dependency. |
| B02 | On failed/unreliable inference, missing required data or supporting sensor failure, retain existing observations and last-known results with their original time and a clear unavailable/constrained indication. |
| B03 | Block new automated actions that require the failed intelligence; do not show stale scores as current. |
| B04 | Human review of available evidence and unaffected permitted workflows remain available with their ordinary restrictions. |
| B05 | When the proposed LLM API is unavailable, report assistant unavailability while maps, alerts, cases and ordinary reports continue operating. |
| B06 | No alternate provider or silent external-data transmission is assumed. |
| B07 | On restoration resume validated new requests; do not replay previously withheld physical actions or portray partially generated answers as complete. |
| B08 | Offline deterrence remains To Confirm under the device policy. |
| B09 | The fallback runbook identifies the affected function, notification and restoration check. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inference failure, stale/absent input or unreliable sensor | Affected result is constrained/unavailable with original last-known time; dependent automation is blocked. |
| AC02 | LLM outage | Assistant failure is explicit; unrelated maps, alerts, cases and reports continue. |
| AC03 | Service restoration | Validated new processing succeeds without replaying withheld commands or completing partial answers by assertion. |
| AC04 | Selected-device fallback inspection | Offline-action disposition and restoration checks remain explicit. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-03/OPEN-11.
SRS-REL-107 — Data Storage
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-CCP-004; URG-T37-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall preserve operational records and controlled object references in the proposed relational and bucket stores.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use PostgreSQL for sensor metadata/readings, devices/deployments, events, alerts, risk/model outputs and lineage, workflow/case/outcome records and audit history. |
| B02 | Use bucket storage for images/video event evidence where captured, import originals, model/dataset artefacts and generated reports, with relational references. |
| B03 | Each object reference records category, owner/parent, checksum, size, media type, creation time, availability state and retention/permission attributes. |
| B04 | Enforce referential/idempotency constraints and separate operational/audit write permissions. |
| B05 | Pending or failed upload is visible; reconciliation detects orphan objects/missing files. |
| B06 | On-demand live viewing is not automatically recorded; initial manual/continuous recording remains outside the user-approved proposal. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Persist/retrieve every listed category | Permissions, object integrity and source/version links are correct. |
| AC02 | Interrupt upload and storage | Pending/failed state and orphan/missing-file repair reporting appear. |
SRS-REL-108 — Data Retention
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-CCP-005; URG-T37-R06. |
| Source modality | descriptive obligation; all source conditions remain applicable. |
A proposed retention and storage-capacity schedule shall cover every major category in URG-T30-R05.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | For every major category listed in URG-T30-R05, provide a proposed retention schedule with duration or explicit unresolved value, retention start event, operational/archive tier, hold/expiry behavior and storage estimate. |
| B02 | Compute required capacity from daily records × average stored record/index size × retention, plus event/evidence count × mean/peak object size, replication/backup overhead and growth allowance; show model/version/dataset and report storage separately. |
| B03 | Retain incident/evidence links according to policy even when binary evidence expires. |
| B04 | Longest retention is not presumed best: balance investigations, data rights, cost and restore requirements. |
| B05 | No numeric period is accepted without TM decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review all retention categories | Each has a policy and capacity formula with approved values or unresolved entries. |
| AC02 | Recalculate using measured sample sizes | Storage estimates reproduce from recorded inputs. |
| AC03 | Approved expiry/hold and restore tests | Links and policy reconciliation behave as specified; schedule and sizing inputs remain available. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10; numerical entry “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
3.3.2 Performance and Capacity
Submodules: Event throughput; alert latency; monitored capacity; dashboard response; scaling and resource cost.
Actors: Delivery/engineering teams measure representative workloads; TM agrees acceptance conditions. Boundary: Separate end-to-end delay, component delay, physical pilot quantities and declared synthetic scale.
SH-PER-001 — Measured performance and workload
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
Performance shall be measured against agreed workload and timing definitions; target values remain To Confirm.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Target status | Workload, processing time, delivery time and platform response values remain To Confirm. |
| Evidence | Measurements under documented agreed conditions. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define and verify workload, processing time, event delivery time, and platform response targets under agreed conditions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Documented representative workload | Processing, delivery and interface response measurements are reproducible; unagreed targets remain To Confirm. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10 and applicable performance numerical entries.
SRS-PER-101 — Event Processing
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-PERF-001; URG-T25-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
FALCON shall process accepted events within the agreed target under the agreed workload.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Primary boundary | Durable platform receipt → queryable event with validation result. |
| Separate measures | IoT-to-platform transit; inference/evidence wait; recorded source occurrence and IoT receipt. |
| Workload / unit | Representative event mix and burst; elapsed time distribution, errors and queue age; agreed time unit pending. |
| Target status | POC target unapproved; acceptance requires agreed target and workload. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each accepted incoming event, record the source occurrence time, IoT-service receipt time, durable platform receipt and completion of validation, de-duplication and operational persistence. |
| B02 | The proposed event-processing measure runs from durable platform receipt to the event becoming queryable with its validation result; separately expose IoT-to-platform transit and any inference/evidence wait so this boundary cannot hide end-to-end delay. |
| B03 | Return a rejection reason and correlation ID for invalid submissions. |
| B04 | Keep unfinished accepted work visibly pending/failed; it must not disappear. |
| B05 | Run ingestion and media/model work through bounded queues so an evidence upload cannot block all event recording. |
| B06 | Processing shall meet the agreed target under the agreed workload; the source’s POC target remains unapproved. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Timestamped representative set and burst including invalid, duplicate and unavailable-evidence cases | Submitted/accepted/rejected counts reconcile and work remains visible. |
| AC02 | Timing and load evidence review | Latency distribution, errors and queue age compare to the approved target; request logs, query results and workload/environment configuration are retained. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entry “Event processing time (PAR-01)”.
SRS-PER-102 — Alert Latency
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-PERF-002; URG-T25-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Alert generation shall meet the agreed latency target measured from receipt of sufficient evidence.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Start | First receipt at which subsequently validated evidence was sufficient under the rule/classifier. |
| End | Alert durably created and available in authorised internal queue. |
| Separate measures | Pre-sufficiency time and client display delay; validation completion retained and validation time included. |
| Workload / unit | Normal/burst evidence sequences, grouped repeats and missing evidence; elapsed time unit To Confirm. |
| Target status | Source “Target capacity: TBD” provides no numerical latency criterion. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Start the alert-latency clock at the first receipt instant at which the subsequently validated evidence set was sufficient under the applicable rule/classifier; retain that receipt timestamp and the rule/model version. |
| B02 | Record validation completion separately; include validation time within alert latency. |
| B03 | End it when the alert is durably created and available in the authorised internal queue; measure client display delay separately. |
| B04 | If required evidence is missing, show a pending or insufficient-evidence state. Do not hide work that is waiting for evidence. |
| B05 | Record the time before sufficiency as a separate measure. |
| B06 | Qualifying repeated detections update their grouped alert while retaining individual events; record-only events are not miscounted as missed alerts. |
| B07 | Alert generation shall meet the agreed latency target; the source label “Target capacity: TBD” does not supply a number. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Known evidence-completion sequences and grouped repeats | Start/end timestamps match sufficiency under the rule; grouped alerts retain individual events. |
| AC02 | Missing evidence under normal/burst conditions | Pending/insufficient state is visible; record-only events are not reported as missed alerts. |
| AC03 | Queue/client trace review | Latency and failed alerts are reported with distinct validation, pre-sufficiency and client-delay evidence. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entry “Alert latency (PAR-02)”.
SRS-PER-103 — Concurrent Monitoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-PERF-003; URG-T25-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The platform shall support the agreed monitoring capacity across separately identified sites, assets and devices.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Capacity dimensions | Registered/active devices, monitored locations, assets, input rates, evidence sizes, users, live sessions, scoring jobs and history. |
| Measurement boundary | Concurrent ingestion, map queries, scoring and agreed video load at agreed cardinality. |
| Target status | Agreed quantities are acceptance capacity; one M2 controlled location is only a demonstration. |
| Evidence | Latency, saturation, storage growth, resource limits, load scripts and configuration. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain separately identified sites, assets and devices without a single-site schema assumption. |
| B02 | Capacity planning shall specify active/registered devices, monitored locations, fibre assets, input rates, evidence sizes, concurrent users, live-video sessions, scoring jobs and retained history. |
| B03 | Use paginated queries and bounded job/stream concurrency, apply backpressure, and report admission failures rather than silently discard critical events. |
| B04 | Acceptance capacity is the agreed number of locations, devices and assets. The single controlled M2 location is for demonstration only. |
| B05 | Size and scale the selected deployment using the resource model in URG-T37-R04. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Populate agreed site/device/asset cardinality and run simultaneous ingest, map, scoring and video load | Records reconcile; latency, saturation, storage growth and resource limits are measured. |
| AC02 | Load evidence review | Scripts and configuration identify the agreed acceptance workload, separately from one-location M2 demonstration. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entry “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”.
SRS-PER-104 — Dashboard Response
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-PERF-004; URG-T25-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Dashboard response shall meet the agreed target for usable operational values and controls under documented load.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Boundary | Permitted navigation/filter/refresh request → displayed operational values and usable map/list controls. |
| Separate measures | Browser versus API; first load versus cached refresh. |
| Workload | Agreed site/asset volume, users, client/network profile and concurrent ingestion. |
| Target status | Response target and elapsed-time unit require agreement; partial shell is not completion. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Dashboard response is measured from a permitted user’s navigation/filter/refresh request to display of the requested operational values and usable map/list controls. |
| B02 | Report browser and API timings separately and distinguish first load from cached refresh. |
| B03 | Page and filter large result sets; load evidence/live media on demand. |
| B04 | Show loading, empty, stale and failed states explicitly; a failed risk service must not be displayed as zero risk. |
| B05 | Define normal operating conditions using the agreed site/asset volume, concurrent users, client/network profile and concurrent ingestion workload. |
| B06 | Meet the agreed response target without presenting a partial shell as a completed dashboard. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | First load, site/date filters, drill-down and map navigation at agreed load; cold/warm caches | Usable values/controls meet the agreed target with separate browser and API timings. |
| AC02 | Dependency failure | Stale/unavailable states appear without zero-risk substitution. |
| AC03 | Evidence review | Screenshots, browser timings, API traces and errors are retained; a partial shell is not counted as completion. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entry “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”.
SRS-PER-105 — Capacity Expansion
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-REX-005; URG-T47-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The deployment shall demonstrate a measured expansion path from POC workload to the agreed larger workload.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Comparison | Initial POC profile versus agreed larger site/device/source profile. |
| Workload | Assets/history, event/evidence rate, live sessions, users, model jobs, retention and replay/recovery demand. |
| Target status | Larger profile, scaling triggers and limits require agreement. |
| Evidence | Actual-device representativeness, reproducible synthetic generators, integrity/timing/resource and cost results. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Demonstrate a capacity path from the initial POC workload to an agreed larger site/device/source set using the sizing model and measured bottlenecks. |
| B02 | Include added asset/history cardinality, event/evidence rate, live sessions, users, model jobs, retention and replay/recovery demand. |
| B03 | Show which resources/workers/storage/network and operating costs grow, the trigger for each increase and limits requiring further design. |
| B04 | Reuse core data/interface/workflow structure and confirm new sites retain correct identities/placement/permissions. |
| B05 | Synthetic load may test scale beyond physical pilot quantities, but must be declared and validated against actual-device traffic characteristics. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Base and expanded reproducible profiles with actual-device flows | Latency, errors and data integrity are measured; synthetic load is declared and representative. |
| AC02 | Before/after resource review | CPU, memory, network and storage evidence supports resource/cost estimates and scaling triggers. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entries “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)” and “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
SRS-PER-106 — Scalability Cost
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-COST-004; URG-T49-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Expansion cost shall be estimated from workload and resource drivers, including step changes.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Cost boundary | Fixed shared platform, per-site/device costs and resource/support tier changes. |
| Workload | Agreed additional sites/assets/sensors/sources/users and operating demand. |
| Unit / target status | Currency/rate basis and quantities follow the agreed sizing/BOM/service-rate model; no assumed linear cost rule. |
| Evidence | Sensitivity cases, amortisation/reuse, load-test resource use, tier limits and uncertainty. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Model expansion by additional sites, monitored assets, sensors, data sources and users, separating fixed shared-platform costs from per-site/per-device costs and step changes. |
| B02 | Main drivers include survey/install/access travel, hardware/power/bearer, media rate/live concurrency and egress, retained data/backups, inference/training compute, source-adapter development, licensing/users, support load, maintenance/replacements and redundancy. |
| B03 | Provide base/expanded sensitivity cases for agreed quantities and workload; show amortisation/reuse explicitly and avoid assuming cost grows only linearly with sensor count. |
| B04 | Identify thresholds where hosting, network or support tier must increase. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recompute expansion from sizing, BOM and service rates | Base/expanded scenarios reproduce and include uncertainty plus cost-per-site breakdown. |
| AC02 | Compare model to load-test consumption and tier limits | Step changes and non-linear cost drivers are supported by evidence. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, Q10; numerical entry “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”.
3.3.3 Maintenance and Diagnostics
Submodules: Service monitoring; health diagnosis; planned maintenance; component replacement; controlled update and rollback.
Actors: Superadmins manage approved platform maintenance. Assigned field personnel carry out physical work within their work instructions. Operational users see service impact and restrictions. Rule: Maintenance must not hide actual health or bypass device-action restrictions.
SH-MNT-001 — Maintenance procedures and ownership
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
Maintenance and recovery procedures shall identify accountable responsibilities and execution evidence.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define inspection, diagnostics, component replacement, software update, and recovery procedures with assigned responsibilities. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Walk through inspection, diagnostics, replacement, update and recovery | Responsibilities and execution evidence are recorded. |
SRS-MNT-101 — Maintenance
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-AVAIL-002; URG-T28-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where maintenance windows apply, changes shall use the approved window and controlled restrictions.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where maintenance windows apply, schedule changes within the approved window and identify affected devices/services and expected impact. |
| B02 | Before work, record the change/version, responsible person, backup/rollback checkpoint and authorised operational restrictions. |
| B03 | Display maintenance state without falsifying device health. |
| B04 | Preserve event records and prohibit maintenance-disallowed activations. |
| B05 | Validate recovery before ending the window, release only the approved restrictions and retain overrun/outage records. |
| B06 | Emergency changes use the separately agreed exception/approval process, not an assumed exemption from the window requirement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Rehearse planned device/service maintenance | Impact notice and restrictions are correct; recovery/rollback evidence includes start/end times. |
| AC02 | Maintenance overrun | Overrun is recorded and reviewed rather than silently excluded. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-04/OPEN-10/OPEN-16; numerical entry “Availability and recovery (PAR-04)”.
SRS-MNT-102 — Maintenance & Management
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-O&M-001; URG-T46-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Operational runbooks shall support controlled inspection, replacement, update, diagnosis and recovery.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide sensor cleaning, inspection and calibration runbooks. |
| B02 | Provide battery inspection, recharge and replacement runbooks. |
| B03 | Provide equipment-swap procedures that preserve identity and deployment history. |
| B04 | Provide software/model update and configuration/requirement/version change-control runbooks. |
| B05 | Provide staged deployment and rollback procedures; the source extract retains the spelling “Roolback”. |
| B06 | Provide fault-diagnosis, database/bucket/configuration/model backup/recovery and health/log monitoring runbooks. |
| B07 | For each runbook state trigger/interval, accountable role, prerequisites/tools, permitted impact/window, steps, validation, rollback/stop condition and records. |
| B08 | Preserve the prior validated artefact/configuration and assess schema compatibility before updating. |
| B09 | After update failure restore a compatible state without replaying stale commands. |
| B10 | Run relevant regression tests after sensor/model/configuration changes. |
| B11 | Include supported-version/license expiry and spare/replacement constraints. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Rehearse battery/equipment replacement and software/model/config updates | Versions/history, working function and event/outcome records remain correct. |
| AC02 | Failed release rollback, diagnosis and restore | Compatible working state returns without unintended actuation; runbook execution evidence is retained. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/OPEN-16.
3.4 Compliance Security and Privacy
Submodules: TM policies; data protection; authentication/authorisation/accounting; third-party dependencies; threat assessment; security evidence.
Purpose: Protect operational assets and information and apply the required TM controls. Actors: Superadmins manage platform security settings; TM reviewers confirm applicable policies and acceptance. Compliance has not yet been verified. No certification is claimed.
SH-SEC-001 — Security and privacy controls
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed. |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
Security controls shall protect identities, access, communications, stored data, credentials and updates.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define security controls for device identity, access, communications, stored data, credentials, and software updates. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Verify agreed identity, communication, data, credential and update controls | Security-assessment and remediation evidence cover the agreed scope. |
SRS-SEC-101 — Data Protection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-003; URG-T26-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Sensitive operational records, evidence and credentials shall be protected across applicable transport and storage paths.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Assets | Sensitive records, evidence, credentials and backups. |
| Enforcement | Authenticated/encrypted transport; private restricted storage; controlled service/key access. |
| Failure / evidence | Reject untrusted peers and unauthorised objects; retain redacted configuration and end-to-end test evidence. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Protect sensitive operational records, evidence and credentials on all relevant paths. |
| B02 | Proposed design uses authenticated encrypted MQTT/HTTP transport, private database/bucket access, encrypted persistent volumes/objects and backups, and managed restricted key access. |
| B03 | Issue authorised short-lived evidence/media access instead of public object links; redact tokens and unnecessary personal content from logs and diagnostics. |
| B04 | Separate service identities by responsibility and revoke compromised access without changing device/business IDs. |
| B05 | Reject untrusted transport peers and unauthorised object access. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Transport/storage/backup configuration inspection and sensitive-record trace | Approved protection covers end-to-end paths; retained evidence excludes keys. |
| AC02 | Unauthorised API/object access or invalid transport peer | Access is rejected; logs are redacted. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-102 — Security of AI Functions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response. |
| TM source | REQ-SEC-006; URG-T26-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
AI inputs and outputs shall remain subject to validation, restricted privileges and normal operational authorisation.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Assets | Operational privileges, model artefacts, retrieved records and prompts. |
| Enforcement | Validated inputs/outputs, isolated jobs, audited configuration and read-only M4 assistant. |
| Failure / evidence | Reject/mark compromised outputs unavailable; adversarial tests demonstrate no unauthorised operational write. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Treat imported text, media metadata, model outputs and retrieved records as untrusted inputs. |
| B02 | Validate type, size and schema; isolate training/inference jobs from operational write credentials and use approved model artefacts with recorded versions. |
| B03 | The proposed M4 chatbot is read-only: retrieved instructions or generated text cannot grant permissions, change thresholds, send commands or close cases. |
| B04 | Prediction/detection outputs enter the platform’s validated rule/approval path; compromised or malformed outputs are rejected or marked unavailable, with normal non-AI operations continuing. |
| B05 | Restrict and audit model/guardrail/configuration changes and prevent secrets or unauthorised records entering prompts. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Malicious retrieved instructions, malformed predictions and out-of-role retrieval | No unauthorised command/write occurs; rejected inputs are visible and only permitted records return. |
| AC02 | Unauthorised model/config change or AI dependency failure | Changes are restricted; maps/cases and normal non-AI operations continue. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/OPEN-11.
SRS-SEC-103 — Enterprise Security
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-COMP-001; URG-T30-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Applicable TM security controls shall be mapped to deployment evidence or explicit unresolved exceptions.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a TM security-control applicability register identifying policy name/version, applicable component/interface/data, required control, implementation evidence, assessor and unresolved exception. |
| B02 | Map the proposed identity, network, data, cloud, AI and workflow controls to that register; apply required controls before the affected deployment is accepted. |
| B03 | Where policy requirements conflict with the draft technology or operating model, record the gap and corrective design or proposed exception for TM decision. |
| B04 | No generic security checklist or successful login test shall be represented as evidence of TM-policy compliance. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Policy-to-control review with sampled configurations and negative tests | Every applicable control maps to evidence or an explicitly unresolved exception; no generic checklist is claimed as compliance. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-104 — Data Protection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-COMP-002; URG-T30-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Data processing shall follow approved purpose, access, location, recipient and retention arrangements.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a data inventory stating category, origin, purpose, permitted use, ownership, personal/sensitive content, processing locations, recipients, retention and required approval. |
| B02 | Apply data minimisation and role-restricted access to imagery, contact details, incident records and location data; prevent uploads to unapproved external services, including LLM providers. |
| B03 | Define correction, access/investigation and deletion/hold handling in accordance with applicable organisational/regulatory obligations. |
| B04 | Record cross-border/third-party processing decisions and contractual restrictions before enabling the affected flow. |
| B05 | Regulatory applicability and lawful processing arrangements require competent TM review, not inference from deployment geography. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace collection/import through storage, reports, backups and approved external API | Recipients, locations and retention match the approved inventory. |
| AC02 | Denied transfer/access tests | Unapproved access/flows are blocked; policy review and redacted flow evidence remain available. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-105 — Third-Party Technology
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-COMP-005; URG-T30-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Third-party dependencies shall have verified rights and approval for their intended use.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain an inventory of third-party hardware, firmware, software packages, datasets, maps, model weights, libraries, cloud/LLM services and connectivity dependencies. |
| B02 | Record version, supplier, license/contract, use/redistribution constraints, attribution, expiry/subscription and permitted deployment/processing region. |
| B03 | Review model-weight and training-data rights separately from runtime-library licensing. |
| B04 | Block unapproved restricted components from a release and retain replacement/renewal actions for expiring dependencies. |
| B05 | A technical proof of concept does not establish commercial reuse rights or transfer TM information to a provider. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare deployed build/BOM and model/data manifests with rights register | Dependencies and required notices match approved contracts/licenses. |
| AC02 | Expiry and incompatible/unmatched dependency inspection | Renewal/replacement actions or blocked release state are explicit. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-106 — Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-CYBER-001; URG-T42-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The security architecture shall identify trust boundaries and enforcement points across the complete operational path.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Document trust boundaries across Device → Connectivity → Edge → Cloud/central → Application → API → User, including reverse command/control and evidence/live-media paths. |
| B02 | For each boundary state authenticated principals, allowed traffic, authorisation point, data classification, encryption/key ownership, audit/monitoring and compromise/failure response. |
| B03 | Separate device credentials from platform and user identity; segregate administrative access from ordinary data paths. |
| B04 | Include offline imports, backups, model artefacts and approved external services. |
| B05 | Show isolation between untrusted input/inference and operational commands. |
| B06 | The security design remains proposed pending applicable TM policy review. No certification is claimed. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Threat/data-flow review across every component/interface | Trust-boundary controls and unresolved exceptions are recorded. |
| AC02 | Cross-boundary negative test on representative actual deployment | Unauthorised access is denied and implemented controls have evidence. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-107 — Security Control
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-CYBER-002; URG-T42-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
The solution shall enforce the eight specified security-control areas at server/service boundaries.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide registered, revocable device identities. |
| B02 | Use authenticated encrypted communication. |
| B03 | Enforce API schema, size and rate limits with object/action authorisation. |
| B04 | Use Administrator-managed users and approved sessions. |
| B05 | Restrict and encrypt data/backup access; minimise data. |
| B06 | Apply least privilege to central infrastructure and protect secrets. |
| B07 | Control model artefacts, validate untrusted inputs and restrict AI data access. |
| B08 | Version operational rules; enforce approvals/restrictions and correlate action audit. |
| B09 | Monitor security failures and define revocation, isolation and recovery for compromised principals. |
| B10 | Enforce controls at servers/services, including evidence/media; UI-only controls are insufficient. |
| B11 | Map each control to applicable TM policy and retained tests. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Role/object access, malformed input and revoked-device tests | Applicable server/service controls reject prohibited access. |
| AC02 | Unauthorised model/rule change, secret-redaction and restriction-bypass tests | Controls prevent changes/leaks/bypasses. |
| AC03 | Storage/network and eight-area evidence review | Each named area has applicable policy mapping and retained evidence. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-108 — AAA
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-CYBER-003; URG-T42-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Operational device exchange shall require a unique authorised device or explicitly mediated adapter identity.
| Specification element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Assets | Device/adapter identity, telemetry/command resources and credentials. |
| Enforcement | Authenticate before acceptance/dispatch; restrict identity to its own permitted resources/actions. |
| Failure / evidence | Unknown/revoked or cross-device access is denied; replacement/registration audit remains traceable. |
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provision a unique registered identity for each field device or explicitly identified secure adapter where native capability requires mediation. |
| B02 | Authenticate before accepting operational telemetry or dispatching commands; restrict each identity to its own permitted publish/subscribe/API resources and device actions. |
| B03 | Unknown devices cannot auto-enrol. |
| B04 | Keep credentials separate from asset IDs, protect provisioning/storage, support revocation/rotation and audit registration/replacement. |
| B05 | Restrict local maintenance interfaces and avoid shared default credentials. |
| B06 | If native device security is inadequate, assess an isolated trusted gateway and document the residual exposure for approval; transport receipt is never treated as identity authorisation or execution proof. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Unknown/revoked credentials and cross-device publication/commands | Only authorised device exchange is accepted and mapped. |
| AC02 | Replacement and re-enrolment | Identity/registration history is auditable; credentials remain absent from logs/exports. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/Q14.
SRS-SEC-109 — Data Privacy
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response. |
| TM source | REQ-ETRES-002; URG-T54-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Applicable personal, sensitive or identifiable information shall be processed only within approved purposes and controls.
| Clause | Control / behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where input, evidence, labels, prompts or outputs contain personal, sensitive or identifiable information, identify the categories and processing purpose before use. |
| B02 | Apply minimum-necessary fields, role-controlled access, protection in transit/storage and approved retention/deletion controls in accordance with the applicable TM policy and regulatory requirements. |
| B03 | Record policy references and approval scope; this SRS does not assert a completed legal-compliance assessment. |
| B04 | For the proposed LLM API, use only TM-approved fields/records and processing arrangements. |
| B05 | Prefer record summaries or redacted fields sufficient for the task; photographs, unrelated identifiers and full incident narratives are not automatically sent. |
| B06 | Exclude credentials from prompts, user responses and ordinary logs. |
| B07 | Permission checks apply both before retrieval/transmission and when returning links or answers. |
| B08 | Until external-processing approval is settled, use permitted test data rather than transmit operational data. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect category-specific data flows and policy mapping | Purpose, policy and approval scope are recorded without asserting completed legal compliance. |
| AC02 | Denied record/field, redacted prompt and excluded secret tests | Actual approved API payload contains only permitted data; protected audit evidence supports the result. |
| AC03 | Retention/deletion including retrieval copies | Configured policy is enforced. |
| AC04 | External processing approval gap | Operational data is not transmitted; only permitted test data is used. |
Decisions still required: Section 5.4, OPEN-10/OPEN-11/Q14.
3.5 Design and Implementation
The criteria below describe planned tests. Test execution: Not Run; editing this document does not demonstrate acceptance.
3.5.1 Architecture Deployment and Portability
Purpose: Define component responsibilities, deployment, portability and capacity.
Actors: Architecture, platform/IoT and deployment leads; TM architecture/security reviewers.
Submodules: Component boundaries; deployment model; resource sizing; interfaces; site replication; configuration; licensing.
Boundaries: Layers describe logical responsibilities. Provider and live-TM integration approval are not implied.
SRS-ARC-101 — Deployment Model
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed deviation |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CCP-002; URG-T37-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
The proposed deployment uses an isolated POC/Pilot central environment and field/edge infrastructure, with offline TM imports and actual IoT-device integration.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Propose an isolated POC/Pilot central environment plus field/edge infrastructure, with offline TM asset/incident imports and actual IoT-device integration. |
| B02 | Identify the final component placement explicitly as public cloud, private cloud, TM infrastructure, hybrid, edge or a combination once approved. |
| B03 | Record tenancy, network ownership, region/residency, access and operational responsibility. |
| B04 | No selected provider or live TM network connection is implied. |
| B05 | Live production integration remains unavailable under user direction and is an unresolved proposed deviation from applicable URG integration/allocation entries, requiring TM agreement. |
| B06 | A portable API/mock test does not close that deviation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect deployment boundary, network and data-flow evidence | Selected environment matches approved residency/access requirements without accidental dependency on live TM production services. |
| AC02 | Review integration disposition | The deviation remains explicitly open until TM approval; portable/API mock evidence does not close it. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-01, OPEN-10 and Q09.
SRS-ARC-102 — End-to-End Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-ARCH-001; URG-T31-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
The proposed architecture allocates logical responsibilities from field capture to authorised response and recorded outcome.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | The proposed logical flow is Field/Physical capture or protection → Connectivity transport → optional Edge filtering/detection/buffering → IoT service normalisation and central platform persistence → AI/Analytics assessment → Application review → Workflow/Integration decision, authorised preventive action and recorded outcome. |
| B02 | Layers are logical responsibilities, not seven mandatory separate deployments. |
| B03 | Every device observation, health message, command and live-media interaction passes through the IoT service boundary. |
| B04 | Platform rules own validation/priority/approval/case closure. |
| B05 | Model output alone cannot actuate. |
| B06 | PostgreSQL stores records. |
| B07 | Buckets store files. |
| B08 | Offline TM imports supply asset/history context. |
| B09 | The standalone boundary remains a proposed deviation from live enterprise integration, requiring TM agreement. |
| B10 | Device integration is retained. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect data-flow diagram and trace an actual animal/rodent detection | Every applicable component links detection to Operator action and recorded outcome; conditional layers are identified. |
| AC02 | Trace construction/theft and predictive preventive flows through allocated capability tests | Applicable flow responsibilities and conditional layers are demonstrable for each allocated capability. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-01, OPEN-03 and Q09.
SRS-ARC-103 — Architecture Documentation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-ARCH-002; URG-T31-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Deliver a versioned logical and physical architecture pack covering the components, interfaces and controls below.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Deliver a versioned logical and physical architecture pack naming physical components. |
| B02 | Name cameras/sensors/IoT devices. |
| B03 | Name bearer networks and trust zones. |
| B04 | Name any edge controller/runtime. |
| B05 | Name central/cloud compute. |
| B06 | Name application and workflow services. |
| B07 | Name PostgreSQL and bucket stores. |
| B08 | Name model training/inference/registry components. |
| B09 | Name dashboard/live-view entry points. |
| B10 | Name API endpoints and external/offline interfaces. |
| B11 | Name identity, encryption, access, audit, backup and monitoring controls. |
| B12 | Each component entry states responsibility, inputs/outputs, deployment location, interfaces, failure/degraded behavior, data stored and operational owner. |
| B13 | Show signal and command direction, authentication boundaries, ports/protocols, storage/recovery dependencies and deployment variants. |
| B14 | Mark unknown vendor and site details as To Confirm; do not describe them as installed. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect every listed architecture component class and event, evidence, command, import, inference and backup path | Paths agree with API/data contracts; review findings and architecture revision history are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-10.
SRS-ARC-104 — Component Traceability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-ARCH-003; URG-T31-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Link major components and interfaces to the original source and local requirement IDs.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide a component-to-requirement matrix linking each major component and interface to literal URG IDs plus source locators and existing PL/HW/SH/FE/MD requirement IDs where present. |
| B02 | Include shared controls, field equipment, external dependencies and supporting engineering deliverables, not only application modules. |
| B03 | For each row show the responsibility satisfied, allocation, verification method and linked design artefact. |
| B04 | Identify an untraced component as an explicit supporting refinement/additional proposal. |
| B05 | Identify an uncovered requirement as a gap requiring response. |
| B06 | Keep duplicate or unusually formatted source IDs; do not replace them with new requirement IDs. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile inventory and traceability matrix in both directions; sample functional and NFR paths | Requirement, component and planned verification links reconcile; untraced components and uncovered requirements remain recorded findings. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-12 and Q01–Q03.
SRS-ARC-105 — Technology Justification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-ARCH -004; URG-T31-R05 |
| Source modality | descriptive obligation; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Document evidence-based technology choices, alternatives, dependencies and replacement paths.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each major technology, provide a selection record stating operating need, evaluated alternatives, assumptions, measured or supplier-supported suitability, security/licensing, integration, maintainability, lifecycle cost, portability and failure limitations. |
| B02 | Retain PostgreSQL, bucket storage and MQTT/HTTP as user-confirmed choices while evaluating versions/providers/broker/transport details. |
| B03 | Assess edge/GPU need against sensor/video/inference workload, network and energy constraints. |
| B04 | Keep camera, deterrent, map supplier, model family and hosting unselected until evidence supports them. |
| B05 | A selected technology must have an exit/replaceability path or a declared proprietary dependency. |
| B06 | Preserve literal ID REQ-ARCH -004. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review every major BOM, software and deployment choice and rejected alternatives | Rationale cites a benchmark, site measurement, requirement or vendor evidence; alternatives use comparable criteria. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03, OPEN-10 and Q02.
SRS-ARC-106 — Cloud Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CCP-001; URG-T37-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Document the proposed central topology and its durable-state, device-interaction and failure boundaries.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Proposed central topology comprises a protected web/API application, separate FALCON IoT service with protocol adapters, ingestion/media and background workers, workflow/risk services, PostgreSQL, private bucket storage and separately controlled model processing/registry. |
| B02 | Show compute/runtime boundaries, storage/database capacity, network zones and allowed traffic, identity/secrets controls, monitoring/logging, backup/restore path and external/offline integration endpoints. |
| B03 | Keep application/workflow state durable. |
| B04 | Bound worker queues and expose dependency failure. |
| B05 | The IoT service is the only device-interaction boundary. |
| B06 | Separate deployment units only where load/security/failure isolation requires them. |
| B07 | This does not mandate a distributed microservice stack or particular cloud vendor. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect deployable topology/configuration inventory; exercise event, command, media, inference and backup paths | Network/security configuration and component-to-requirement links are retained for the exercised paths. |
| AC02 | Make each dependency unavailable | Declared degraded/failure handling is observed without loss of required durable state; evidence remains linked to the topology. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-10 and Q10; numerical parameters “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)” and “Availability and recovery (PAR-04)”.
SRS-ARC-107 — Resource Requirements
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CCP-003; URG-T37-R04 |
| Source modality | descriptive obligation; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide reproducible resource sizing based on measured workloads and explicit assumptions.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide a sizing sheet with calculations and assumptions that can be checked and repeated. |
| B02 | CPU demand derives from measured request/ingest/worker service time and peak rates. |
| B03 | GPU is included only for selected model throughput/latency that needs it. |
| B04 | Memory includes runtime/model working sets, active jobs and database cache. |
| B05 | Storage includes retained row/index growth, evidence/model/import/report objects, queue reserve and backups. |
| B06 | Network demand sums telemetry, event media, requested live streams, updates and replay overhead. |
| B07 | Database capacity states record cardinalities, query concurrency, write rate, index/retention assumptions and recovery overhead. |
| B08 | Record headroom, benchmark environment and scaling trigger as proposed parameters. |
| B09 | Show how different values for unknown inputs affect the sizing result. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Benchmark messages, queries, model jobs and streams; calculate base, peak and failure-recovery capacity | Sizing is reproducible from measured workload and retained environment assumptions. |
| AC02 | Load-test candidate sizing | Observed resource use and bottlenecks reconcile with the sizing sheet; workload and environment manifest are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, Q10; numerical parameters “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”, “Live-view quality and sessions (PAR-10)” and “Retention, backup and reporting scale (PAR-12)”.
SRS-ARC-108 — Scalability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CCP-006; URG-T37-R07 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Support expansion through configuration, canonical contracts and measured capacity controls without rewriting core concepts.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Represent site/device/source as data/configuration, with indexed/paginated queries and adapters using the same canonical contracts. |
| B02 | Scale ingestion, media and model workers independently within measured database/broker/storage limits. |
| B03 | Externalise durable queue/work state so restarting a worker does not lose accepted work. |
| B04 | Partition high-volume data or add replicas only when the capacity assessment demonstrates need, preserving consistency of commands, cases and audit. |
| B05 | Apply bounded concurrency/backpressure and expose saturation. |
| B06 | Expansion must not require rewriting core asset/event/workflow concepts. |
| B07 | New device-specific adapters or site engineering may still be necessary and declared. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Add a second configured site/source and increase load through the planned POC-to-Pilot envelope | Isolation/associations remain correct without core-code redesign; agreed latency and data-integrity measures are met, with bottleneck/scaling evidence and any observed deviations retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, Q10; numerical parameters “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”, “Event processing time (PAR-01)” and “Alert latency (PAR-02)”.
SRS-ARC-109 — Site Replication
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-REX-001; URG-T47-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Replicate additional sites using the common contracts and a controlled deployment package.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Instantiate additional sites through registered site/asset/device/deployment records and approved site configuration, reusing the same IoT, event, risk, workflow and access contracts. |
| B02 | Replication package includes core application/runtime release, compatible device adapters, database/schema changes, site-specific assets/geometry, rule/settings versions and deployment/commissioning checklist. |
| B03 | Survey, power, connectivity, mounting and field-safe action policy remain site-specific inputs. |
| B04 | Configuration reuse cannot waive them. |
| B05 | Verify central capacity before connecting the new site and isolate incomplete provisioning so it cannot emit accepted events or commands under another identity. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Create second site from replication package, register/import devices/assets and run end-to-end flow | Histories and identities do not collide; any code changes are recorded and justified as adapter/configuration changes rather than fundamental redesign. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04.
SRS-ARC-110 — Deployment Portability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PORT-001; URG-T48-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Package core services, migrations, interfaces and configuration for redeployment at additional fibre locations.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Package core services, data migrations, interfaces and site configuration so they can be redeployed at additional fibre locations without changing the core architecture. |
| B02 | Keep site coordinates, monitored assets, network endpoints, device mappings and operational settings outside core application code. |
| B03 | Revalidate physical placement, power, connectivity, environment and safety for each location. |
| B04 | Retain device relocation/deployment history instead of overwriting old records. |
| B05 | Portability does not guarantee that the same sensors, mounts and communications links suit every site or remove the need for installation work. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Deploy second-location configuration with the same application release | Registration, ingestion, dashboard, authorised workflow and historic-location checks succeed against the agreed configuration; site-specific adaptations are documented. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-ARC-111 — Technology Dependency
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PORT-002; URG-T48-R03 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Maintain a dependency and exit register for the selected hardware, software, services and external interfaces.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a dependency/exit register for proprietary hardware interfaces/firmware, controller accelerators/runtime, map/GIS tools, model weights/frameworks, database extensions, bucket/cloud identity/monitoring services, connectivity providers and external APIs. |
| B02 | For each state purpose, criticality, license/service terms, data export format, replacement option, adaptation effort, unsupported feature risk and migration cost/time. |
| B03 | Retain PostgreSQL, buckets and MQTT/HTTP as chosen abstractions while declaring provider-specific features actually used. |
| B04 | Exportability is tested. |
| B05 | An open protocol alone does not demonstrate that the whole solution can be moved to another platform. |
| B06 | Provider/model/vendor remains unselected unless separately approved. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile deployed BOM and service/configuration inventory with dependency register | Dependencies and declared limitations are complete and traceable. |
| AC02 | Rehearse representative records/files/configuration export/import and one replaceable boundary | Exportability and replacement limitations are evidenced; migration results are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-10.
SRS-ARC-112 — Deployment Replicability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PORT-004; URG-T48-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide a reproducible deployment guide identifying prerequisites, responsibilities, gates and recovery procedures.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide a replication guide naming required central/edge software versions, selected equipment/BOM, power/mounting/connection prerequisites, site survey/design, permitted credentials, asset/device imports, adapter/API dependencies, configuration bundle, model/rule versions and capacity allocation. |
| B02 | Sequence provisioning, installation, calibration, integration, verification, monitored operation and handover. |
| B03 | State who performs/accepts each gate and how failed deployment is isolated/rolled back. |
| B04 | Identify reusable components versus site engineering and optional dependencies. |
| B05 | Keep the target site uncommissioned until required evidence is accepted, with residual limitations documented. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | A person other than the guide author reproduces a clean deployment using the package | End-to-end function and recovery behaviour are reproduced; missing prerequisites and ambiguities are recorded. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-16.
SRS-ARC-113 — Licensing and Subscription
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-COST-003; URG-T49-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
List required and optional recurring licensing/subscription dependencies and their operational impact.
| Rule | Architecture / deployment rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | List all required recurring software/platform/model/cloud/connectivity/data/map/support and other license/subscription dependencies, with supplier, item/version/tier, metric billed, included allowance, overage/egress, renewal/termination, data/usage rights, support/end-of-life and service failure/expiry behavior. |
| B02 | Distinguish optional services from those needed to sustain core operation. |
| B03 | Record whether an LLM outage affects only the proposed assistant. |
| B04 | Include per-device/SIM, per-user, per-inference/token, storage/backup and software maintenance charges where relevant. |
| B05 | Reference current supplier terms/quotes when selected and state unknowns explicitly. |
| B06 | No subscription or purchase is approved by this specification. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile dependency/cost registers with deployed service/license inventory | Required and optional subscription dependencies and cost assumptions are traceable. |
| AC02 | Model allowance exhaustion and expiry | Observed functional impact and data export/exit obligations match the declared terms and limitations. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-10.
3.5.2 Edge Controller
Purpose: Allocate edge workload and justify controller resources and dependencies.
Actors: Hardware/edge and IoT leads; engineering reviewers.
Submodules: Workload assessment; hardware/software dependencies; local processing; compute/storage/interface sizing.
Boundaries: A separate inference controller is conditional on measured need; local physical-action authority is not implied.
HW-CTL-001 — Controller resources and interfaces
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide sufficient computing, storage, and interfaces for the agreed camera, sensor, and edge workloads.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Run agreed camera, sensor and edge workload on selected unit | Resource usage is recorded against agreed capacity limits; no pass is inferred before those limits are agreed. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and Q10; numerical parameter “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”.
SRS-CTL-101 — Assessment of edge functions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-EDGE-001; URG-T36-R02 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
For each proposed edge function, state the device capability and measured operating need that justify running it locally.
| Rule | Controller capability / condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | Document an edge-function allocation for preliminary filtering, video/image processing, event detection, aggregation, compression, local decision-making and temporary storage, identifying each as selected, unnecessary or unresolved with rationale. |
| B02 | Proposed minimum on a capable edge unit is acquisition, timestamp/identity preservation, health and buffering. |
| B03 | Place filtering/inference/compression locally only when measured bandwidth, latency, privacy or offline needs justify the compute/energy cost. |
| B04 | Ready-made detection devices may emit events without a separate inference controller. |
| B05 | Central platform retains business rules/cases. |
| B06 | No generic local physical-action authority is inferred. |
| B07 | Record inputs, outputs, configuration/model version, resource bounds and degraded behavior for each selected function. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review function allocation against selected hardware; exercise each chosen function with sample input, resource measurement and central-link loss | Selected functions exhibit documented outputs, resource bounds and degraded behaviour. |
| AC02 | Inspect excluded functions | Evidence shows each is handled elsewhere or is genuinely inapplicable. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameters “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)” and “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-CTL-102 — Hardware Dependency
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-COST-002; URG-T49-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Justify each proposed hardware item using functional value, alternatives and lifecycle implications.
| Rule | Controller capability / condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each proposed physical item explain the threat/function it enables, why existing infrastructure or a simpler option is insufficient, measured/expected operational benefit and limitations. |
| B02 | Attach installation/mounting, power/duty/autonomy, communications/data, maintenance/calibration, consumables, replacement/spares, useful-life/end-of-support and disposal implications. |
| B03 | Separate sensing/detection value from deterrent/protection effectiveness. |
| B04 | A working actuator is not evidence of prevention benefit. |
| B05 | Compare at least the relevant lower-complexity/no-extra-hardware option where credible. |
| B06 | Quantify with validated trials or mark assumptions. |
| B07 | Do not preserve an accelerator/sensor solely because it appeared in a historical proposal. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace every BOM item to requirement/use-case evidence and review alternatives, value and lifecycle implications | Observed POC performance supports the claimed necessity; maintenance and power burden reconcile with the assessment. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03.
3.5.3 Sensors Camera and Live View
Purpose: Specify sensing, placement, calibration, evidence and authorised live viewing.
Actors: Hardware/IoT leads, authorised maintainers, Operators and Administrators.
Submodules: Threat-to-sensor mapping; coverage and placement; calibration; animal/tamper detection; health; event media; live viewing.
Boundaries: Actual-device evidence is required where stated. One camera per panel does not establish system concurrency; live viewing does not add recording.
HW-SEN-001 — Sensor and camera acquisition
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Connect selected sensors and camera to the edge system and capture observations with timestamps and source identity.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Capture observations from actual selected sensors/camera | Timestamps, source identity and available evidence match the observation; separately specified live-view controls are verified. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-09 and OPEN-14; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-001 — On-demand live view
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Administrators and Operators shall start and stop a live session for one supported camera per viewing panel through the IoT-mediated path.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Viewer-only accounts shall be denied. |
| B02 | Session inactivity shall terminate viewing using the agreed timeout, and start/stop/timeout shall be audited. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | View actual supported camera from device and related-event entry points using Administrator and Operator roles | Each allowed role can start and explicitly stop the IoT-mediated session; start/stop actions are audited. |
| AC02 | Attempt Viewer access and exercise inactivity termination | Viewer access is denied; viewing terminates at the agreed inactivity condition and termination is audited. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-14; numerical parameter “Live-view quality and sessions (PAR-10)”.
SRS-SEN-002 — Live and saved media distinction
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Live viewing shall be identified separately from stored event images/clips.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Initial live-view scope excludes manual and continuous recording. |
| B02 | Displaying an image shall not count as demonstrating continuous live video. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare actual moving live scene with saved event evidence | Live and stored media have clear distinct labels; a saved image is not accepted as continuous live-video evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-14.
SRS-SEN-101 — Sensor Connectivity
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-INTHW-001; URG-T12-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where sensors are deployed, observations pass from registered authorised devices through the IoT service to the platform.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where sensors are deployed, registered and authorised devices send observations through the IoT service, which authenticates the source, translates its payload and supplies the platform. |
| B02 | Retain originating device, source observation/event identity, original time, receipt time and available evidence/health data. |
| B03 | MQTT and HTTP remain the recorded protocol direction. |
| B04 | Exact device adapter and payload are not assumed. |
| B05 | Resolve the observation against the device deployment valid at its original event time, then its monitored location and linked fibre asset where available. |
| B06 | Missing/invalid required fields are quarantined or flagged with a reason. |
| B07 | An unknown device is rejected. |
| B08 | Ambiguous event time or overlapping/missing deployment history retains the observation for authorised review but withholds association-dependent automatic action. |
| B09 | Do not discard separate genuine detections merely because they share values. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace actual deployed sensor observation through its adapter | Registered source and applicable deployment/location/asset are preserved through the IoT path. |
| AC02 | Replay same identity; submit a genuine new detection | Replay creates no duplicate; the distinct genuine detection remains retained. |
| AC03 | Submit unregistered device, invalid payload and delayed pre-relocation observation, including ambiguous history/time | Unknown source is rejected; invalid input has a reason; determinable historic placement is used and ambiguity remains reviewable without association-dependent action. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-07.
SRS-SEN-102 — Infrastructure Tampering
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-FUNC-031; URG-T17-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where appropriate monitoring equipment is deployed, record supported tamper/access observations against the commissioned asset and deployment.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where appropriate equipment is deployed on cabinets, manholes, poles or other designated fibre infrastructure, register its monitored asset and the supported abnormal-access/tamper signature. |
| B02 | Translate a qualifying observation into an event retaining raw/source indication, device, applicable deployment, time and available evidence. |
| B03 | The commissioned equipment/asset mapping is a precondition. |
| B04 | A database record alone does not establish monitoring coverage. |
| B05 | When authorised maintenance context exists, label it for operator assessment and apply the agreed alert rules. |
| B06 | Maintenance restrictions may prevent physical response but do not delete tamper observations. |
| B07 | Unsupported signals, absent sensor contact or stale status are device/coverage conditions rather than evidence that no tampering occurred. |
| B08 | Do not modify underlying fibre infrastructure without separately approved installation scope. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Apply safe approved tamper/access stimulus and benign condition for each selected equipment/asset type | Mapped asset, timestamps and raw indication match the commissioned observation. |
| AC02 | Test maintenance context and disconnected sensor | Observations/history and unavailable coverage remain distinguishable; maintenance does not erase tamper evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04.
SRS-SEN-103 — Animal Activity Detection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-FUNC-040; URG-T18-R02 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Demonstrate actual animal/rodent observations in M2 and integrated field detection, response and outcome in M3.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | At an agreed controlled location in M2, receive an actual animal/rodent detection or identifiable observation through the IoT service, associate it to the monitored deployment and show it with available evidence. |
| B02 | Demonstrate a separate authorised operator-triggered actual deterrent and basic live view. |
| B03 | M3 integrates actual field detection, rule decision, response and outcome. |
| B04 | Detector processing location, species and deterrent are not assumed. |
| B05 | For each supported activity, produce event identity, animal/rodent category or unclassified activity, device/source, original/receipt time, deployment and available evidence/confidence. |
| B06 | Review monkey-related drop-fibre damage and recurring rodent damage from the narrative when defining supported scenarios. |
| B07 | Activity is a potential damage indicator, not proof of damage. |
| B08 | Missing evidence or unsuitable light/coverage is an explicit limitation. |
| B09 | No rule match means record only and no automatic physical action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Actual selected device under agreed safe conditions: animal/rodent event, benign input and unsupported condition | Event traces to platform with supported classification/evidence and explicit limitations; benign/unmatched input cannot cause unapproved physical action. |
| AC02 | Separately demonstrate M2 manual deterrent and basic live view | Actual authorised deterrent and live-view evidence are retained separately from detection. |
| AC03 | M3 integrated rule, approval and action-result test | Full field response path is evaluated against agreed detection metrics and records outcome separately from execution. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-04 and OPEN-09; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-104 — Animal Classification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-FUNC-041; URG-T18-R03 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where suitable data is available, the detector should return reviewed animal/rodent categories and supplied confidence.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where image, sensor or other suitable data is available, the detector should return reviewed animal/rodent activity categories and any source-supplied confidence. |
| B02 | Preserve raw class and mapped operational category with the classifier/version. |
| B03 | Proposed initial resolution is the minimum category needed by an approved response rule. |
| B04 | Species-level labels require suitable evidence and validation. |
| B05 | An uncertain or unsupported class remains Unclassified/Needs review rather than a guessed species. |
| B06 | Allow an appropriately authorised operator to record a corrected/reviewed category and reason as feedback while retaining the original detection and its evidence. |
| B07 | Only approved rules using sufficiently supported inputs may request action. |
| B08 | Missing confidence is not numeric zero and does not satisfy a confidence condition. |
| B09 | A category change does not replay past physical actions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reviewed examples for every supported category; ambiguous input, unsuitable evidence and absent confidence | Category results meet agreed criteria or retain recorded failures; no unsupported species label or numeric-zero confidence is invented. |
| AC02 | Inspect model/source and Operator correction provenance | Original and corrected categories remain traceable; correction does not replay past physical actions; class-level test results are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-09; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-105 — Field Deployment Design
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PHY-001; URG-T32-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide a site deployment schedule and arrangement drawing for each installed field component.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide a site deployment schedule and arrangement drawing for each installed field component, with unique item/device ID, monitored threat/asset/zone, location, mounting, power, communications, coverage and maintenance access. |
| B02 | Assess applicability separately for cameras, IoT sensors, acoustic/vibration sensors, cabinet sensors, manhole sensors, environmental sensors, animal/rodent detection devices, communication gateways, power systems, mounting equipment and enclosures. |
| B03 | A category not selected receives a reason and alternative coverage, rather than an assumed installation commitment. |
| B04 | Include selected deterrent/passive protection components and their physical separation from sensing where needed. |
| B05 | The M2 arrangement must connect actual selected detection and deterrent hardware through the IoT service. |
| B06 | Final site arrangement cannot be inferred from a lab layout. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect every listed category in applicability/BOM schedule and trace installed items | Every installed item links to drawing, inventory and requirement; excluded categories retain rationale. |
| AC02 | Demonstrate actual M2 signal/command path and inspect field layout before energisation | Selected detection/deterrent hardware uses the IoT boundary; field arrangement has its own inspection evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-SEN-106 — Threat-to-Sensor Mapping
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-001; URG-T33-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Maintain a validated threat-to-sensor mapping for construction, theft/vandalism and animal/rodent scenarios.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a threat-to-sensor matrix across construction, theft/vandalism and animal/rodent scenarios. |
| B02 | For construction, assess visible machinery/person/activity and acoustic/vibration indications near fibre. |
| B03 | For theft/vandalism, assess intrusion, cabinet/manhole access or abnormal disturbance. |
| B04 | For animal/rodent, assess observed presence/approach/contact at the agreed species/size/zone. |
| B05 | Validate each proposed sensing method; do not assume one generic camera can recognise every threat. |
| B06 | Record sensor output, physical evidence, expected detection/classification stage, complementary data, limitations and the action decision it can inform. |
| B07 | Passive protection has no sensing claim unless monitored separately. |
| B08 | Detection does not itself prove fibre damage or successful deterrence. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review every target threat and test positive/negative observations with selected sensors | Labelled evidence, detected outputs and coverage/false-alarm limitations substantiate the mapping without unsupported sensing or effectiveness claims. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-09.
SRS-SEN-107 — Sensor Coverage
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-002; URG-T33-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record validated effective sensing coverage and exclusions for the designated risk area.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record effective coverage as the validated observable area/segment/zone under stated target size, distance, lighting, orientation, occlusion and environmental conditions. |
| B02 | For non-visual sensors record the physical coupling/propagation or monitored enclosure/point that bounds detection. |
| B03 | Overlay each sensor’s validated coverage on the designated risk area, identify overlaps and blind spots, and describe combined coverage plus any uncovered approach. |
| B04 | Select placement/additional sensing or constrain the claimed monitored area when test evidence does not cover the proposed zone. |
| B05 | A map icon or datasheet maximum range alone is insufficient proof of field coverage. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Documented grid/path/zone test at boundaries and expected blind spots in agreed day/night conditions | Validated coverage, distances, test evidence and remaining exclusions are retained for representative targets. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and Q10; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-108 — Sensor Detection Performance
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-003; URG-T33-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record selected-sensor performance using applicable measurable characteristics and declared test conditions.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Create a selected-sensor performance sheet with measurable detection range, field of view, sensitivity/threshold, detection/reporting frequency, sampling rate, accuracy and false-positive/false-negative characteristics where applicable. |
| B02 | Distinguish raw sensor accuracy/resolution from model classification quality and end-to-end detection success. |
| B03 | State units, target/ground-truth definition, sample count, environmental/lighting/distance conditions, firmware/model/configuration and confidence/uncertainty. |
| B04 | Non-applicable characteristics require reasons. |
| B05 | Absent vendor values require measurement or an explicit limitation. |
| B06 | Report both detected and missed threat opportunities and false alarms over a declared observation basis. |
| B07 | No minimum percentage or range is invented. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Labelled positive/negative trials over proposed operating envelope; collect raw/model outputs | Applicable detection/error measures include denominators and condition slices; comparison uses agreed limits and retains failures as evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, Q10; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-109 — Sensor Placement
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-004; URG-T33-R05 |
| Source modality | descriptive obligation; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Select and validate sensor placement through the stated site assessment method.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Apply this placement method: identify the threatened asset/segment and expected threat approach. |
| B02 | Inspect line of sight or sensor coupling, target scale and environmental interference. |
| B03 | Select position/orientation and candidate coverage. |
| B04 | Check power/connectivity, structural fit, physical safety, privacy and maintenance access. |
| B05 | Then validate coverage with representative trials. |
| B06 | Record the selected and rejected positions with reasons. |
| B07 | For cameras, relate mounting/FOV to usable evidence and on-demand live view. |
| B08 | For cabinet/manhole/vibration sensors, document attachment and measured response at the protected structure. |
| B09 | Re-run the method when infrastructure, vegetation, construction or device placement changes. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review one position-selection record and repeat site placement/coverage checks | Rejected locations and constraints remain documented; final arrangement matches approved drawing. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-110 — Sensor Calibration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-005; URG-T33-R06 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where calibration applies, retain the calibration procedure, results, configuration history and validation conditions.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where calibration applies, store the manufacturer/reference procedure, required reference instrument/target, device identity, calibration date, operator, environmental conditions, measured results and next check trigger. |
| B02 | Save configuration/threshold versions and permitted ranges. |
| B03 | Only authorised maintainers change them. |
| B04 | Validate sensor operation after initial setup, relocation, firmware/sensor replacement or material drift. |
| B05 | If calibration is failed/expired where required, identify the affected readings as not validated and constrain dependent decisions according to the approved quality policy. |
| B06 | Where a device is factory-calibrated or has no adjustable calibration, retain evidence and define a functional validation instead of inventing a calibration control. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Calibrate/configure representative sensor and compare before/after readings with traceable reference | Calibration and configuration history retains the measured results. |
| AC02 | Attempt invalid/unauthorised change; simulate failed calibration | Invalid/unauthorised changes do not become valid configuration; affected readings and dependent decisions follow the approved calibration/quality policy. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-07; numerical parameter “Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05)”.
SRS-SEN-111 — Sensor Data Integrity
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SENS-007; URG-T33-R08 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Preserve sensor identity, timing, source values, quality and historical deployment association in accepted records.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Accepted sensor records carry registered device/sensor-channel identity, original timestamp with clock-quality indication, service receipt timestamp, deployment/location reference, measurement or event type/value, relevant unit and supplied device status. |
| B02 | Derive the initial location from registered placement rather than require per-event GPS. |
| B03 | Preserve raw source unit/value and validated normalised representation where conversion is needed. |
| B04 | Flag a missing required unit, time or status as a quality issue; do not supply an assumed value. |
| B05 | Retain source and platform identities separately for deduplication. |
| B06 | Proposed delayed-event association uses a trustworthy event time and non-overlapping deployment history. |
| B07 | Uncertain/boundary time is flagged unresolved without rewriting historical placements or enabling location-dependent automatic action. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Complete, missing-unit, unknown-device, duplicate and delayed records across relocation | Validation results are explicit; source metadata remains unchanged; reliable historical deployment is used, otherwise association is explicitly unresolved. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-07.
SRS-SEN-112 — Findings
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-SITE-002; URG-T44-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Translate material site-survey findings into traceable design decisions, constraints or corrective actions.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Convert each material survey finding into a design decision, constraint or corrective action with traceability to placement/coverage, selected component/environmental envelope, power budget, bearer, mounting/security or maintenance access. |
| B02 | Revise drawings/BOM/configuration and test conditions accordingly. |
| B03 | Identify residual blind spots, inadequate supply/coverage or unresolved permissions and provide an alternative or explicit TM decision before commissioning. |
| B04 | Preserve the original finding, disposition, responsible owner and verification. |
| B05 | Recheck affected design assumptions and acceptance checks when field conditions change. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace coverage, power, network and installation/security survey findings to final design and commissioning | Each material finding has disposition/evidence; critical open findings reconcile to resolution or an approved limitation. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02.
SRS-SEN-113 — Additional Sensors
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-REX-003; URG-T47-R04 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Additional sensor types should integrate through declared IoT capabilities and canonical contracts.
| Rule | Sensing / live-view rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Additional sensor types should join through an IoT adapter and capability profile declaring identity/channel, unit/schema, timing, status/health, evidence, commands/feedback and calibration limits. |
| B02 | Translate native payloads into canonical observation/event/health contracts without coupling the central platform to vendor message structures. |
| B03 | Register/authorise the device and map its placement before accepting operational data. |
| B04 | Unsupported capabilities remain explicitly unavailable. |
| B05 | An adapter must not claim execution confirmation or duplicate-execution control it cannot prove. |
| B06 | If a sensor changes what the data means, review and extend the interface contract and carry out the required migration; do not silently change existing field meanings. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Second contrasting sensor simulator or selected type connected through adapter; contract, identity, quality and replay tests | Existing device flows remain unchanged; capability matrix and limitations are retained, including unsupported capabilities. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-07.
3.5.4 Edge Software
Purpose: Specify selected local processing, buffering and synchronisation.
Actors: Edge/IoT leads and engineering reviewers.
Submodules: Acquisition and timestamping; permitted local processing; buffering; restart recovery; synchronisation.
Boundaries: Offline sensing/buffering does not authorise autonomous deterrence or replay of withheld/expired actions.
HW-SW-001 — Local processing
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Acquire camera and sensor data and run the agreed local processing.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Known camera/sensor inputs processed using agreed local functions | Outputs and provenance match the expected processing result. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
HW-SW-002 — Buffering and recovery
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Support local buffering and recovery when connectivity is interrupted.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Interrupt connectivity and fill/recover agreed buffer workload | Original timestamps are preserved and applicable data loss/overflow is reported. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-EDG-101 — Resiliency
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-EDGE-002; URG-T36-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Designated edge functions shall continue during temporary central-connectivity loss within their agreed power and storage envelope.
| Rule | Edge operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | During temporary central-connectivity loss, designated edge functions shall continue within their agreed power/storage envelope: proposed local capture, source timestamping, installed validated detection where selected, health recording and durable buffering. |
| B02 | Retain the last approved configuration/model needed for those functions and make queue/resource limits visible after reconnection or locally where supported. |
| B03 | Do not equate lost central connectivity with permission for autonomous deterrence. |
| B04 | Offline action eligibility, limits, stop behavior and recovery must be separately approved for the chosen device/site. |
| B05 | Until then the draft leaves that decision open while retaining the required offline sensing/buffering design. |
| B06 | Document exactly what stops when capacity/power is exhausted. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Disconnect central link for agreed endurance window | Acquisition, selected detection and queue records reconcile to expected input and selected recovery behaviour. |
| AC02 | Full storage and power interruption | Documented exhausted-capacity behaviour occurs without unintended physical action. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-EDG-102 — Synchronisation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-EDGE-003; URG-T36-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Synchronise buffered metadata and evidence through the IoT service after connectivity returns.
| Rule | Edge operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | After connectivity returns, re-authenticate the device/edge identity and synchronise queued metadata/evidence through the IoT service using original IDs/times, payload schema/version and integrity checks. |
| B02 | Resume incomplete files where the chosen transport supports it, otherwise retry the same identified object. |
| B03 | Acknowledge only the durable accepted state. |
| B04 | Apply rate-limited catch-up so replay does not starve current critical telemetry. |
| B05 | Deduplicate retransmissions, preserve real separate detections and flag out-of-order/delayed/clock-uncertain data. |
| B06 | Resolve device deployment from recorded history when reliable. |
| B07 | Ambiguous relocation association is exposed for review. |
| B08 | Synchronisation does not rerun historical rules into expired or withheld deterrent actions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconnect after duplicates, interrupted evidence, uncertain clock and relocation during outage | Counts, checksums and location associations reconcile; ambiguity is explicit, current traffic remains observable and stale commands do not execute. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
3.5.5 Connectivity
Purpose: Select site communications and define loss, retry and recovery behaviour.
Actors: Connectivity, edge and IoT leads; TM site owners.
Submodules: Site communications assessment; protocol adaptation; connection loss; acknowledgements; store-and-forward.
Boundaries: MQTT/HTTP are protocol decisions; each site bearer and media capability still needs evidence. IoT owns command retries.
HW-CON-001 — Event evidence and health transport
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Transmit events, evidence, and device health through the agreed communications interface.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace actual-device event, evidence reference and health reading across selected communication path | Corresponding platform records retain the expected source/transport association. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
HW-CON-002 — Acknowledgement retry and buffering
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Define acknowledgement and retry behaviour with edge buffering to handle interrupted connectivity.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Interrupt and restore selected connection | Agreed acknowledgements/retries preserve original timestamps with duplicate-free recovery; unsupported buffering has an explicit disposition. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-CON-101 — Field Connectivity
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CONN-001; URG-T35-R02 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Connect selected devices through assessed bearers and the IoT service using the documented protected platform interface.
| Rule | Connectivity / recovery rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Connect selected devices to the IoT service using assessed site bearer links, and connect that service to the platform over the documented protected interface. |
| B02 | MQTT and HTTP are retained protocol decisions. |
| B03 | Adapters mediate native device protocols as required. |
| B04 | Evaluate fibre, Wi-Fi, cellular, LPWAN, radio, satellite or another suitable bearer where appropriate rather than require all. |
| B05 | Carry observations/status and command/results. |
| B06 | Transfer evidence and requested live video through a capacity-suitable path within the IoT boundary. |
| B07 | A low-bandwidth bearer suitable for telemetry is not assumed suitable for continuous video. |
| B08 | Expose loss/quality limitations and rejected/failed transfers. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Demonstrate actual-device observations, evidence, health, command/results and requested live-view path on proposed bearer | Throughput, latency, reconnection behaviour and supported-function limitations are captured. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-CON-102 — Connectivity Selection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CONN-002; URG-T35-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Select site connectivity using measured coverage, workload, energy, reliability, security and cost evidence.
| Rule | Connectivity / recovery rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Issue a site connectivity comparison using measured/verified coverage, sustainable and burst bandwidth, latency/jitter, reliability/outage behavior, device power consumption, environmental/installation constraints, security and ongoing cost. |
| B02 | Model telemetry, event images/clips, concurrent requested streams, updates and buffer replay separately. |
| B03 | Include uplink limits and data caps. |
| B04 | Explain selected primary bearer and whether fallback is needed for the agreed service target. |
| B05 | Define degraded behavior when media cannot pass but event metadata can, and document any site requiring additional infrastructure. |
| B06 | Marketing coverage maps or protocol choice alone are insufficient field evidence. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Site signal/path and representative upload/stream tests where access permits | Findings reconcile to workload/energy/cost assumptions; alternate-bearer trade-offs and unresolved coverage risk are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-CON-103 — Communication Loss
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CONN-003; URG-T35-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Continue selected local functions during communication loss and recover delivery without stale or duplicate physical action.
| Rule | Connectivity / recovery rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | On communication loss, continue the selected local acquisition/buffering functions and report loss after the configured contact threshold. |
| B02 | For critical event information use durable local or edge storage where technically supported, preserving source IDs/time and available evidence. |
| B03 | Acknowledgement and deletion rules distinguish transport receipt from durable application acceptance. |
| B04 | Retry metadata/file transfer within bounded capacity and expose pending, failed and dropped/lost counts. |
| B05 | Reconnection re-authenticates, resumes/replays idempotently and labels delayed data. |
| B06 | Commands use the separate IoT-owned retry/expiry contract. |
| B07 | Recovery of event delivery does not authorise stale actuator replay. |
| B08 | If a selected device cannot retain critical information, require a supporting edge design or an explicit TM-reviewed limitation/deviation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Interrupt during receipt, upload and command handling, then restore link | Source/accepted/lost counts, checksums and original times reconcile without duplicate records/actions or stale actuator replay. |
| AC02 | Restart while disconnected; reach full buffer | Agreed persistence, capacity and loss-reporting behaviour is evidenced. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
SRS-CON-104 — Store-and-Forward
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-CONN-004; URG-T35-R05 |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where connectivity is not assured, the proposed design adopts bounded persistent store-and-forward under the source should recommendation.
| Rule | Connectivity / recovery rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where continuous connectivity cannot be guaranteed, the proposed design adopts the source’s “should” recommendation through a bounded persistent edge/device queue. |
| B02 | Store source event identity/time, deployment reference, status and required event metadata before sending. |
| B03 | Retain relevant evidence subject to declared capacity. |
| B04 | Size the queue from agreed event/evidence rate and outage duration, define acknowledgement-based removal, restart durability and an approved overflow priority/loss report. |
| B05 | Protect queued data and upload securely after restoration, retaining original timestamps and verifying evidence integrity. |
| B06 | If native buffering is inadequate, evaluate an edge companion. |
| B07 | Document any residual nonconformance instead of treating the recommendation as irrelevant. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Known sequence during link loss; restart buffering component, then reconnect | All in-capacity records/evidence reconcile with original identity/time and integrity. |
| AC02 | Controlled capacity exceedance | Loss counters and approved overflow priorities reflect actual loss without false completeness claims. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameter “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)”.
3.5.6 Solar and Power
Purpose: Size and verify field power, overnight operation and failure recovery.
Actors: Power/hardware engineers, site owners and commissioning personnel.
Submodules: Load budget; overnight operation; solar/battery sizing; power monitoring; interruption and recovery.
Boundaries: HW-PWR-001 retains its Confirmed overnight-operation statement. Its acceptance conditions remain unagreed; solar sizing remains Proposed.
HW-PWR-001 — Overnight operation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Confirmed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-02 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
The field unit must support operation overnight.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Selected field unit operates through agreed overnight test with approved duty cycle and initial battery condition | Required overnight operation is evidenced by retained power, health and time logs; duration and pass limits must be agreed before judging acceptance. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
HW-PWR-002 — Solar load and energy sizing
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide a solar-based power system sized against the agreed total load and operating conditions.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect sizing against measured total load and agreed operating/environmental conditions | Energy balance and operating-test evidence substantiate the proposed solar sizing. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-PWR-101 — Power Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PEM-001; URG-T34-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Produce a measured load schedule and power architecture for every device/field unit, preserving the confirmed overnight requirement.
| Rule | Power capability / operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | Produce a per-device/field-unit load schedule and power diagram showing source, voltage/current, conversion/distribution, isolation/protection, storage/charging and monitoring points. |
| B02 | Include controller/sensor idle and active consumption, startup/inrush, night illumination, communications/reconnect, evidence/live-video, cooling and permitted deterrent duty cycle. |
| B03 | Calculate daily/overnight energy from measured duty cycles plus conversion losses and approved design margin. |
| B04 | Size cable/protection and battery/solar/PoE capacity against the resulting envelope. |
| B05 | Preserve HW-PWR-001 overnight operation. |
| B06 | Record what remains operational and how faults are reported under low power. |
| B07 | Physical action limits remain device/site-policy decisions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Measure representative modes and peak demand; compare budget with selected source/storage ratings | Diagram, measurements and sizing assumptions reconcile. |
| AC02 | Demonstrate agreed overnight workload | Required operation continues for the agreed test conditions; measured evidence is retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-PWR-102 — Power Availability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PEM-002; URG-T34-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
The equipment schedule shall identify the actual power source, backup and distribution dependencies of each powered component.
| Rule | Power capability / operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | The installed-equipment schedule shall identify mains, battery, solar, PoE or other actual source for every powered component, plus backup source and distribution dependencies. |
| B02 | For mains/PoE record supply point, capacity and approved isolation/protection. |
| B03 | For battery record chemistry/capacity and charging interface. |
| B04 | For solar record panel/controller/storage topology and exposure assumptions. |
| B05 | Unpowered passive protection is marked as such. |
| B06 | The existing solar-based proposal is assessed site by site. |
| B07 | It does not make solar compulsory for every camera/controller. |
| B08 | A missing or insufficient source blocks the affected installation until a reviewed alternative is provided. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile every BOM item/accessory to power diagram and capacity; controlled shared-supply disconnection | Declared source dependencies and fault indications match the installed equipment. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-PWR-103 — Battery Operation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PEM-003; URG-T34-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where battery operation is proposed, calculate usable energy and define endurance, charging, replacement and maintenance behaviour.
| Rule | Power capability / operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where battery operation is proposed, calculate usable energy from nominal capacity, approved depth of discharge, conversion efficiency, temperature/age derating and reserve assumptions. |
| B02 | Estimate duration using the measured operating workload. |
| B03 | Specify replacement/recharge trigger, expected charge time, access/tooling, safe handling/disposal and maintenance records using manufacturer requirements. |
| B04 | State whether operation continues during battery change/charging and what data/action is unavailable if it cannot. |
| B05 | Monitor available state/voltage indicators and distinguish an estimate from guaranteed autonomy. |
| B06 | Include overnight demand and the chosen no-sun/outage case where relevant. |
| B07 | No chemistry, capacity or duration is selected here. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Discharge/recharge or validated representative endurance test under agreed workload/environment | Achieved duration and trigger behaviour reconcile to declared assumptions and measured workload. |
| AC02 | Rehearse battery replacement | Data continuity/unavailability and configuration retention match the declared operating method. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-PWR-104 — Power Failure
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PEM-004; URG-T34-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where technically feasible, receive explicit power-fault telemetry through the IoT service and distinguish it from inferred contact loss.
| Rule | Power capability / operating condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where technically feasible, receive explicit mains/charger/battery/voltage fault telemetry or a supported last-gasp signal for critical devices through the IoT service. |
| B02 | Identify device, fault type, original and receipt time and last available energy/health readings. |
| B03 | If loss of power removes all communications, use contact loss as an indirect symptom labelled cause unknown. |
| B04 | Do not report a confirmed power failure from silence alone. |
| B05 | Retain local fault information for forwarding after restoration where supported, and verify restart configuration/data recovery. |
| B06 | Critical-device designation and safe hardware behavior during brownout/power return require the approved equipment policy. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Remove primary supply, simulate low voltage/complete loss, then restore | Direct versus inferred status, delayed fault delivery and preserved records match available evidence; no unintended actuator activation occurs. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-04; numerical parameters “Commands and connectivity recovery (PAR-09)” and “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
3.5.7 Enclosure and Mounting
Purpose: Specify environmental protection, mounting, access and installation drawings.
Actors: Qualified installation personnel, site engineering and security reviewers.
Submodules: Weather and thermal protection; mounting; physical security; cable entry; service access; installation drawings.
Boundaries: Site engineering/manufacturer limits govern installation; no enclosure rating or installation permission is invented.
HW-ENC-001 — Environmental enclosure and mounting
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide enclosure, thermal management, cable entry, mounting, and service access appropriate to the agreed site conditions.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect enclosure, thermal arrangement, cable entry, mounting and service access | Selected arrangement meets agreed site/environment criteria; any observed non-conformance is retained and does not establish a pass. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-ENC-101 — Physical Installation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PHY-003; URG-T32-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide installation instructions, diagrams and checks against approved site engineering and manufacturer requirements.
| Rule | Installation / environmental rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Each installation work instruction shall state the mounting interface/load and fastening method. |
| B02 | The work instruction shall state cable types/routing/strain relief/separation and labels. |
| B03 | The work instruction shall state enclosure, glands and thermal/service clearances. |
| B04 | The work instruction shall state power source, isolation and protection. |
| B05 | The work instruction shall state grounding/bonding and surge/lightning assessment. |
| B06 | The work instruction shall state weather/dust/corrosion protection. |
| B07 | The work instruction shall state lock/tamper controls. |
| B08 | The work instruction shall state safe maintenance access. |
| B09 | Supply connection diagrams, BOM revisions and pre-energisation checks, using manufacturer instructions and applicable approved site engineering standards. |
| B10 | Identify any excavation, pole/structure work, traffic/access control or proximity to live infrastructure requiring specialist permission. |
| B11 | Failed fit, wiring, protection or access checks prevent commissioning until corrected or formally dispositioned. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect assembled/installed unit against approved drawings and signed checklist | Cable, ground and power checks, photographs, component identities and non-conformances are recorded. |
| AC02 | Qualified-person inspection of safety-critical details | Required installation checks have competent verification evidence before commissioning disposition. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-ENC-102 — Outdoor Environment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PHY-004; URG-T32-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Assess each component and complete assembly against the intended environment and supported operating/storage envelope.
| Rule | Installation / environmental rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each component and assembled unit, state intended site exposure and manufacturer-supported operating/storage limits, then assess the whole assembly against temperature, humidity/condensation, rainfall/water exposure, dust, vibration, sunlight/UV/solar heating, corrosion and physical impact where applicable. |
| B02 | Include enclosure heat rise, cable entries and ventilation effects. |
| B03 | A rating for one component does not certify the complete assembly. |
| B04 | Provide environmental mitigations and inspection/maintenance conditions, and record any derating. |
| B05 | Outside-envelope operation is a reported limitation/fault requiring the approved operational response. |
| B06 | No invented ingress rating, temperature range or impact class is accepted by this draft. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare survey exposure with datasheets/engineering evidence; inspect protective details | Whole-assembly environmental assumptions and mitigations are evidenced, including limitations. |
| AC02 | Test representative agreed environment or supply accepted qualification evidence | Functional before/after performance and limitations are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-ENC-103 — Physical Security
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-PHY-005; URG-T32-R06 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Apply the selected site’s physical-security assessment to equipment access, mounting, identification and supported tamper reporting.
| Rule | Installation / environmental rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use the selected site’s physical-security assessment to specify lockable/serviceable enclosures, controlled key/access custody, protected cables and connectors, tamper-resistant mounting and visible unique asset identification. |
| B02 | Restrict exposed maintenance ports and credentials. |
| B03 | Where selected hardware supports tamper/open/removal sensing, report the observation with device/time and route it under a configured operational rule. |
| B04 | Absence of that hardware is declared, not simulated. |
| B05 | Log authorised maintenance/removal/relocation separately from suspected tamper. |
| B06 | Position equipment to reduce theft/damage exposure while preserving sensing coverage and safe maintenance access. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect access/fastening/cables; agreed non-destructive unauthorised access/removal scenarios | Supported tamper reports and authorised maintenance records remain distinct; site assessment and exception decisions are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-ENC-104 — Illustration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-INST-002; URG-T43-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Where applicable, issue controlled site drawings sufficient to reproduce and inspect the installation.
| Rule | Installation / environmental rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where site-specific drawings apply, issue a revision-controlled location/layout plan, mounting elevation/detail, sensor orientation and coverage, cable/communications routing, power/isolation/grounding diagram and enclosure/component arrangement. |
| B02 | Mark existing fibre/infrastructure, access/clearances, known hazards and drawing reference coordinates. |
| B03 | Cross-reference device/BOM IDs and installation instructions. |
| B04 | Label conceptual drawings separately from approved-for-installation and as-built versions. |
| B05 | If a drawing type is unnecessary for a simple configuration, record why. Retain enough detail to reproduce and inspect the installation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare drawings, survey, BOM and installation; redline differences | Revision/status, labelled connections, coverage and access are correct or explicitly reconciled in as-built updates; drawings/photos are retained. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
3.5.8 Hardware Assembly
Purpose: Build identified units with traceable components, wiring and checks.
Actors: Assembly personnel, hardware engineers and commissioning reviewers.
Submodules: Bill of materials; wiring; unit identity; assembly instructions; inspection and functional checks.
Boundaries: Unresolved mandatory failures prevent proposed commissioning release.
HW-ASM-001 — Assembly and wiring records
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Document the approved component list, wiring, connections, assembly steps, and unit identification.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect approved component/wiring/assembly/identity record | Each selected component traces to the actual assembled unit. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-16.
HW-ASM-002 — Unit inspection and functional checks
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Check each assembled unit against the approved assembly and functional checklist.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Execute approved assembly/functional checklist on identified unit | Measured results and deviations are retained against the unit identity. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-16.
SRS-ASM-001 — As-built unit record
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Each assembled unit shall have a traceable as-built component/wiring/configuration record, functional check result and recorded deviations from the reviewed design.
| Rule | Assembly / release rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Unresolved failed checks shall block the proposed commissioning release. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile selected unit identities/components with as-built record | Physical unit and recorded configuration are traceable. |
| AC02 | Record failed mandatory check | Proposed commissioning release remains pending. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-03 and OPEN-16.
3.5.9 Testing and Commissioning
Purpose: Record integration, endurance, failure tests and commissioning disposition.
Actors: Qualified installation/test personnel, responsible maintainers and acceptance authority.
Submodules: Installation method; site checks; integration and sustained-operation tests; as-built evidence; commissioning decision.
Boundaries: Installation alone is not acceptance; actual-device/site checks and approved test conditions remain required.
HW-TST-001 — System and interruption tests
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record functional, integration, sustained-operation, and power-interruption test results against agreed criteria.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Execute agreed functional, integration, sustained-operation and power-interruption cases | Actual results, conditions and deviations are recorded against agreed criteria. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-16 and Q10; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
HW-TST-002 — Site commissioning evidence
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-03 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record installation checks, field validation results, and acceptance of each commissioned unit.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect installation and field-validation evidence for identified site/unit | Explicit commissioning decision references the evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-16 and Q10; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-COM-001 — Handover readiness
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Commissioning shall retain the site/unit evidence and an explicit acceptance decision; installation alone is not acceptance.
| Rule | Commissioning gate / record |
|---|---|
| B01 | Commissioning shall record site/unit identity, installed configuration, functional and integration checks, limitations, defects, responsible maintainer and explicit acceptance decision. |
| B02 | Installation alone shall not establish acceptance. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect complete and incomplete commissioning packs | Required identity/configuration/check/maintainer/disposition information is present; missing mandatory evidence or unresolved blocking defects prevents a pass. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-16 and Q10; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
SRS-COM-101 — Methodology / Working Instruction
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-INST-001; URG-T43-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Deliver a sequenced installation and commissioning instruction with defined responsibilities, evidence and stop/correction gates.
| Rule | Commissioning gate / record |
|---|---|
| B01 | Deliver a sequenced work instruction with gates: survey and infrastructure assessment. |
| B02 | Include a gate for approved placement/power/connectivity/BOM. |
| B03 | Include a gate for inspected assembly and installation. |
| B04 | Include a gate for authorised identity/configuration. |
| B05 | Include a gate for sensor calibration/validation. |
| B06 | Include a gate for IoT/platform integration. |
| B07 | Include a gate for functional tests. |
| B08 | Include a gate for agreed performance and failure/recovery tests. |
| B09 | Include a gate for operational handover. |
| B10 | Each step identifies inputs, responsible competence, tools, expected result, evidence and stop/correction condition. |
| B11 | Before physical work check permits, safe access, structure/electrical constraints and allowed test actions. |
| B12 | Record deviations. |
| B13 | Failed safety, identity, connectivity, calibration or essential functional checks block commissioning of the affected unit. |
| B14 | Handover includes operating limitations, support contacts, maintenance/backup procedures and accepted outstanding issues. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Execute work instruction on actual selected unit/site | Test/configuration records and signed gate decisions are retained; defects reconcile to correction/retest or an explicitly approved limitation. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-16 and Q10; numerical parameter “Power and sustained operation (PAR-11)”.
3.5.10 Passive Protection
Purpose: Assess, prototype, record and evaluate passive protection.
Actors: Engineering reviewers, installation and inspection personnel.
Submodules: Candidate protection design; ground-level prototype; installation records; inspection; bypass/failure observations; effectiveness evaluation.
Boundaries: Additional engineering proposal only: no approved protection design or installation authorisation. Candidate dimensions/materials, cable loads and acceptance require engineering review.
FE-PAS-001 — Protection design assessment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Assess candidate guard design, supports, access routes and installation constraints.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review candidate design against documented loads, supports, access and installation limits | Each unresolved engineering item has a retained disposition. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
FE-PAS-002 — Ground-level protection prototype
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Build and inspect a ground-level prototype before any field installation.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Ground-level prototype inspection before installation approval | Agreed grip, rotation, bypass, jamming, environment and trapping-hazard checks are recorded. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
FE-PAS-003 — Installed protection record
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record protection type, version and installation detail against the asset or location.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Retrieve installed protection record and compare with physical unit | Type/version, location, mounting configuration and installation evidence match. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
FE-PAS-004 — Inspection and failure history
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Record guard condition, maintenance, and observed bypass or failure.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Record inspection and observed bypass/failure | Condition, actor, date, evidence and servicing/removal disposition remain traceable. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
FE-PAS-005 — Protection effectiveness assessment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Compare observations, access attempts and verified outcomes against the installed protection.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare reviewed observations/verified outcomes over agreed period with selected baseline | Coverage and confounders accompany the effectiveness assessment. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-PAS-001 — Protection installation gate
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
A proposed passive protection design remains subject to engineering approval and a reviewed ground-level prototype before field installation.
| Rule | Protection capability / condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | A proposed passive protection design shall remain subject to engineering approval of allowable loads, mounting, environmental conditions, access and bypass/trapping hazards. |
| B02 | A ground-level prototype and documented review shall precede any field installation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect engineering review and controlled prototype evidence against agreed hazards/loads | Release evidence precedes field installation. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
SRS-PAS-002 — Protection evaluation record
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | BA refinement of this module and recorded drafting direction; not a new TM source obligation. |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Retain an evaluation record linking the protection design, installation, inspection, failure observations and outcome.
| Rule | Protection capability / condition |
|---|---|
| B01 | Each evaluated protection installation shall identify design version, monitored location, installed configuration, inspection history, observed bypass/failure and intervention outcome. |
| B02 | Report comparison period and limitations. |
| B03 | Do not infer causal effectiveness from deployment alone. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile test installation, inspection and observed failure | All link to the same design/location; evaluation identifies period, baseline and limitations. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-02 and OPEN-03.
3.5.11 Delivery Documentation and Handover
Purpose: Specify delivery evidence, lifecycle cost, dependencies and handover.
Actors: Delivery and engineering leads, reviewers, maintainers and acceptance authority.
Submodules: Delivery increments; dependencies and risk; deployment completion; lifecycle costs; manuals; support ownership and handover evidence.
Boundaries: Controlled documents, workbooks, registers and test records can satisfy deliverables when they carry the required reviewable evidence; new product screens are not required. Dates and ownership follow the agreed delivery plan.
| Deliverable | Minimum specified contents | Source relationship and proposed stage |
|---|---|---|
| Architecture and interface pack | Logical/physical components as selected, data/control/media flows, trust boundaries, storage, AI processing location, device/platform responsibilities, interface version/error/security contract, deployment dependencies and technology rationale. | REQ-ARCH/INT/APINT and related narrative; M1 draft, updated with each equipment/interface change. |
| Data-source and model pack | Source inventory/permission, schema/quality/lineage, missing-data eligibility, label/target definitions, dataset/model versions, evaluation/baseline, limitations, monitoring/retraining and approval evidence. | Data and AI/ML responses; M1 design, M3 initial model evidence, later updates. |
| Site survey and deployment design | Site identity/constraints, monitored risks, geometry/coverage, access, safety/security/environment, connectivity/power, equipment necessity/alternatives and installation arrangement. | REQ-SITE-001/002 and field-deployment obligations; before the relevant physical installation. |
| Bill of materials and unit/build record | Selected item/model/version, quantity per agreed site/unit, capability/interface, supplier/support assumptions, configuration and assembly/qualification record. | Hardware/installation/lifecycle obligations; selected-design stage. No purchase or quantity is authorised by this table. |
| Installation as-built and commissioning record | Actual device/site/deployment identities, position/orientation, power/connectivity, configuration/calibration, assembly/install checks, deviations, test outcomes, photographs/evidence where appropriate, handover references. | REQ-INST family and HW-TST records; before claiming the installed unit/site commissioned. |
| Verification and acceptance pack | Requirement/case mapping, test configuration/data, expected/actual results, evidence, model metrics, performance/security/recovery findings and authorised dispositions. | REQ-TEST/VER and N27/N28; per milestone, including system-wide end-to-end evidence. |
| Lifecycle cost and dependency assessment | Selected-design acquisition, deployment, recurring infrastructure/connectivity/API, energy/battery, maintenance/calibration, replacement, licensing, support and retirement assumptions; quantities/unit costs/currency/time horizon, source quotes and sensitivity. | Lifecycle-cost/hardware-dependency responses; draft structure at design, actual costs only after verified inputs. Unknown amounts remain unknown. |
| Operations and support pack | Monitoring/triage, device/site health, backup/restore, credential/change/rollback procedures, sensor/power/equipment maintenance, escalation/support boundaries, known limitations and recovery/continuity behavior. | REQ-O&M-001/002 and cross-cutting requirements; initial procedures before operation, updated for pilot/handover. |
| Delivery and handover pack | Dependency-aware schedule, stage scope/evidence/entry-exit criteria, risk register, training material/attendance, asset/configuration inventory and applicable source/licensing/document transfer. | Schedule, maintainability, portability and workbook deliverables; dates/owners governed by agreed delivery plan, not invented here. |
Source-listed security and load assessment evidence
The Project Roadmap M5 deliverables explicitly include performance, load, stress and VAPT reports with remediation/retest evidence.
| Assessment scope / condition |
|---|
| Retain these as proposed M5 acceptance deliverables, not silently replace them with ordinary permission/API tests. |
| Before scheduling assessment, agree the authorised environment/targets, scope, method, assessor/independence requirements if any, permitted test activity, data handling, disruption limits, severity/disposition rules and report audience. |
| No external assessor, paid engagement, security certification or test authorisation is implied by this SRS. |
| Keep vulnerability/penetration assessment findings, remediation and retest evidence distinct from routine functional checks; use an approved test plan and explicit scope. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-10, OPEN-16 and Q10; numerical parameter “Monitored capacity and dashboard response (PAR-03)”.
SRS-DEL-101 — Lifecycle Cost
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-COST-001; URG-T49-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Provide a lifecycle cost workbook with traceable quantities, cost assumptions and uncertainty.
| Rule | Delivery / governance rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Provide a lifecycle cost workbook with item/unit/quantity, one-time versus recurring basis, frequency, assumed useful life, evidence/quote date, currency/tax treatment and uncertainty. |
| B02 | Include design/development/integration. |
| B03 | Include lifecycle costs for site survey/permits/civil/mount/cabling work. |
| B04 | Include lifecycle costs for sensors/controller/camera/deterrent/protection/power/enclosures and spares. |
| B05 | Include lifecycle costs for hosting/storage/backups/egress. |
| B06 | Include lifecycle costs for connectivity. |
| B07 | Include lifecycle costs for software/maps/models/data/LLM licensing. |
| B08 | Include lifecycle costs for operations/monitoring/support/training. |
| B09 | Include lifecycle costs for cleaning/calibration/battery/part replacement and travel. |
| B10 | Include lifecycle costs for upgrades/revalidation/security. |
| B11 | Include lifecycle costs for scaling. |
| B12 | Include lifecycle costs for decommissioning/data migration/disposal. |
| B13 | Sum initial deployment plus recurring operation and scheduled replacements over the agreed evaluation horizon, distinguishing reusable central from per-site costs. |
| B14 | No vendor prices or budget are invented. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review cost categories against BOM, services, maintenance and deployment; recompute totals and sensitivity | Sourced quotes or labelled estimates support calculations; double counting and missing recurring costs are flagged. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-16.
SRS-DEL-102 — Delivery Milestones
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-DEPL-001; URG-T50-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Use proposed technical milestone gates with explicit scope, dependencies, evidence and acceptance disposition.
| Rule | Delivery / governance rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Propose technical gates: M1 full-solution SRS/traceability, architecture/interfaces, site/design assumptions and verification plan. |
| B02 | Propose M2 gate: working platform foundations, approved prototype equipment procurement/assembly/configuration and actual-device controlled animal/rodent flow plus basic live view. |
| B03 | Propose M3 gate: surveyed/installed field integration, configurable workflows/cases, initial historical and predictive risk, reports and integrated tests. |
| B04 | Propose M4 gate: second agreed capability, preventive/intervention functions and proposed read-only assistant. |
| B05 | Propose M4–M5 gate: basic mobilisation. |
| B06 | Propose M5–M7 gate: remaining capability/MVP completion, readiness, POC/Pilot validation, maintenance and handover as agreed. |
| B07 | For every gate include design/development, procurement where applicable, integration, installation, configuration, test, POC/Pilot and deployment outputs rather than a software-only demo. |
| B08 | Explicitly map unresolved URG initial-phase allocations/deviations. |
| B09 | No silent deferral. |
| B10 | Reconcile the live workbook conflicts in the linked Delivery Allocation section: source milestone dates differ across tabs, and older Case/Preventive deferrals conflict with the latest user-confirmed M3 cases/M4 preventive direction. |
| B11 | This response retains that current functional direction without selecting an authoritative date. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review milestone-to-requirement/deliverable mapping, entry/exit criteria and prerequisites | Each gate records actual delivery, defects, deviations and authorised sign-off separately from planned scope. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-01, OPEN-09, OPEN-11, OPEN-16 and Q09.
SRS-DEL-103 — Deployment Completion
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-DEPL-002; URG-T50-R03 |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Complete the agreed deployment scope against the baselined programme schedule and retain evidence of actual completion.
| Rule | Delivery / governance rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Complete the agreed deployment scope within the approved programme schedule once baselined. |
| B02 | Track each site/component activity with prerequisite, accountable owner, planned start/finish, actual status/evidence and impact on the next technical gate. |
| B03 | Define completion as installed/configured required equipment and services, accepted tests/as-built/handover, plus explicit accepted outstanding items. |
| B04 | Procurement receipt or dashboard demonstration alone is not deployment completion. |
| B05 | Forecast slippage from real dependencies and obtain the appropriate scope/date decision rather than silently reduce requirements. |
| B06 | This SRS supplies stable dependencies. |
| B07 | Volatile receipt estimates remain in working delivery tracking. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile approved schedule and deployment inventory with commissioning, tests and handover | Variances and change approvals are recorded; forecast dates remain distinct from completed dates. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-16.
SRS-DEL-104 — Schedule Dependencies
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-DEPL-003; URG-T50-R04 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Maintain an evidence-based dependency register across site, data, equipment, services, approvals and acceptance inputs.
| Rule | Delivery / governance rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a dependency register for site access/readiness/permits and engineering approval. |
| B02 | Track dependencies for TM asset/incident data/sample/quality/rights. |
| B03 | Track dependencies for field connectivity and power. |
| B04 | Track dependencies for hardware procurement, adapter compatibility, lead times and spares. |
| B05 | Track dependencies for third-party hosting/model/map/services/contracts. |
| B06 | Track dependencies for production/non-production integration access and credentials. |
| B07 | Track dependencies for security/privacy/safe-action approvals. |
| B08 | Track dependencies for review/acceptance authority. |
| B09 | Each dependency states affected requirement/milestone, needed input/decision, owner, required-by gate, evidence/status, fallback and critical-path impact. |
| B10 | A fallback that alters customer scope remains a proposed deviation requiring decision, including replacing live TM integration with offline files. |
| B11 | Do not publish transient data-receipt estimates as SRS commitments. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review dependencies against every milestone and installation/model/interface prerequisite | Fulfilled status has actual receipt/access/approval evidence; unresolved dependencies have assessed schedule impact. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-01, OPEN-02, OPEN-07, OPEN-10, OPEN-16 and Q14.
SRS-DEL-105 — Schedule Risk
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source / URG locator | REQ-DEPL-004; URG-T50-R05 |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable |
| Test execution | Not Run |
Maintain material schedule risks, mitigation evidence, contingency decisions and impact on approved delivery dates.
| Rule | Delivery / governance rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Record material schedule risks with cause, affected deliverable, probability/impact assessment, trigger, mitigation, contingency owner and decision deadline. |
| B02 | Include late/unsuitable TM data, unclear acceptance targets, site/permit/power/bearer readiness, unavailable hardware/long lead time, adapter/live-video incompatibility, deficient sensor/model performance, field-safe action approvals, policy/hosting approval, integration access, failed endurance/recovery/security tests and reviewer availability. |
| B03 | Mitigate through early samples/site surveys, controlled actual-device tests, adapter contracts, alternative qualified components, staged independent work and explicit review gates. |
| B04 | Contingencies must not silently substitute historical counts for prediction, simulated devices for required actual-device evidence, or waive customer obligations. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review risk triggers against current gate evidence | Completed mitigation, residual risk/contingency decisions, approved-date impact and required retest are recorded. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4, OPEN-16 and Q10.
3.6 AI and Machine Learning
This section defines the logical obligations for predictive and detection models, their evidence and controlled operational use. Model choice, runtime placement and numerical acceptance criteria remain subject to the decisions in section 5.4.
3.6.1 Predictive Model Lifecycle
Purpose and actors: AI/data practitioners prepare and evaluate model evidence; authorised reviewers and release operators approve, deploy and monitor versions; Operators review their operational results.
Boundaries: Historical indicators, observed detections and future-risk predictions remain distinct. Dataset availability, approved processing and verified outcomes constrain model use; neither a model output nor a lifecycle update authorises a physical action.
Submodules: Dataset lineage; target/horizon; reproducible training; held-out evaluation; baseline comparison; registry; deployment; drift; rollback and feedback.
MD-PRED-001 — Traceable analytical datasets
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Prepare traceable analytical datasets combining incident history, asset and location context, and available field observations.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Recreate a dataset snapshot and reconcile source IDs, periods, quality checks, joins and exclusions to the input batches. | Snapshot sources, periods, quality decisions, joins and exclusions reconcile to the input batches. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-07 and OPEN-08.
MD-PRED-002 — Prediction objective and inputs
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Define model input variables and the incident or risk outcome to estimate for a location and period.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review the target, time horizon, geographic unit and permitted inputs; reject a scoring configuration missing required agreed definitions. | Target, horizon, geographic unit and permitted inputs are agreed; incomplete configurations cannot score. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08.
MD-PRED-003 — Reproducible training
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Train candidate models with reproducible, recorded configurations.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Repeat a recorded training run with the same dataset and configuration; reconcile model artefact/version and documented reproducibility tolerance. | The repeated run reconciles to its recorded artefact/version within the documented tolerance. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
MD-PRED-004 — Held-out evaluation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Evaluate held-out results and review errors by cause, location and time.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Evaluate on held-out, leakage-checked data and compare with the agreed baseline by time/location/cause; record metrics and error cases. | Held-out metrics and cause/location/time errors are recorded against the baseline without leakage. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
MD-PRED-005 — Model version registry
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Register model versions with input definitions, training data references, evaluation results and approval status.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a registered version for dataset, feature/schema, runtime, training/evaluation and approval references; reject deployment without required evidence. | The registered package has complete evidence; deployment is rejected when required evidence is absent. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-16.
MD-PRED-006 — Approved deployment and scoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Deploy an approved model, score on agreed schedules or triggers, and retain the model version with each result.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Deploy an approved version, score a known input and exercise failure/rollback; verify each result identifies the version and does not silently substitute historical counts. | Approved scoring, failure and rollback retain producing versions; historical counts do not replace predictions. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08.
MD-PRED-007 — Mapped prediction results
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Link predictive scores, explanations and assessment times to assets or areas for map display and review.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Select a mapped prediction and reconcile location, horizon, score, explanation, confidence/limitations and source/model version. | The mapped result reconciles to its location, horizon, score, explanation, limitations and source/model version. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08.
MD-PRED-008 — Performance review and retraining
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Review model performance, data changes and verified outcomes to guide controlled retraining or replacement.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Introduce a reviewed drift/degradation condition; verify monitoring, review decision and controlled retraining/replacement without unapproved automatic promotion. | Drift/degradation initiates a recorded review and controlled lifecycle decision; no unapproved promotion occurs. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08; Model degradation threshold (PAR-07) parameters.
SRS-PRD-101 — Risk Factors
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-051; URG-T19-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain reviewed input factors and their lineage for each prediction configuration.
Input factors and lineage
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each prediction configuration list relevant available factors and their source/cutoff, transformation, units, quality/eligibility and version. |
| B02 | Review historical fibre faults, location, infrastructure characteristics, construction activity, environmental conditions, sensor observations, previous theft/vandalism and animal/rodent activity. |
| B03 | These are potential factors, not mandatory promises of eight available feeds. |
| B04 | Include only inputs useful and legitimately available for the target; record why candidates are unavailable or excluded. |
Input eligibility
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | Apply a documented missing-value policy appropriate to the approved method, record any imputation and do not automatically equate missing history/telemetry with no incidents/activity. |
| B06 | Reject incompatible input schemas or withhold an ineligible prediction with a reason. |
| B07 | Use deployment/location history for mobile device observations and distinguish predictor collection time from outcome time. |
| B08 | Factor changes require a new reviewed input/model version. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a factor lineage matrix covering every listed candidate family. | Every candidate family has lineage or an exclusion/unavailability reason. |
| AC02 | Reconstruct an output from accepted factor values; remove a required factor, change schema, supply future-dated data and relocate a device to test gating/time-location treatment. | Accepted inputs reconstruct the output; required-factor, schema, future-data and relocation cases follow eligibility/time/location controls. |
| AC03 | Verify exclusions and imputation are visible in evaluation evidence. | Exclusions and imputation remain visible in evaluation evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-07 and OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-102 — Prediction Explainability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-054; URG-T19-R06. |
| Source modality | should; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where an AI/ML model produces risk results, it should explain the major contributing factors using a suitable method.
Explanation output
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where an AI/ML model produces a risk result, it should provide the major contributing factors using an explanation method suitable for that model. |
| B02 | Present factor name, actual relevant input or reference, contribution/direction where supported, assessment period and model version, plus limitations. |
| B03 | Distinguish model association from causation. |
| B04 | A generic generated narrative unsupported by the assessment inputs is not an explanation of that prediction. |
Unavailable and historical explanations
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | If an explanation is unavailable, say so and retain the prediction with its review status/limitations under the approved release policy; do not invent a reason. |
| B06 | For a rules-based historical score, show applied factors/weights separately without claiming an AI/ML explanation. |
| B07 | Authorised users may open supporting records; any restricted records remain protected. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | For an approved model compare displayed leading factors and values with its stored input/explanation output. | Displayed factors and values match the stored inputs and explanation output. |
| AC02 | Perturb a reviewed factor and inspect expected interpretation. | The observed effect is assessed against the reviewed model-specific expected interpretation; no universal direction or magnitude is assumed. |
| AC03 | Test missing explanation, restricted evidence and historical-rule output; verify no causal claim or invented reason. | Missing explanations are declared; restricted records remain protected and historical rules do not become invented AI or causal explanations. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-103 — AI/ML Use Case
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-001; URG-T51-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain a specification and applicability decision for each supported AI/ML use case.
Use-case specification
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a use-case specification for each supported capability, identifying its operational purpose, permitted inputs, output, user, deployment location, decision boundary and evidence of effectiveness. |
| B02 | The catalogue shall explicitly assess fibre fault prediction, risk assessment, threat/event detection, threat classification, anomaly detection, hotspot identification, fault likelihood estimation, preventive action recommendation and any other proposed AI/ML capability. |
| B03 | Record whether each use case applies and why; a separate learned model is not required for every use case. |
Initial delivery boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | For the initial delivery, distinguish observed threat detection/classification, retrospective hotspot indicators and future-risk prediction. |
| B05 | M3 shall present historical risk separately from an initial prediction for a defined future period and location/segment; historical counts do not demonstrate prediction. |
| B06 | M4 preventive recommendations initially use configured rules, while the proposed conversational assistant retrieves records and generates summaries. |
| B07 | Neither is represented as an approved autonomous agent. |
| B08 | Any anomaly or additional fault-estimation model needs a defined objective/data/evaluation before being described as supported. |
| B09 | Predictions and recommendations feed the configured platform workflow; automation is a separately authorised execution capability. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect the catalogue against all nine source entries. | All nine source entries have a supported, conditional or unsupported disposition. |
| AC02 | Demonstrate a detection, a historical indicator and a future-risk result with distinguishable labels/time meaning. | Detection, retrospective indicators and future-risk results have distinct labels and time meaning. |
| AC03 | Trace any recommendation to its rule/model and show that displaying it alone issues no command. | Recommendations trace to their rule/model; display alone issues no command. |
| AC04 | Unsupported/conditional use cases must have an explicit disposition; no historical-only demonstration passes M3 prediction. | Conditional/unsupported entries are explicit; historical-only evidence cannot pass M3 prediction. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08, OPEN-09 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-104 — Model Selection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-002; URG-T51-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Select each model through a recorded comparison of applicable candidates and operational constraints.
Selection evidence
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Prepare a short selection record per use case comparing viable candidates, including a non-learned reference where appropriate. |
| B02 | Address each applicable source factor: training-data nature/availability, prediction/detection objective, accuracy, false-positive and false-negative consequences, explainability, compute demand, inference latency, scalability, maintainability and field/edge/central suitability. |
| B03 | Record an explicit reason where a factor does not apply. |
Selection boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Use measured evaluation and target-hardware trials to select a candidate rather than prescribing an algorithm in this SRS. |
| B05 | Detection placement remains a device/edge/server decision after device selection; the IoT boundary stays intact. |
| B06 | Predictive-model selection is separate from detection and from the user-proposed LLM API for M4 chat/summaries. |
| B07 | The selected package must expose the inputs and outputs required by the common contract above; an incompatible or unevaluated candidate is not promoted solely because a demonstration runs. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review one completed selection record per applicable use case for all ten factors and recorded alternatives. | Each applicable use case covers all ten factors and recorded alternatives. |
| AC02 | Reproduce a candidate/reference comparison on the declared dataset and inspect resource/latency observations on the intended runtime. | The declared candidate/reference comparison is reproducible and intended-runtime resource/latency observations are retained. |
| AC03 | Verify selection does not conflate classifier accuracy, future-risk validity and assistant answer quality. | Classifier accuracy, future-risk validity and assistant answer quality are assessed separately. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-03, OPEN-08 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-105 — Baseline Comparison
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-004; URG-T51-R05. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Define and justify a reference baseline, then compare the candidate under equivalent evaluation conditions.
Comparison rules
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define an appropriate reference before final model comparison for every AI/ML use case. |
| B02 | Consider rule-based detection, threshold detection, statistical methods, existing operational practice or another agreed reference. Select and justify the appropriate reference; all five are not required. |
| B03 | Run candidate and baseline on comparable inputs, outcome definitions, time horizons and evaluation conditions, reporting measurable change in the agreed primary measure together with false-positive/false-negative and operational trade-offs. |
Use-case application and acceptance
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | For initial prediction, a defensible simple historical/statistical reference is a candidate baseline, subject to data review; its presence does not make retrospective hotspots a prediction deliverable. |
| B05 | For a hosted assistant, define an agreed task-level reference such as the existing record-search/summary process, with supported-answer and operational usefulness checks, rather than claiming access to provider training data. |
| B06 | A model that fails to demonstrate the required improvement stays unaccepted pending revision or an explicit TM disposition. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Retain baseline definition/version, identical comparison-set references, candidate outputs, calculation and difference report. | Baseline version, identical comparison set, candidate outputs, calculations and differences remain available. |
| AC02 | Check that neither comparison uses unavailable future data. | Neither comparison uses unavailable future data. |
| AC03 | Demonstrate that a non-improving result is recorded as unmet rather than omitted or described as a pass. | Non-improvement is recorded as unmet, without omission or a false pass. |
| AC04 | Minimum improvement/decision rule requires agreement. | Minimum improvement and the acceptance decision rule remain subject to agreement. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-11; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
SRS-PRD-106 — Training Data
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-001; URG-T52-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain versioned, traceable dataset records for each model throughout development and operation.
Dataset register
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a dataset register for development, training, validation and operation of each model. |
| B02 | Each entry records source/owner and permitted use, data type and format, expected frequency, required history, actual/required volume, quality rules, labelling needs, retention rule and known limitations. |
| B03 | Link unchangeable import/snapshot references and transformations to the model package. Record each update as a new dataset version so the previous evaluation basis remains traceable. |
Data availability and permitted use
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Document TM offline assets and incident/docket history separately from device observations/evidence and operator outcome labels. |
| B05 | Record a missing dataset as an unresolved dependency; do not treat it as available for training. |
| B06 | For a pretrained detector or hosted LLM, record the supplier’s available provenance/limitations and the local task-evaluation/retrieval datasets; do not claim custody of inaccessible pretraining data or require bespoke pretraining by implication. |
| B07 | Dataset access and any API use remain subject to approved purposes and retention. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a register entry for all ten required source fields and trace a model input sample to its import/observation version and permitted purpose. | All ten register fields and a sample input resolve to versioned sources and permitted purpose. |
| AC02 | Check an absent history period, a third-party model with unavailable pretraining detail and a dataset version update are recorded explicitly. | Missing history, unavailable pretraining detail and dataset updates have explicit records. |
| AC03 | Verify unauthorised access is rejected. | Unauthorised access is denied. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-07, OPEN-08, OPEN-10 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-107 — Training, Validation and Test Data
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Clarification required |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-004; URG-T52-R05. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Retain the source baseline-comparison obligation and separately propose split/leakage controls pending Q06.
Literal source obligation
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Q06 remains unresolved: the title is “Training, Validation and Test Data” but the description repeats baseline comparison. |
| B02 | The description’s complete baseline obligation is retained: define and justify a rule, threshold, statistical, existing-practice or other agreed reference as appropriate, then demonstrate measurable improvement under the comparison response in URG-T51-R05. |
Proposed data partition rules
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | Separately propose a split/leakage-control policy to address the title without presenting it as corrected TM wording. |
| B04 | Freeze a versioned final test set before final candidate evaluation; use development/training data for fitting and validation data for model/threshold selection. |
| B05 | Keep related records from the same incident, repeated frames and duplicate imports together. |
| B06 | For future-risk testing, choose time-separated evaluation with inputs limited to information available at prediction time; where location generalisation is claimed, add a suitably separated location/site evaluation. |
| B07 | Record the split rationale and any small-data limitations. |
| B08 | No fixed train/validation/test percentages are selected. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Verify baseline evidence for this row independently of its title. | The literal baseline obligation has evidence independently of the title. |
| AC02 | Inspect membership lists and separation rules; attempt to trace a duplicate event/frame or later outcome across partitions and verify it is excluded from leakage. | Membership/separation rules prevent duplicates, related frames and later outcomes from leaking across partitions. |
| AC03 | Reproduce the test using the frozen dataset and preprocessing. | The frozen dataset and preprocessing reproduce the test. |
| AC04 | The split policy is proposed and does not resolve Q06. | The split policy remains proposed and Q06 remains unresolved. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-12 / Q06; OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-108 — Data Drift
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-006; URG-T52-R07. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Monitor operational models for applicable changes in inputs, sensor behaviour and event patterns.
Mandatory monitoring
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | The monitoring capability is mandatory under the source; only the selection of applicable drift/metric indicators is conditional. |
Reference and observations
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B02 | Maintain a versioned reference profile for each operational model’s key inputs and outputs, with configurable review windows and material-change criteria. |
| B03 | Where applicable compare missingness/value/category distributions for data/feature drift, sensor health/readings/configuration for behaviour changes, and event rates/classes/location/time patterns for significant event changes. |
| B04 | Include sample counts and changes in import coverage or deployed equipment; distinguish these changes from changes in threat activity. |
Review and operating response
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | Record and report the affected model, feature/source, period, reference, observed change and proposed review action. |
| B06 | A drift indication initiates review; it does not by itself prove lower accuracy or authorise retraining/deployment. |
| B07 | Too little current data is shown as insufficient monitoring evidence. |
| B08 | Known quality/health failures can block dependent automation under the guardrail while unaffected platform functions continue. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare a stable sample with controlled changes to a feature distribution, a sensor’s behaviour and event pattern; verify the applicable report identifies each source and period. | Applicable changes identify their feature/sensor/event source and observation period. |
| AC02 | Check small/empty windows and changed device populations do not manufacture an accuracy claim. | Small/empty windows and changed device populations do not manufacture accuracy findings. |
| AC03 | Threshold-crossing outcomes are checked against the agreed configuration. | Threshold outcomes match the agreed monitoring configuration. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08; Model degradation threshold (PAR-07) parameters.
SRS-PRD-109 — Corroboration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-004; URG-T53-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where corroboration applies, define and check the required evidence before enabling the dependent workflow.
Corroboration configuration
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For workflows where corroboration is applicable, configure the required corroborating evidence and correlation rule before enablement. |
| B02 | A proposed rule may combine a model prediction with another sensor observation, a separate source, relevant incident history or contextual asset/site information. |
| B03 | Preserve source IDs, times, location linkage and the result of each check. |
Evidence eligibility
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Count retransmission or multiple copies of one observation as one item, not independent corroboration. |
| B05 | A rule must say whether contextual history is sufficient or a contemporaneous observation is necessary; no blanket two-sensor requirement is imposed. |
| B06 | If required evidence is absent, conflicting, stale or cannot be linked to the same asset/area, hold the dependent action for operator review and identify the reason. |
| B07 | Do not assume extra sensors or live TM production feeds will be available. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Exercise a configured rule with valid corroboration, duplicate/replayed evidence, mismatched location/time, conflicting evidence and missing required evidence. | Valid, duplicate, mismatched, conflicting and missing evidence are evaluated under the configured rule. |
| AC02 | Verify the evidence chain and that only the eligible case advances; blocked cases remain reviewable. | Only the eligible case advances; held cases retain their evidence chain and reason. |
| AC03 | For a workflow without this condition, inspect the explicit applicability rationale. | A workflow without corroboration has an explicit applicability rationale. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-04 and OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-110 — Human Validation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-HITL-001; URG-T55-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Support authorised human validation while preserving the original inference and the distinction between validation, action approval and outcome verification.
Review capability
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where the workflow requires validation, provide authorised users with the prediction, applicable confidence/risk, supporting evidence and linked context. |
| B02 | Support accept, reject, classification correction and feedback with a recorded intervention reason, actor and time. |
| B03 | Preserve original model output alongside the reviewed classification/decision; a correction must not rewrite the original inference or the source evidence. |
Authority and label boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Proposed M3 use places review with the permitted Operator for the relevant alert/case; Viewer remains read-only. |
| B05 | Record unsupported or uncertain ground truth explicitly. |
| B06 | Accepting a prediction is distinct from approving an operational action, while approving an action is distinct from verifying its outcome. |
| B07 | If evidence is unavailable or access is denied, show the limitation and do not imply validation occurred. |
| B08 | A human classification correction is a candidate label requiring the labelling quality process before model reuse. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Demonstrate review of prediction/evidence, accept, reject, modify classification, feedback and intervention reason. | Review, acceptance, rejection, correction and feedback retain intervention reasons. |
| AC02 | Verify role denial, original-versus-reviewed values and audit. | Role denial and audit protect distinct original/reviewed values. |
| AC03 | Check accept alone neither executes a command nor creates an unquestioned training label, and unavailable evidence leaves the validation limitation visible. | Acceptance alone neither commands action nor approves a training label; missing evidence leaves validation limitations visible. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-04 and OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-111 — Model Versioning
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-001; URG-T56-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Give every operational model package a unique version identity and retain the producing identity with every inference.
Version register
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Assign a unique version identity to every model package deployed for operational use, including POC/Pilot operation. |
| B02 | Keep its use case, model artifact/reference, input/preprocessing definitions, configuration, training/evaluation dataset references, results, approval state and intended runtime together in a controlled register. |
| B03 | Every inference stores the identity actually used, not just the current active model name. |
History and hosted-model limits
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Retain previous versions for audit and agreed rollback until retirement under the retention policy. |
| B05 | A vendor-hosted API entry records the available provider/model identifier and revision plus the local prompt/retrieval configuration version; disclose if a provider cannot pin its internal version. |
| B06 | “Production model” in the source does not authorise connection to TM production systems. |
| B07 | User-facing labels may be readable names but must resolve to the unique package identity. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Deploy two distinguishable versions in a test environment, generate results and verify each resolves to its own package/configuration/evaluation record. | Each version produces results linked to its own package, configuration and evaluation evidence. |
| AC02 | Check an attempted identity reuse/change is rejected or creates a new version. | Identity reuse/change is rejected or receives a new version. |
| AC03 | Inspect available hosted-provider metadata and documented pinning limitations if applicable. | Available hosted metadata and version-pinning limits are documented where applicable. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-10 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-112 — Model Deployment
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-002; URG-T56-R03. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Release validated model versions through an authorised, traceable process with recovery and failure handling.
Release controls
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Use a controlled release process: identify the validated candidate package and intended environment, review acceptance/compatibility and residual limitations, record authorised release approval, install/activate the selected version, perform health/interface checks and retain the prior validated configuration for recovery. |
| B02 | Log the deployment result and the versions serving predictions. |
| B03 | Unvalidated candidates cannot become the active operational model through ordinary configuration changes. |
Release operation and fallback
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | For the POC/Pilot, a documented operator-run release/checklist is an acceptable proposed mechanism; a large automated MLOps platform is not assumed. |
| B05 | Define the change window and handling of in-flight work so a version change cannot issue duplicate actions or reset approvals. |
| B06 | If activation/checks fail, keep/revert to a compatible validated version or mark the dependent AI function unavailable while unaffected operations continue. |
| B07 | Do not promise zero downtime without an agreed target. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Exercise an approved version update and a failed/incompatible activation. | Approved updates and failed/incompatible activations have recorded release outcomes. |
| AC02 | Verify release records, versioned predictions, in-flight handling, no duplicate command, health checks and restoration/fallback. | Versioned results, health checks, in-flight handling and recovery remain traceable without duplicate commands. |
| AC03 | Check unauthorised/unvalidated activation is denied and normal unaffected functions remain available during the planned failure case. | Unauthorised/unvalidated activation is denied; unaffected functions continue during planned failure. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-10 and OPEN-16.
SRS-PRD-113 — Model Performance Monitoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-003; URG-T56-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Monitor active model performance using applicable metrics and explicit evidence cohorts.
Mandatory monitoring
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | The monitoring capability is mandatory under the source; only the selection of applicable drift/metric indicators is conditional. |
Performance evidence
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B02 | Provide an operational monitoring view/report per active model/version and period. |
| B03 | Include applicable prediction volume, accuracy, precision, recall, F1, false positives, false negatives, confidence distribution, data quality and model/data drift. |
| B04 | Derive outcome-dependent metrics only from an identified, reviewed labelled cohort with sample counts and outcome-availability period; predictions awaiting outcomes stay pending rather than being counted correct. |
Operational monitoring and assistant evaluation
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | Maintain volume/confidence/input-health indicators even when truth labels are delayed. |
| B06 | Relate reported errors to use case, site/condition and deployed version; do not infer predictive accuracy from a healthy API or the absence of complaints. |
| B07 | Use agreed reference/thresholds for notifications and retain the report/evidence. |
| B08 | For the assistant, monitor request failures and reviewed answer-grounding/permission issues with an agreed task-specific rubric rather than forcing classifier metrics onto text generation. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Generate known prediction/label samples and reconcile each applicable source metric with the monitoring report. | Applicable metric values reconcile to known prediction/label samples. |
| AC02 | Check delayed/unavailable labels, empty classes and confidence absence are explicit. | Delayed or missing labels, empty classes and absent confidence remain explicit. |
| AC03 | Verify drift/quality indicators and failure counts stay separate from accuracy; inspect different model versions and condition slices without merging their denominators. | Drift, input quality and failures remain distinct from accuracy; version/condition denominators are not merged. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-11; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) and Model degradation threshold (PAR-07) parameters.
SRS-PRD-114 — Model Degradation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-004; URG-T56-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Detect and report performance degradation against agreed evidence and threshold rules.
Source identity and comparison
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain this literal REQ-MLOP-004 as “Model Degradation”, URG-T56-R05; it is separate from the Closed-Loop AI/ML row URG-T57-R05. |
| B02 | Compare current model performance with the agreed reference using a defined cohort, observation window, measure, threshold and minimum evidence rule. |
| B03 | Record model/version, observed value, baseline, time, data sufficiency and affected use case. |
Degradation response
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | When the agreed degradation threshold is exceeded, generate an internal alert/notification for the designated authorised personnel and link the evidence and review status. |
| B05 | Distinguish performance degradation supported by labels from input drift, API failure and insufficient evidence. |
| B06 | Proposed response is investigation and, where warranted, constrained use or controlled rollback under the release process; a notification does not autonomously retrain or activate a replacement. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Provide a labelled sample that stays within the agreed limit and one that crosses it; verify only the configured condition creates the expected notification and evidence. | Only the configured threshold crossing produces the expected notification and evidence. |
| AC02 | Exercise insufficient labels separately. | Insufficient labels produce an evidence limitation rather than confirmed degradation. |
| AC03 | Verify source trace distinguishes this Model Degradation row from the duplicate-ID closed-loop row and both remain present. | Both literal REQ-MLOP-004 rows retain distinct titles/locators and evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-12 / Q01; Model degradation threshold (PAR-07) parameters.
SRS-PRD-115 — Model Retraining
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-005; URG-T56-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Retrain applicable trainable components through reviewed datasets, reproducible evaluation and release approval.
Retraining lifecycle
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Define the retraining process for model components that are trainable within the delivery. |
| B02 | Collect operational examples/outcomes and check permissions, provenance, quality and labels. |
| B03 | Version the eligible dataset and fit a candidate with recorded configuration. |
| B04 | Evaluate against the reference and protected test protocol. |
| B05 | Review regressions and obtain release approval before deployment. |
| B06 | Retain unsuccessful candidates and their evaluation disposition as appropriate to the approved retention policy. |
Feedback and closed-model boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B07 | New or corrected operator feedback is not ingested blindly. |
| B08 | For a third-party pretrained model/API whose weights cannot be retrained by the project, document that boundary and propose an applicable controlled alternative such as evaluated replacement, vendor update or separately approved adaptation. |
| B09 | Retrieval/prompt changes require evaluation but are not described as weight retraining. |
| B10 | Inability to satisfy an applicable retraining obligation needs TM disposition; it is not silently waived by choosing a hosted product. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace validated operational data through one reproducible candidate-training/evaluation exercise for each applicable trainable model. | Each applicable trainable model has a reproducible candidate exercise tracing reviewed operational data. |
| AC02 | Verify unreviewed labels and final-test leakage are excluded, and a candidate failing review cannot become active. | Unreviewed labels and final-test leakage are excluded; rejected candidates cannot activate. |
| AC03 | For hosted/closed models, inspect the explicitly approved lifecycle alternative and unresolved scope condition. | Hosted/closed-model entries retain the approved alternative and any unresolved retraining obligation. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-116 — Model Rollback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-006; URG-T56-R07. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Support authorised restoration of a previously validated compatible model, with an explicit fallback where restoration is unavailable.
Rollback evidence
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain a previously validated, deployable model package and compatible preprocessing/configuration so an authorised release operator can restore it when the active update has unacceptable performance or behaviour. |
| B02 | Record rollback reason, affected version, target version, operator/time, compatibility checks and resulting health/evaluation evidence; preserve predictions from both versions. |
Compatibility and hosted fallback
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | Reverting a model does not reverse physical actions, erase case history or repeat prior commands. |
| B04 | If the earlier package cannot operate on the current schema/runtime, do not activate it blindly; use the defined AI-unavailable/review-only fallback while resolving compatibility. |
| B05 | For externally hosted models, confirm that the provider offers a usable pinned previous version or propose another validated fallback before operational reliance. |
| B06 | If no equivalent rollback capability can be supplied, retain an explicit unmet requirement/deviation for TM decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Activate a validated update, simulate unacceptable behaviour and restore the prior validated compatible package. | The prior validated compatible package can be restored after unacceptable update behaviour. |
| AC02 | Verify health, output/version trace and absence of action replay. | Health and versioned outputs remain traceable without replaying actions. |
| AC03 | Exercise a compatibility failure and hosted-version unavailability; confirm safe fallback and an open disposition rather than a false claim of successful rollback. | Incompatibility/hosted-version absence triggers the declared fallback and open disposition, not a false rollback success. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-10 and OPEN-11.
SRS-PRD-117 — Model Lifecycle Records
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-007; URG-T56-R08. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain linked lifecycle evidence and distinguish planned work, validation and release approval.
Lifecycle records
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain linked lifecycle records for development, training, validation, approval, deployment, version changes, retraining, performance monitoring, rollback and retirement. |
| B02 | For each significant activity identify model/use case/version, actor/time, inputs or dataset references, configuration, result, decision and evidence location. |
| B03 | A controlled register plus stored reports/artifacts is sufficient for the initial POC/Pilot; no bespoke lifecycle-management interface is required by this proposal. |
Approval and record protection
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Separate proposed, validated and authorised-for-use states in the record so existence of an artifact is not mistaken for release approval. |
| B05 | Retiring a version prevents new selection while preserving historical inference/action references for the approved retention period. |
| B06 | Protect records through role-controlled changes and retain change history. |
| B07 | Provider limitations and unavailable underlying training records remain explicit in externally hosted model entries. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a sample lifecycle chain covering all ten source activities, using recorded applicability where an activity has not yet occurred. | All ten lifecycle activities have evidence or recorded applicability where not yet performed. |
| AC02 | Verify traceability of version/actor/evidence, access denial for unauthorised changes and historic lookup after retirement. | Version, actor and evidence links survive retirement; unauthorised changes are denied. |
| AC03 | Planned/not-yet-performed activities remain pending rather than carrying invented evidence. | Planned activities remain pending without invented completion evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-10 and OPEN-16.
SRS-PRD-118 — Prediction-to-Workflow Integration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLIN-001; URG-T57-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Deliver model results through a defined logical workflow contract without bypassing platform controls.
Logical result contract
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Transmit predictions, risk assessments and recommendations to the platform workflow component through a defined internal contract. |
| B02 | Proposed payload includes result ID/type, affected asset/location/segment, source/model/version, assessment time and validity/horizon, result/score, applicable confidence, supporting-record references, data/guardrail state and correlation to the originating observation. |
| B03 | Validate required identity/type/time fields before workflow evaluation. |
Workflow acceptance and action controls
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | Store or acknowledge each accepted result and preserve failures for review. |
| B05 | Re-delivery of the same result must not create duplicate decisions/actions, while a genuinely new assessment receives its own identity. |
| B06 | Stale, unresolvable or incomplete payloads remain retained/rejected with a reason and cannot trigger a dependent physical action. |
| B07 | The platform applies its own permission/approval and safety controls; the AI service cannot bypass them. |
| B08 | Field requests still pass through the FALCON IoT service. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Send one valid prediction, risk result and recommendation; trace each to workflow intake and decision. | A valid prediction, risk result and recommendation each trace to intake and decision. |
| AC02 | Re-deliver a result and verify no duplicate action, then submit a genuinely new result and retain it. | Re-delivery does not duplicate action; a genuinely new assessment retains its own result identity. |
| AC03 | Test invalid identity, stale validity and missing required location/evidence; verify reasoned rejection/review and no unsafe command. | Invalid, stale or incomplete results have reasoned rejection/review and cannot trigger unsafe commands. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-04, OPEN-07 and OPEN-08.
SRS-PRD-119 — Closed-Loop AI/ML
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-MLOP-004; URG-T57-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where applicable, demonstrate a governed improvement loop from reviewed operational outcomes to an evaluated release decision.
Source identity and improvement loop
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Retain this literal REQ-MLOP-004 as “Closed-Loop AI/ML”, URG-T57-R05, separately from Model Degradation, URG-T56-R05. |
| B02 | Where applicable, demonstrate a governed improvement loop: collect linked operational outcomes; review their quality/labels and error patterns; propose a model/data/rule improvement; evaluate it against the recorded reference; obtain release approval; deploy or reject the candidate; monitor the result. |
Governance and hosted limitations
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | The proposed first loop may be analyst/operator-run using versioned datasets and evaluation reports. |
| B04 | Continuous improvement means a repeatable, evidence-linked lifecycle, not unattended weight updates after every feedback item. |
| B05 | Unverified, ambiguous or intervention-confounded outcomes stay outside automatic training. |
| B06 | For a closed hosted model, use only the lifecycle changes actually supported and agreed, and state if a retraining/rollback obligation needs separate disposition. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | For an applicable use case, follow a real or clearly labelled demonstration outcome set into a reviewed improvement candidate and evaluation decision. | A real or clearly labelled demonstration set traces to a reviewed improvement candidate and evaluation decision. |
| AC02 | Verify a rejected candidate remains inactive, an accepted release has traceable approval and subsequent monitoring, and both duplicate-ID rows remain separately verified. | Rejected candidates stay inactive; accepted releases have approval/monitoring and each duplicate-ID row has separate evidence. |
| AC03 | A diagram alone is not a completed closed-loop demonstration. | A diagram alone is insufficient evidence of a completed loop. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-12 / Q01; OPEN-08 and OPEN-11.
3.6.2 Detection Model Lifecycle
Purpose and actors: Model practitioners and designated reviewers establish supported detection scenarios, evaluate representative observations and record limitations. Authorised maintainers monitor deployed versions; Operators retain separate investigation findings.
Boundaries: Detection indicates potential activity, not proven damage, guilt or threat resolution. Supported classes and processing placement depend on reviewed evidence and selected equipment. Approval, labelling and source-title conflicts remain separately traceable.
Submodules: Construction/theft/animal use cases; labelling; representative data; detection evaluation; runtime compatibility; monitoring and responsible use.
MD-AI-001 — Labelled source examples
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Assemble and label examples with traceable origins.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a sample dataset for origin, usage permission, class definition, label and reviewer; quarantine unresolved or disputed labels. | Origins, permissions, definitions and reviewed labels are traceable; disputed labels are quarantined. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-09.
MD-AI-002 — Detection model selection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Choose or adapt a model for the agreed detection or assessment task.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Compare the selected candidate with a documented baseline for the agreed task/data/runtime and retain the selection rationale. | The candidate/baseline comparison supports the recorded task, data and runtime selection rationale. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-03 and OPEN-08.
MD-AI-003 — Representative evaluation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Evaluate model results against reviewed examples and agreed acceptance measures.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Run reviewed representative positive/negative examples; report false positives, misses and agreed task metrics by relevant field condition. | False positives, misses and applicable metrics are reported by the relevant field conditions. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08 and OPEN-09; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
MD-AI-004 — Runtime model package
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Package an evaluated model for the intended runtime and hardware.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Run the approved model package on intended hardware/runtime and record compatibility, resource use and failure behaviour against agreed limits. | The package meets agreed compatibility/resource/failure limits on its intended hardware/runtime. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-03 and OPEN-10.
MD-AI-005 — Model history and rollback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed |
| Provenance | Baseline Sources#SRC-04 |
Track model versions, evaluation records, and evidence for replacement or rollback.
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace a deployed model to its approved evidence and execute a controlled rollback; verify results retain the producing version. | Deployment evidence and producing versions remain traceable through controlled rollback. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-10.
SRS-MLD-101 — Construction Activity Detection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-020; URG-T16-R02. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Identify potentially threatening construction activity from approved inputs and preserve traceable observations.
Detection output
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For an approved sensor/camera or other approved data input, identify construction-related activity potentially threatening fibre, preserve the observation and produce a construction event containing activity class, source, time, location basis and available evidence/confidence. |
| B02 | Keep unsupported or inconclusive observations available for review rather than invent a positive classification. |
| B03 | Detection identifies potential risk; it does not establish damage or authorised-work status. |
| B04 | Processing location and detector/model remain hardware-neutral until selected. |
Supported construction indicators
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | Review excavation, drilling, roadworks, heavy machinery, construction vehicles, activity inside fibre protection zones and change in activity over time as potential indicators. |
| B06 | Include oversized vehicles and drainage works from the narrative scenario. |
| B07 | For each record supported source, observable signature, monitoring conditions, limitation and evaluation case; the source says may include, so it does not mandate universal recognition of every example. |
| B08 | Do not silently exclude an agreed scenario because a chosen device cannot see it. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Run representative reviewed positive and negative examples for every agreed indicator under its agreed conditions, retaining source observations and detector/version output. | Every agreed indicator has representative positive/negative evidence under agreed conditions, linked to observations and detector/version. |
| AC02 | Include a harmless or distant construction example and a failed/unsupported sensing condition. | Harmless/distant construction and unsupported/failed sensing have explicit dispositions. |
| AC03 | Document false positives, missed detections and limits against separately agreed metrics. | False positives, misses and limitations are measured against separately agreed metrics. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-03 and OPEN-09; Sensor coverage and detection (PAR-05) and Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
SRS-MLD-102 — Unauthorised Activity Detection
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-030; URG-T17-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Identify observations indicative of potential theft, vandalism or unauthorised access without presenting suspicion as proof.
Detection output
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Consume approved observations from registered equipment or approved source records and identify behavior indicative of potential theft, vandalism or unauthorised access. |
| B02 | Produce a traceable event with scenario/type, time, location/asset, observation source and available evidence/confidence. |
| B03 | Use potential/suspected labels; detection is not proof of a crime or identification of a perpetrator. |
| B04 | Operator investigation records its own finding and does not overwrite the original detection. |
Scenario applicability
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B05 | Review the narrative examples and local authorised-access context. |
| B06 | Agree how each supported scenario is recognised, whether a supplied authorised-work list exists, the monitored period/area and the conditions that remain unsupported. |
| B07 | A missing authorised-access record cannot itself prove unauthorised access. |
| B08 | Coordinated theft requires agreed correlation evidence; no identity recognition or cross-site attribution capability is implied. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Run reviewed suspicious and benign/authorised examples for each agreed scenario. | Agreed scenarios include reviewed suspicious and benign/authorised examples. |
| AC02 | Trace positive events to their actual observations, demonstrate an uncertain case and verify no automatic assertion of guilt. | Positive events trace to observations; uncertain cases do not assert guilt. |
| AC03 | Evaluate false-positive/missed-event performance under the agreed conditions. | False-positive and missed-event performance is assessed under the agreed conditions. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-09.
SRS-MLD-103 — Suspicious Activity Classification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-FUNC-032; URG-T17-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Classify theft/vandalism detections against reviewed scenarios while preserving original and reviewed findings.
Classification output
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each theft/vandalism detection apply the reviewed scenario definitions, retaining scenario identity/version, input evidence, resulting classification and supplied confidence/limitations. |
| B02 | Proposed catalogue entries correspond to approved observable cases such as abnormal access, physical tampering/cable damage and coordinated suspicious activity; these are not approved detector classes until reviewed. |
| B03 | Unmatched or ambiguous observations remain Unclassified/Needs review and are retained. |
Review and configuration controls
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | The operator may record a reviewed finding with reason and links while preserving the original classification. |
| B05 | A scenario result feeds the configured risk rule; it does not automatically establish severity, authorise action or close a case. |
| B06 | Configuration changes apply through versioned new evaluations, with historical classifications retained. |
| B07 | Permission to view does not confer permission to correct classifications or publish scenario definitions. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Evaluate reviewed examples for each agreed class, an ambiguous example and a changed catalogue version. | Agreed, ambiguous and changed-version scenarios are evaluated against the reviewed catalogue. |
| AC02 | Verify raw detection, classifier result and operator finding remain distinguishable; confirm old events retain their applied version and no unauthorised correction succeeds. | Raw detection, classifier result and operator finding remain distinct; old versions persist and unauthorised corrections fail. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-09.
SRS-MLD-104 — AI Monitoring
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-OBS-004; URG-T29-R05. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Monitor deployed models using operational indicators and quality measures supported by verified outcomes.
Monitoring evidence and response
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each deployed model/version expose inference volume, latency/errors, unavailable/low-quality input counts, confidence/risk distribution, freshness and drift indicators appropriate to its inputs. |
| B02 | When independently verified labels/outcomes are available, calculate the applicable quality metrics on that labelled cohort and show sample size, period and label delay; unlabeled operational volume is not accuracy evidence. |
| B03 | Separate construction, theft/vandalism and animal/rodent slices when supported. |
| B04 | Alert authorised maintainers when configured degradation/data-quality thresholds are exceeded; preserve the prior result/version and degraded indication instead of silently substituting zero risk. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inject missing/stale inputs and changed feature/event distributions; compare monitoring totals with inference records and labelled evaluation fixtures; verify a configured threshold produces a traceable issue and no false accuracy claim for unlabeled data. | Monitoring reconciles to inference/labelled fixtures; configured issues are traceable and unlabelled activity does not imply accuracy. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08; Model degradation threshold (PAR-07) parameters.
SRS-MLD-105 — AI/ML Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-AIMLA-001; URG-T38-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Record the selected processing placement and operating boundaries for each AI/ML use case.
Processing placement and boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a processing-placement record per AI/ML use case: detection/classification may use a selected device, edge runtime or central worker; historical/predictive risk is proposed as platform/central analytics using accepted TM data; any hybrid path shows both stages and transferred data. |
| B02 | The proposed M4 read-only chatbot uses an LLM API and is a separate capability, not the selected detection model. |
| B03 | State model/version, input dependency, runtime/compute, output schema, latency/resource assumptions and failure fallback for each placement. |
| B04 | Decide placement from device capability, bandwidth, offline need and privacy/cost evidence, not a preferred algorithm name. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Trace representative input/output for every selected model location; disconnect its dependency and verify declared degraded/unavailable state without unapproved substitution or action. | Declared placement failures produce explicit degraded/unavailable states without unapproved substitution or action. |
| AC02 | Retain deployment/model manifest and resource measurements. | Deployment/model manifests and resource measurements support selected placements. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-03, OPEN-10 and OPEN-11.
SRS-MLD-106 — Dependency
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-AIMLA-003; URG-T38-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Identify model dependencies and govern inference, degraded operation and recovery against their availability and compatibility.
Dependencies and recovery
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | For each model list data services and artefacts it requires: sensor/adapter availability, asset/deployment resolution, accepted incident/history import, feature/normalisation schema, labelled training/evaluation data, model registry/version, inference runtime and any external API. |
| B02 | Record required/optional status, freshness/quality criteria, version compatibility and dependency owner. |
| B03 | Missing critical inputs prevent or constrain inference; optional inputs may be omitted only under a documented model contract. |
| B04 | Show stale/last-successful output separately from current output, monitor dependency failure and restore only after compatible input/model versions are available. |
| B05 | No assumed access to TM production data or a third-party model API is embedded in the dependency graph. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Remove each critical dependency in turn and supply incompatible/missing/stale inputs; check explicit unavailable/degraded results, model lineage and recovery after valid inputs return. | Each critical/incompatible/missing/stale dependency produces explicit constrained/unavailable handling; valid compatible recovery retains lineage. |
| AC02 | Retain dependency matrix and failure-test logs. | The dependency matrix and failure-test logs retain the observed evidence. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-07, OPEN-08 and OPEN-11.
SRS-MLD-107 — Additional Sensors
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Clarification required |
| TM source | REQ-AIML-003; URG-T51-R04. |
| Source modality | shall/may; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Evaluate applicable POC/Pilot use cases against agreed task metrics while retaining the unresolved source title conflict.
Source conflict
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Q05 remains open: the literal title is “Additional Sensors”, while the description specifies performance evaluation. |
| B02 | This response implements the description as proposed evaluation scope and does not infer an extra-sensor purchase or silently correct the title. |
Task evaluation
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | For each applicable POC/Pilot use case, produce an evaluation report naming the task, model/version, dataset/labels, operational conditions, baseline, thresholds and results against the agreed criteria. |
| B04 | For classification-based prediction, report overall Accuracy plus Precision, Recall and F1 Score. |
| B05 | Report a confusion matrix and per-class/support counts as a proposed aid to interpreting those measures. |
| B06 | Select ROC-AUC/PR-AUC for applicable scored classification, MAE/RMSE for applicable numeric prediction, and false-positive/false-negative rates with explicit denominators; the source’s optional metric list does not require meaningless metrics for every model. |
| B07 | Record unevaluable metrics and why. |
Acceptance boundaries
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B08 | Keep detector, predictor and conversational-assistant evaluations separate. |
| B09 | Missing labels or agreed minimums yield an unresolved acceptance result, not an assumed pass. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect the report and recompute the selected metrics from retained predictions/labels. | Selected metrics reproduce from retained predictions/labels. |
| AC02 | Check an imbalanced class, a class with no evaluable observations and false alarms/missed events. | Imbalance, empty classes, false alarms and misses have explicit support/denominator treatment. |
| AC03 | Verify classification prediction contains all four required metrics and distinguishes measured results from agreed POC/Pilot minimums. | Classification prediction includes Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1; measurements remain separate from agreed POC/Pilot minimums. |
| AC04 | Formal passing depends on the applicable approved criteria. | Formal acceptance depends on the applicable approved criteria. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-12 / Q05; OPEN-08 / Q10; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
SRS-MLD-108 — Data Labelling
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-003; URG-T52-R04. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Where supervised learning is used, define and apply traceable labelling and label-quality controls.
Label definitions
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Where supervised learning is used, maintain task-specific label guidance stating class/outcome definitions, inclusion/exclusion criteria, ground-truth sources, labelling steps, handling of ambiguous events and labelled-data quality assurance. |
| B02 | Separate observed threat class, incident cause, prediction target and intervention outcome; they are not interchangeable labels. |
Label-quality controls
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | Proposed initial process: a designated reviewer checks labels against original evidence/incident records, unresolved disagreements remain marked ambiguous, and a reviewed label change retains the prior value, reviewer, reason and time. |
| B04 | Exclude ambiguous examples from hard-label acceptance metrics unless the evaluation protocol explicitly defines their use. |
| B05 | Do not treat an operator’s acceptance of a prediction or an executed deterrent command as ground truth. |
| B06 | For prediction, define when an outcome can be known and how unmatched incidents or uncertain no-event periods are handled. |
| B07 | An external labelling worksheet/tool is sufficient; an in-platform annotation product is not assumed. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect guidance for all six required elements. | All six labelling-guidance elements are present. |
| AC02 | Review labelled positive, negative and ambiguous examples; trace to evidence and adjudication. | Positive, negative and ambiguous labels trace to original evidence and adjudication. |
| AC03 | Verify an unresolved label cannot silently become an accepted training/test label and that changes preserve history. | Unresolved labels cannot silently enter accepted training/test data; reviewed changes preserve history. |
| AC04 | If supervised learning is not used, retain an explicit method/applicability decision. | Non-supervised use has an explicit method/applicability decision. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08.
SRS-MLD-109 — Data Representativeness
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-MLDM-005; URG-T52-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Assess whether development and validation data represent the intended operating conditions.
Coverage assessment
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Compare model-development and validation data coverage with the intended deployment conditions and record the result in the dataset/evaluation report. |
| B02 | Proposed review dimensions are threat/cause and non-threat cases, site/location, time/season, lighting/weather, camera placement/distance or sensor configuration where relevant, network/asset characteristics and source-data completeness. |
| B03 | Use only dimensions relevant to the selected model; their inclusion does not add sensors or new personal-data collection. |
Gaps and mitigation
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B04 | State counts and known gaps for important conditions. |
| B05 | Where coverage is weak, propose targeted collection/review, additional field evaluation, a narrower supported operating envelope or a conservative review-only mode with clear limitations. |
| B06 | Synthetic or replayed data is labelled and cannot silently stand for actual-site performance. |
| B07 | A controlled one-location demonstration does not establish representativeness for every deployment or the later two-state pilot. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Review the coverage comparison against the agreed operational scenario/site conditions. | Coverage comparisons address agreed deployment scenarios and site conditions. |
| AC02 | Examine examples from relevant slices and a deliberately absent slice; verify the gap, impact, mitigation and validation status are visible. | Relevant and absent slices show their gaps, impacts, mitigation and validation status. |
| AC03 | Check claims of generalisation are bounded by the evidence and any narrowed use needs an explicit disposition. | Generalisation claims remain evidence-bounded and narrowed use requires explicit disposition. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-02, OPEN-08 and OPEN-09.
SRS-MLD-110 — Human Approval
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Clarification required |
| TM source | REQ-MLGRL-005; URG-T53-R06. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Retain the source representativeness obligation and separately address independently required action approval pending Q07.
Literal source obligation
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Q07 remains open: the source title is “Human Approval”, but the description repeats Data Representativeness. |
| B02 | Retain and satisfy that description through the operational-coverage assessment and mitigation response at URG-T52-R06, preserving a separate source trace rather than merging the rows. |
Independent approval controls
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | Independently, approval of designated operational actions is required by REQ-FUNC-072 and REQ-WFO-003 and elaborated by the existing workflow requirements. |
| B04 | Proposed review shows the prediction, evidence, intended action/target and blocking conditions to an authorised operator, records approve/reject with actor/time/reason and rechecks relevant restrictions before action delivery. |
| B05 | Approval does not prove the prediction true and cannot lift maintenance, stale-action or other non-overridable restrictions. |
| B06 | These approval details are a response to independently stated obligations and a proposal for the conflicting title, not an assertion that TM has corrected this row. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect representative-data evidence and mitigation under this literal row/locator. | Representativeness evidence and mitigation remain linked to this literal source row/locator. |
| AC02 | Separately exercise designated approval/rejection, denied approval permission and changed restrictions after approval; retain their independent requirement links. | Approval/rejection, permission denial and changed restrictions have their independent requirement links. |
| AC03 | Neither an approval demo alone nor the title alone closes this row’s description conflict. | Neither approval demonstration nor the title alone resolves the description conflict. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-12 / Q07; OPEN-04 and OPEN-09.
SRS-MLD-111 — Responsible AI
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-ETRES-001; URG-T54-R02. |
| Source modality | shall; all source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain a proportionate risk assessment and supporting controls for every deployed AI use case.
Risk assessment
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B01 | Maintain a concise AI risk assessment with intended use, affected operations, risk, mitigating control, evidence, residual limitation and responsible reviewer for each deployed AI use case. |
| B02 | Cover all source concerns: inappropriate decisions, biased/unrepresentative data, incorrect predictions, excessive automation, inadequate explainability and inappropriate reliance on AI-generated recommendations. |
Controls and review
| Clause | Specification |
|---|---|
| B03 | Proposed controls are representative-data/error review, explicit operating limits, understandable reasons, separation of prediction from action, approval/override paths, monitoring and controlled model replacement. |
| B04 | For the assistant also test unsupported factual claims, malicious instructions inside retrieved text and unauthorised disclosure; enforce the read-only boundary outside the model. |
| B05 | State limitations in the operational display/training material. |
| B06 | Apply risk review before deployment and when material data/model/use-case changes occur. |
| B07 | This is a proportionate POC/Pilot review, not a claim of certification or a new mandatory external standard. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect a risk/control/evidence entry for each of the six source concerns. | All six source concerns have risk, control and evidence entries. |
| AC02 | Demonstrate one incorrect prediction, an unrepresented condition, a blocked unauthorised action and an explanation/override path. | Incorrect prediction, unrepresented conditions, blocked actions and explanation/override paths demonstrate relevant controls. |
| AC03 | For delivered assistant scope, verify grounded/refusal and permission-abuse cases. | Delivered assistant scope passes applicable grounding/refusal and permission-abuse checks. |
| AC04 | Review residual limitations before the relevant acceptance decision. | Residual limitations are reviewed before the relevant acceptance decision. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-08, OPEN-10 and OPEN-11.
3.6.3 Common model and prediction contract
Purpose: Define shared logical model/result information for the Data Dictionary and Interface Contracts without selecting a wire schema.
| Logical record | Proposed information |
|---|---|
| Model package | Use case; unique version; input/preprocessing definition; intended runtime; data references; evaluation/baseline; approval state; limitations. |
| Prediction/result identity | Result ID and kind; model/configuration version; affected asset/location/segment. |
| Time meaning | Input/reference period; assessment time; future target/horizon when relevant. |
| Result | Result/category/score; confidence only when supported. |
| Evidence and controls | Supporting-record references; data coverage; guardrail/decision links. |
| Clause | Contract rule |
|---|---|
| B01 | Historical indicator, observed detection, future prediction and recommendation remain distinct result kinds. |
| B02 | Proposed result usability is valid, constrained or unavailable with a reason; exact encoded values remain for interface design. |
| B03 | Usability describes fitness for the intended use, not threat severity or a new case lifecycle. |
| B04 | Missing confidence does not equal zero; missing history does not equal low risk. |
| B05 | Proposed M3 delivery includes initial future-risk prediction as well as historical ranking. |
| B06 | Frequency, recency and severity/impact remain provisional historical factors. |
| B07 | No predictor, detection algorithm, confidence scale, numeric target or processing location is selected here. |
Decisions still required: See section 5.4: OPEN-07, OPEN-08, OPEN-10 and OPEN-11; Model performance and improvement (PAR-06) parameters.
4. Verification
The SRS states expected results; it does not report successful execution. Every requirement starts with verification status Not Run. A criterion with an unagreed parameter remains blocked for acceptance until its decision is recorded.
4.1 Verification scope and methods
-
Verification covers the full agreed FALCON solution across all three threat families: construction, theft/vandalism and animal/rodent.
-
It includes field devices and any selected edge functions, the FALCON IoT service, platform data and workflows, risk/AI functions, user access, operational controls and supporting deployment evidence.
-
Milestone allocation determines when evidence is due; it does not remove an unanswered URG obligation.
-
REQ-TEST-001 explicitly requires sensor testing, connectivity testing, data ingestion, AI/ML performance, alert generation, workflow execution, API functionality, security, performance and failure/recovery scenarios.
-
The plan should identify cases for each category and connect them to relevant operational scenarios and SRS requirements.
-
A category without a detailed requirement or test case remains a coverage gap.
Proposed methods are:
-
Test: execute defined inputs and preconditions, including applicable negative, boundary, permission and recovery cases; compare observed results with agreed criteria.
-
Demonstration: witness the representative operational flow and actual physical action where applicable, retaining correlated records rather than relying only on screenshots.
-
Inspection: review versioned requirements, interface/schema definitions, permissions, configuration, site survey, installation/as-built records and operational procedures against their source obligations.
-
Analysis: evaluate measured performance, sensing coverage, data suitability, model metrics/baselines, capacity, power and recovery evidence using a stated method and assumptions.
-
Methods may be combined.
-
Component tests or a visual prototype cannot substitute for the representative end-to-end flow required by REQ-TEST-002/N27.
-
Simulated data and injected faults may support repeatable checks, but the evidence must label them and identify what was actually exercised.
-
A simulated device response does not demonstrate physical deterrent execution.
-
The current project boundary is standalone POC/Pilot operation with offline TM data imports and device interaction through the FALCON-developed IoT service.
-
Do not assume live TM production access to execute tests.
-
Preserve the unresolved disposition of URG enterprise-integration/initial-phase entries under Q09.
-
Conditional AI/agent functions and later capabilities remain traceable until their applicability/allocation is agreed; M2/M3 evidence does not establish their completion.
4.2 Verification and Test Plan content
REQ-VER-001 requires a Verification and Test Plan. This section defines its proposed content and acceptance approach; it is not the executable test plan. The complete design-stage source mapping is in Requirements Traceability; actual results and acceptance evidence remain Not Run/not produced.
| Plan content | FALCON-specific detail to record |
|---|---|
| Scope and coverage | Source/SRS revision, included requirement locators, scenario and milestone allocation, ten REQ-TEST-001 categories, applicability decisions, exclusions and unresolved dependencies. |
| Method, scenarios and cases | Chosen method for each obligation; actors, preconditions, inputs, steps, expected outputs/state changes, negative/failure paths and links from operational scenario to case. Specify real, replayed or simulated stimuli. |
| Environment and tools | Platform/IoT build and configuration, rule/model versions, selected devices/firmware/adapters, site/location, sensor placement/calibration where applicable, power/connectivity conditions, test instruments/tools and timestamp/clock basis. Record differences from the intended deployment. |
| Test data | TM import source/version and permitted use, record selection, expected valid/invalid/unmatched examples, device evidence, ground truth and labelling method where applicable. For model evaluation, identify the evaluation set, prediction unit/horizon, reference baseline and source ambiguities that affect interpretation. |
| Expected results and criteria | Observable results per case; target-register reference with values, units, measurement boundaries, workload, observation period and agreed decision rule. Preserve optional evidence and conditional source wording. |
| Evidence | Required records from each component and physical observation, correlation identifiers, artifact locations, result-record schema, reviewer access and applicable data-protection/retention controls. |
| Responsibilities | Named preparer, executor, technical reviewer, TM SRS reviewer, field/site participant and milestone acceptance authority; approval/decision references. Names and allocation To Confirm. |
| Defect handling and repeat verification | How to report, assess, correct and recheck defects; identify impacted requirements/configurations, regression scope, remaining exceptions and the authority for acceptance decisions. Severity definitions and acceptance rules To Confirm. |
- Before field verification, link the site assessment and readiness evidence required by REQ-SITE-001/002 (URG-T44-R02/R03), with the agreed installation and commissioned-unit records.
- HW-TST-001/002 own the proposed unit/site test records; this section owns their relationship to system-wide verification.
- Safe test conditions, permitted physical actions, site access and participants remain To Confirm for the selected equipment/location.
4.3 Requirement traceability and evidence
-
The traceability framework preserves 199 numbered source rows with 198 distinct literal source IDs, plus 28 narrative coverage entries.
-
These are coverage inventories, not counts of answered or passed requirements.
-
Each numbered row remains separately identifiable by source revision, literal TM ID, heading/title and URG-Txx-Rxx locator.
-
Narrative N01–N28 are local locators, not TM IDs.
-
Additional requirements use their own SRS IDs and provenance with “Not directly derived” where appropriate.
-
In particular, retain both REQ-MLOP-004 rows: Model Degradation, URG-T56-R05, and Closed-Loop AI/ML, URG-T57-R05.
-
Preserve literal IDs REQ-COMP003, REQ-ARCH -004, REQ-O&M-001 and REQ-O&M-002.
-
Q01–Q03 govern source ambiguities; an alias must not replace or collapse the originals.
-
Nested REQ-VER-002 examples, including REQ-WF-002 and REQ-API-002, are illustrations rather than additional numbered requirements (Q12).
Proposed RTM/evidence fields are:
| Record group | Required mapping or proposed evidence fields |
|---|---|
| Source and response | Source revision/locator, literal ID and title, source modality/conditions; SRS IDs/section and origin; full/partial/unanswered response coverage; applicability, deviation or deferral with reason and decision reference. |
| Allocation and case | Milestone/component, scenario link, verification method, case ID/version, preconditions, expected result and acceptance/target reference. One source row may map to several cases; a shared case must identify the result supporting each obligation. |
| Execution identity | Run ID, execution date/time, executor/witness, environment/build/configuration, device/site, data/model/rule versions, tool versions and differences from the agreed setup. |
| Actual result and evidence | Observed result, measurements with units and stated clock basis, logs/screenshots/data extracts/analysis or physical-observation record, artifact references, and relevant event/alert/case/command/device correlation IDs. |
| Outcome and review | Execution status, defect/blocker reference, review result, reviewer, disposition authority/date/reference and retest evidence. Acceptance decision is recorded separately from test outcome. |
-
Proposed execution statuses are Not Run, In Progress, Passed, Failed and Blocked.
-
“Not applicable” and “Deferred” belong to a reviewed applicability/allocation decision; neither is a passing execution result.
-
Record the reason when a criterion is unagreed, a test dependency is unavailable or a result is inconclusive. Do not mark the test as passed.
-
Earlier runs remain linked when corrected software/configuration is retested.
-
For the field chain, evidence should connect the original observation and registered device/location through IoT receipt, platform event, rule/version and alert, any approval, the uniquely identified command, device-specific execution evidence, and the recorded response/outcome.
-
The Data Dictionary distinguishes Requested, Sent, Confirmed, Failed, Expired and Unconfirmed command states; a receipt or dispatch record cannot establish device execution or threat resolution.
-
Physical confirmation criteria remain device-specific and To Confirm.
4.4 Proposed M2 acceptance gate
- This is a candidate gate for TM review, based on the current M2 working checklist.
- Before using it for acceptance, agree the allocated requirement/case list, selected actual equipment, controlled location, allowed actions, device confirmation method, relevant targets, evidence and sign-off authority.
- All remain To Confirm where not already recorded as functional drafting direction.
| Check group | Proposed observable result and evidence |
|---|---|
| Access and records | Representative Administrator, Operator and Viewer accounts demonstrate allowed/denied delivered actions. Offline assets and manually registered devices are distinct, linked to their locations/sites and visible on map/dashboard. Link import/registration records and permission checks to SH-ACC-001, PL-DAT-001/002, PL-GIS-001/002 and PL-DEV-001/002. |
| Actual-device chain | An actual detection device provides an event through the IoT service to the platform, with available evidence/status and device/location traceability. An authorised operator triggers an actual deterrent through the IoT service; record command progression and physical action/result. Distinguish this from a simulated event or UI-only interaction. |
| Basic live view | An actual supported camera supplies continuous on-demand live viewing through the agreed service path. Check Administrator/Operator access, Viewer denial, explicit start/stop, one camera per panel, configured inactivity termination and session audit. Saved event images/clips remain distinct. |
| Controlled setup and limits | Demonstrate at one controlled location while inspecting multi-site data associations. Record selected hardware/configuration, conditions, limitations, unmet criteria and follow-on allocation; review relevant component, security and failure evidence rather than relying on the happy-path demonstration alone. |
Operator-triggered deterrence is sufficient for the user-confirmed M2 functional baseline; automatic detection-to-deterrent execution is not added as an M2 acceptance obligation. The HTML prototype does not satisfy actual-device evidence. M2 does not claim field-wide effectiveness, validated prediction, or completion of later pilot coverage.
4.5 Proposed M3 acceptance gate
- The proposed M3 gate extends the M2 evidence at an agreed field location using selected actual equipment and the agreed initial module functions.
- The detailed module checklist, field/site readiness, TM-data suitability, permitted action policy, numerical targets and acceptance authority remain To Confirm.
- M3 is not a substitute for the later URG pilot intent of two designated sites in two different states (N05).
| Check group | Proposed observable result and evidence |
|---|---|
| Integrated field flow | Trace detection through the IoT service, validation/risk decision, configured alert/workflow, designated approval, permitted response, device result and operator-recorded outcome. |
| Integrated field flow | Use representative field conditions and the agreed capability; retain construction and theft/vandalism verification/allocation in the full-solution register. |
| Workflow controls | Cover record-only/unmatched/incomplete-input paths, retained separate detections with configured grouping, rule priorities/conflicts, maintenance prohibition, approval/rejection, pauses/expiry without withheld-command replay, cooldown and manual commands. |
| Workflow controls | Check decision-version history without historical replay. |
| Workflow controls | These verify PL-WFO-001–004 refinements; they do not introduce the rejected rule-testing product feature. |
| Failure and recovery | Verify service outage differs from device offline, with last-known/unverifiable status. |
| Failure and recovery | Exercise agreed retry/expiry/unconfirmed paths without independent platform action retries or duplicate physical execution. |
| Failure and recovery | For the selected buffering-capable configuration, reconnect with original timestamps and delayed-event labels; stale events do not automatically trigger actions. |
| Failure and recovery | Record unsupported capabilities/deviations rather than silently waiving URG obligations. |
| Data and risk | Reconcile valid/rejected/unmatched imports and repeat-import handling. |
| Data and risk | Show ranked historical risk with supporting records separately from initial future-risk prediction. |
| Data and risk | Evaluate prediction against the agreed dataset, horizon, baseline and metrics. |
| Data and risk | Insufficient TM data requires an explicit scope/acceptance decision; historical counts alone cannot pass the prediction criterion. |
| Operational response | Verify internal alert/acknowledgement/escalation and linked cases. |
| Operational response | Exercise Open, In Progress and Closed, one responsible operator, reassignment history, recorded field actions and operator closure with outcome/note; attachments remain optional. |
| Operational response | Field Team accounts are available in M3. Verify assigned-work access, progress/evidence submission, denied access to unrelated work, and Operator review before case closure. |
| Operational response | Sent/Confirmed commands and Closed cases do not automatically mean Threat addressed. |
| Live view, reporting and audit | Verify device/event live-view entry points, permissions, session termination/audit and separate event evidence. |
| Live view, reporting and audit | Reconcile site/date-filtered summaries and Excel/PDF exports with underlying records, distinguishing historical/predictive views and closure outcomes. |
| Live view, reporting and audit | Trace imports, configuration, approvals, commands/results, pauses, assignments and closure changes to actor/time/record audit evidence. |
- Use these checks alongside the sensor, API, security, performance and failure/recovery tests in the Verification and Test Plan. They do not cover all 199 source responses.
- Model lifecycle, further threat capabilities, preventive action/resource mobilisation and the proposed M4 assistant retain their own allocation and evidence needs.
4.6 Defect disposition and acceptance ownership
The following disposition process is Proposed. No severity scale, tolerated defect count, automatic waiver or acceptance authority is established by this draft.
- Record each defect or unresolved exception with source/SRS/case links, actual versus expected result, evidence, environment/version and impact on the intended milestone. Distinguish an implementation defect from missing data, an unagreed target, a source ambiguity or an unapproved scope deviation.
- Propose correction and repeat verification, dependency resolution, clarification, or an explicit deviation/deferral. Record owner and intended disposition date as To Confirm until assigned. A missing device capability or failed test does not authorise changing the requirement.
- After a change, retain the original result and link new execution evidence plus the impacted regression checks. A claim that the issue is fixed does not close the finding without verification evidence.
- Present the milestone evidence and unresolved items to the authorised reviewer/acceptance authority. Any acceptance with outstanding items needs an explicit decision naming affected obligations, residual impact, conditions and follow-up responsibility. Unanswered proposals remain To Confirm; they are not accepted exceptions.
| Responsibility | Proposed scope | Named owner / authority |
|---|---|---|
| Verification lead and case executors | Prepare the source-linked plan, coordinate platform/IoT/device/model cases and retain results. | To Confirm |
| Technical and field reviewers | Review architecture/interface, device/site, data/model and security evidence within assigned competence. | To Confirm |
| TM SRS reviewers | Review the requirement interpretation, source discrepancies and proposed criteria against the designated URG baseline. | To Confirm |
| Target agreement and exception authority | Agree applicable target conditions and decide scope deviations, applicability or deferrals within authorised scope. | To Confirm |
| Milestone acceptance authority | Make and record the M2/M3 acceptance decision against the agreed evidence package. | To Confirm |
Review records should identify the person, role/authority, date, reviewed revision, decision and supporting evidence. Weekly Sprint Review feedback does not by itself constitute Milestone Sign-off. No deadline or named assignment is inferred from a source role label.
4.7 M5 assessment and handover verification
- Beyond the proposed M2/M3 gates, the verified delivery workbook lists M5 complete-MVP/UAT, performance/load/stress and VAPT reports with remediation/retest evidence, documentation and initial training.
- Preserve those source-listed proposed deliverables and their unresolved timing/readiness boundary in Delivery Allocation.
- Functional permission tests are part of security verification but do not by themselves establish completion of the separately listed vulnerability/penetration assessment.
- Approved scope, authorised test environment/activity, assessor and acceptance/disposition rules remain prerequisites.
4.8 Verification-plan source requirements
SRS-VER-101 — Architecture
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-TEST-001; URG-T45-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; source conditions remain applicable. |
The Verification and Test Plan shall cover the applicable component and end-to-end verification categories.
Required coverage
| Category | Coverage |
|---|---|
| Sensors | Range, coverage, calibration and false detections. |
| Connectivity | Connection, buffering and replay. |
| Ingestion | Valid, invalid and duplicate inputs. |
| AI/ML | Labelled evaluation and baseline comparison. |
| Alerts | Evidence sufficiency, grouping and latency. |
| Workflow | Priority, approval, restrictions, action and closure. |
| APIs | Every applicable interface contract. |
| Security | Authentication, authorisation and data protection. |
| Performance | Resource, load and response measurements. |
| Failure and recovery | Device, power, network, service, storage and restore failures. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Link every case to its source locator/literal ID and canonical SRS requirement. |
| B02 | Record method, preconditions, environment/version, input/ground truth, steps, expected result/threshold, evidence, responsible tester and actual result/defect. |
| B03 | Keep unknown thresholds and owners as blocked acceptance fields; do not assume a pass. |
| B04 | Retain raw execution evidence, defects, retests and the separate acceptance decision. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect coverage in both directions between plan and SRS/RTM | Every applicable requirement and case maps to its source; omissions remain visible. |
| AC02 | Execute approved cases with the appropriate verification methods | Raw results and evidence support the recorded outcomes; inspection, demonstration, analysis and measured tests remain identifiable. |
| AC03 | Inspect a case with unknown threshold or owner | Acceptance remains blocked rather than assumed. |
Decisions still required: Q10 and OPEN-16; see section 5.4.
SRS-VER-102 — Demonstration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed conditional response |
| TM source | REQ-TEST-002; URG-T45-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; source conditions remain applicable. |
Demonstrate representative end-to-end flows with actual selected devices and supported data.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | For construction, trace activity → detection → ingestion → applicable AI analysis → risk classification → alert → workflow → authorised preventive action/outcome. |
| B02 | For animal/rodent activity, trace detection/classification → risk → alert → approved intervention/outcome. |
| B03 | For theft/vandalism, demonstrate the corresponding detection and response chain. |
| B04 | Identify sensor, model and Operator evidence separately at each stage. |
| B05 | Include negative/ambiguous evidence, missing input, offline/delayed events, denied approval and failed/unconfirmed actions. |
| B06 | Where real threats cannot ethically or safely be staged, use controlled safe stimuli or accepted recorded data and label simulation limits. |
| B07 | Do not treat device execution or apparent retreat alone as proof of long-term prevention effectiveness. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Demonstrate each allocated scenario | Timestamped sensor evidence, model/rule/configuration versions and event/alert/case/command records establish the observed chain. |
| AC02 | Review ground truth and conditions | The observed outcome is supported by ground truth and recorded environmental conditions. |
| AC03 | Reconcile expected and observed results, including exception scenarios | Each result maps to its criterion and any defect; simulation and evidence limitations remain explicit. |
Decisions still required: OPEN-02, OPEN-03, OPEN-04, OPEN-09, OPEN-16 and Q10; see section 5.4.
SRS-VER-103 — Verification Plan
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-VER-001; URG-T59-R02 |
| Source modality | shall; source conditions remain applicable. |
Prepare and submit a versioned Verification and Test Plan with measurable expected results and objective evidence.
Objective evidence
| Evidence group | Records retained where appropriate |
|---|---|
| Execution | Logs, readings, API records and workflow records. |
| Models and configuration | Model evaluations and configuration/architecture records. |
| User and field observations | Screenshots/dashboards, field observations and incident records. |
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Cover verification scope/methodology, scenarios/cases, environment, data, tools, expected results, acceptance criteria, evidence, responsibilities and defect management. |
| B02 | For each case, identify source locator/SRS link, applicable milestone, preconditions, actors/permissions, steps/stimuli, expected observable behaviour and evidence. |
| B03 | Declare actual-device, replayed or simulated conditions. Retain test environment/build/model/rule/data versions. |
| B04 | Cover sensor, connectivity, ingestion, AI/ML, alerts, workflow, APIs, security, performance and failure/recovery. |
| B05 | Cover the full applicable detection-to-response/outcome/audit chain across all threat families. |
| B06 | Use testing, demonstration, inspection, analysis and operational observation as applicable. |
| B07 | Agree numerical criteria and authorities before interpreting a run as accepted. |
| B08 | Record defects, dependencies and retest evidence. Missing criteria and simulated physical actions shall not become assumed passes. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Inspect the plan against the source | All twelve source headings, scenario/requirement coverage, assigned or explicitly pending responsibilities, measurable expected results and evidence access are addressed. |
| AC02 | Execute representative approved cases | Actual results reconcile with expected results and retained evidence. |
| AC03 | Review component-only and simulated tests | Component-only results do not close end-to-end obligations; simulated actions remain labelled. |
| AC04 | Review the SRS and plan status | Draft plan requirements are not reported as completed test results. |
Decisions still required: Q10 and OPEN-16; see section 5.4.
SRS-VER-104 — Requirement Traceability
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Status | Proposed response |
| TM source | REQ-VER-002; URG-T59-R03 |
| Source modality | shall; source conditions remain applicable. |
Maintain source-to-verification traceability without conflating response coverage, execution and acceptance.
| Clause | Required behaviour |
|---|---|
| B01 | Identify each source by revision, literal requirement ID, title and locator. Map every applicable requirement to verification method, test case, expected result, actual result, evidence, status and defect reference where applicable. |
| B02 | Keep both REQ-MLOP-004 rows separate. Preserve unusual literal IDs and the Q05–Q07 conflicts. |
| B03 | Treat nested REQ-WF-002 and REQ-API-002 as illustrations, not newly adopted source requirements. |
| B04 | Proposed additional RTM fields distinguish SRS response coverage, applicability/conditionality, delivery allocation, test execution and authorised acceptance. |
| B05 | Allow multiple cases per requirement. A shared case must provide an identifiable result for each supported requirement. |
| B06 | Use Not Run, In Progress, Passed, Failed or Blocked for execution. Record approved not-applicable/deferred decisions separately; they are not passing tests. |
| B07 | Preserve failed runs and links to retests. |
| B08 | Include all 199 numbered rows/198 literal IDs and 28 narrative locators in coverage review. Extra requirements retain their own provenance. |
| B09 | Treat this document as traceable draft responses, not a completed execution RTM. |
Verification:
| Criterion | Scenario / method | Expected result |
|---|---|---|
| AC01 | Reconcile source and case registers | Source counts, IDs/locators and mandatory/conditional obligations match the response and case register. |
| AC02 | Inspect executed and pending cases | Executed cases contain the seven required mappings; pending cases contain no invented actual results or evidence. |
| AC03 | Sample shared cases, both duplicate-ID rows, an unresolved conflict, a defect/retest and an approved exception | Each relationship and disposition remains traceable without collapsing source identities or execution history. |
| AC04 | Review acceptance reporting | Response coverage alone cannot establish acceptance. |
Decisions still required: Q01–Q03, Q05–Q07, Q12, OPEN-12 and OPEN-16; see section 5.4.
4.9 Evidence and acceptance disposition
-
For each executed check, record requirement and test IDs, build/configuration/model/device versions, site/dataset, approved parameters, steps, actual observations, evidence location, executor/date and result.
-
Use Not Run, In Progress, Blocked, Passed or Failed for execution; use a separate approval/disposition record for acceptance.
-
A documented deviation is not a passed original requirement.
-
The detailed criterion following a requirement supplies its verification intent; create executable test cases with positive, denied/invalid and recovery paths where applicable.
-
A proposed test reference is
VT-<requirement ID>with suffixes for individual cases. -
These references are a naming convention, not evidence that test scripts exist or ran.
TM and the delivery team must agree the acceptance authority, defect severity/waiver rules, required evidence and numeric thresholds before deciding a milestone pass. Operational benefit, physical execution, model quality and software conformance need their own evidence. A deployed SRS website verifies document publication only.
5. Appendixes
5.1 Logical data dictionary
Device events
| Logical field | Meaning and agreed treatment |
|---|---|
| Event ID | Identity used to distinguish a new detection from retransmission of the same event. Generation and uniqueness scope To Confirm. |
| Device ID | Originating registered/authorised device. |
| Event type | Event classification used for routing/grouping; taxonomy To Confirm. |
| Original event time | Time at the observation source, retained on delayed delivery; clock/timezone handling To Confirm. |
| Service receipt time | Time received by the IoT service, distinct from original event time. |
| Evidence | Available images/clips or their references, linked to the event. Format, size and retention To Confirm. |
| Confidence | Included only when provided by the detection source; absent confidence is not zero confidence. Scale and interpretation To Confirm. |
- Initial device site/location is maintained in its registration record; per-event GPS transmission is not required.
- The platform associates events with that registered location.
- Existing PL-DEV-003 preserves deployment history and event-time coordinates on relocation; do not relink historical events to a device’s new placement.
- Exact delayed-event association rules remain To Confirm.
Retransmission of the same event shall not create duplicate event records. Genuine separate detections remain separately recorded even when they contribute to one grouped alert.
Device commands
Each command shall have a unique command ID carried through the platform and IoT service and correlated to supported device acknowledgements/results. If the device cannot echo that ID, the adapter correlation method must be defined; no unsupported device capability is assumed.
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Requested | The authorised action request is recorded. |
| Sent | The IoT service reports the command dispatched to the device. |
| Confirmed | Execution is confirmed using the agreed device-specific evidence; service acceptance alone is insufficient. |
| Failed | A definitive delivery/execution failure is reported under the agreed failure rules. |
| Expired | The command is outside its permitted execution validity. |
| Unconfirmed | Execution could not be established from the available acknowledgement/evidence. |
Status transitions, deadlines, late acknowledgements, retry interactions and detailed error codes remain To Confirm. These command statuses are distinct from case statuses Open, In Progress and Closed.
Recognising a retransmitted command shall prevent repeated physical execution of the same action. Device/adapter duplicate-execution controls must be validated before enabling the applicable automatic retry. The target behaviour does not establish exactly-once execution on every candidate device.
Proposed complete logical data model
PostgreSQL stores structured records; controlled bucket references identify files. Physical table layout, provider and database extensions remain To Confirm. Logical fields do not replace the original TM source schemas.
Identity time and validation conventions
| Convention | Rule |
|---|---|
| Application identity | each persistent entity has an immutable opaque identifier. |
| Application identity | Preserve its original source identifier separately, with a source namespace. |
| Application identity | Human labels, camera names and mutable serial/display fields are not substitutes for application identity. |
| Application identity | UUID is a possible technical encoding, not a required version or vendor choice. |
| Record provenance | imported/derived records identify their source batch or producing event/model/rule, source record identifier where supplied, creation/receipt time and responsible actor/service. |
| Record provenance | Corrections create auditable revisions; historical references do not silently point to a different meaning. |
| Time | interchange instants use RFC3339 with an explicit UTC offset. |
| Time | Store an accepted normalised UTC instant plus the original source value/offset and clock-quality or uncertainty flag where available. |
| Time | Keep original observation, service receipt, platform receipt and processing times distinct. |
| Time | Display timezone is explicit; local rule windows use a configured site timezone. |
| Time | A timestamp without a known offset requires an approved source mapping, not a guessed UTC conversion. |
| Time | See RFC3339. |
| Missing values | absent confidence is unknown, not zero; absent incident impact is unknown, not no impact. |
| Missing values | Distinguish missing, invalid, not applicable and withheld fields. |
| Missing values | Preserve validation reasons and eligibility for each use. |
| Missing values | Display/export those distinctions rather than presenting a zero or empty-looking success. |
| Geometry | retain source coordinate reference system and geometry type. |
| Geometry | A reviewed import mapping may produce the display/analysis geometry, with transformation provenance. |
| Geometry | Invalid/out-of-range or ambiguous coordinates are flagged; a nearest asset is a candidate association, not automatically a confirmed match. |
| Geometry | Selected spatial conventions remain part of source/interface review. |
| Versions | retain rule, model, dataset, import-mapping and relevant configuration version references used for a result. |
| Versions | A newer version changes new evaluations only unless a separately authorised recalculation is explicitly requested and recorded. |
Entity catalogue
Fields below are the proposed minimum logical information. Source-dependent fields may be unavailable; the validation/eligibility rules determine permitted use. Links are references, not duplicated copies of entire records.
| Entity | Minimum information and relationships | Main rules and owner |
|---|---|---|
| Site | Site ID, name, location/zone definition, configured timezone, status, source/reference. | Multi-site data from the first increment; no invented locations. Shared by GIS/devices/operations. |
| TM asset | Application asset ID, source namespace/ID, asset type, source attributes, geometry/CRS, site or route association, import provenance and validation state. | Separate from FALCON device identity. PL-GIS-001; missing geometry prevents spatial calculations needing it. |
| FALCON device | Device ID, source/native identity, type/model when selected, supported capabilities, authorised/onboarding state, current deployment reference, latest contact/status and configuration reference. | PL-DEV-001/002; no implicit camera or command capability for every device. Secrets are protected credentials, not ordinary registry fields or exports. |
| Deployment | Deployment ID, device ID, asset/location/site, coordinates/CRS, effective start/end, planned destination/date where relevant, relocation reason, recorded outcome, recorder and audit reference. | PL-DEV-003: one active deployment; planning does not change current placement. Completing a move closes the previous interval and starts the new one. |
| Observation/event | Event ID and source identity, device, deployment/association status, type, original/receipt times, payload/schema version, available evidence/confidence, validation and delay flags. | PL-EVT-001 and earlier event fields; raw sensor observations may require selected processing before producing a classified event. Preserve both source observation and derived-event lineage where applicable. |
| Evidence object | Evidence ID, bucket object/version reference, media type, originating event/device/import, capture/receipt time, integrity metadata where available, access/retention class and availability state. | Store media once, link it from permitted records. Missing/deleted-by-policy media remains distinguishable from evidence never supplied; no public bucket assumption. |
| Import batch | Batch ID, source/file reference and content fingerprint, source namespace, mapping version, submitting Administrator, preview/application times, counts and run status. | PL-DAT-001/002; record source file/version and outcomes. Fingerprint helps repeat-file detection but does not identify duplicate real incidents by itself. |
| Import row/result | Batch+row locator, source key, proposed target ID/revision, accepted/rejected/unmatched disposition, validation/matching reasons and application result. | Preview changes to existing records before applying. Partial valid-row progress reconciles to counts; failures do not conceal skipped rows. |
| Historical incident/docket | Incident ID, source docket ID(s), event/record dates, threat/category, usable location, asset match and confidence/status, reported impact/severity if supplied, source batch and revision. | One source docket is not assumed to equal one distinct incident. Unmatched records remain available, excluded only from calculations needing the missing link. |
| Alert and event membership | Alert ID, type/zone/grouping-rule version, linked event IDs, risk/severity, current handling state, created/updated times, acknowledgement/routing history. | PL-EVT-002; grouping retains all event records/device identities. Exact transition proposal is in the functional response to REQ-FUNC-060–064. |
| Notification attempt | Notification ID, alert/workflow reference, intended internal recipient/destination, channel, requested/delivery state, attempt/error times. | Notification delivery is distinct from alert acknowledgement. M3 internal notifications first; no external channel is silently selected. |
| Rule version and evaluation | Rule/version ID, conditions/action references, priority, enabled/effective state, author, evaluation ID, event/input versions, result, reason and applied restrictions. | PL-WFO-001–004; historical decisions retain the applied version. Proposed fields document what was evaluated, not a new end-user rule-testing feature. |
| Approval and restriction | Approval ID/action target, authorised decider, decision/reason/time and validity; pause/maintenance records identify scope, creator, start/end/expiry and reason. | Rejection/pending approval cannot be interpreted as permission. A pause governs automatic actions within its scope; other restrictions remain after expiry. |
| Command and result | Command ID, originating action/evaluation or manual reason, device/target, action/parameter version, requester, approval/restriction references, validity, status history, adapter correlation and result evidence. | Preserve the six command states above. Each delivery attempt belongs to the same logical command; no independent platform action retry. |
| Case | Case ID, source alert/event/recommendation links, Open/In Progress/Closed, one responsible operator, assignment history, field-action records, closure outcome/note and optional evidence. | PL-CAS-001. Record assigned Field Team accounts separately from the responsible Operator. External responders may still be recorded by an Operator without an application account. |
| Case action and closure record | Case ID, action/response description, reported performer, recording user (Operator or assigned Field Team member), action/report times, outcome category/version, note and optional evidence. | Distinguish who performed an action from who entered it. Retiring a configurable outcome does not rewrite old cases. |
| Risk assessment/prediction | Assessment ID, type (historical or predictive), asset/location/segment and unit, assessed/prediction period, score/category, factors, source coverage, model/rule/dataset version and limitations. | PL-RSK-001; probability only when its semantics and calibration justify that label. A historical count is not a prediction. |
| Preventive recommendation | Recommendation ID, target location/asset, proposed action, reasons/evidence/risk, priority and rule version; operator accept/dismiss/defer decision/reason and linked follow-up case. | PL-PRV-002/003. Recommendation acceptance is not automatic physical execution. |
| Mobilisation/intervention | Responding team/contact, requested action, agreed mobilisation status; intervention action/date/responsible party/outcome, evidence if supplied and source links. | PL-PRV-004/005. M4–M5 split pending; no full rostering/scheduling subsystem implied. |
| Effectiveness review | Review ID, selected before/after periods, incident/risk measures, data coverage, interventions considered, limitations and reviewer observations. | PL-PRV-006. Different monitoring periods/exposure must be stated; association is not a causal claim. |
| Dataset/model/evaluation record | Dataset manifest/source/label versions and permitted use; model/version and task; evaluation method/data/metrics/baseline; deployment/monitoring/rollback references. | Existing model requirements and AI/ML response specifications. Logical records may be managed in a controlled registry/document repository; no separate MLOps product purchase is mandated. |
| User and permission assignment | Account ID, active/disabled state, assigned role/explicit capabilities and administrative audit. | SH-ACC-001. Five roles: Superadmin, Administrator, Operator, Field Team and Viewer. Apply section 2.2 access rules; no public registration. Secrets/tokens never enter business exports. |
| Audit entry | Actor/service, action, target IDs, timestamp, request/correlation ID, result and changed-version references or protected before/after details. | SH-AUD-001. Access and retention controlled; redact credentials and minimise personal content. Audit is separate from diagnostics and operational event evidence. |
| Live session | Session ID, actor, camera, authorisation decision, start/stop/timeout times and outcome/reason. | Viewing metadata only; no automatic continuous/manual video recording. Transport details and session limits remain selected-camera dependent. |
| Report/assistant output | Report ID/type, filters/period, data cutoff/version, creator/time, format and controlled output reference; assistant output also identifies sources, language and missing-information limitations. | Reports in Excel/PDF for M3; read-only on-demand assistant proposed M4. AI-summary export is not established. |
Deployment and delayed-event association
-
Prefer an authenticated deployment identifier where the adapter can supply it and verify that it matches the registered device.
-
Otherwise use a trustworthy original event instant against the device’s deployment history.
-
Proposed intervals include their start and exclude their end, so a boundary instant has one placement.
-
Preserve a snapshot/reference of the historical geometry used for the event.
-
If device time is unreliable, a placement interval is missing/overlapping, or source and registered deployment conflict, retain the event with association unresolved and the candidate information.
-
Do not assign it to the current deployment merely because it arrived now.
-
Block calculations or automatic actions that need a reliable location until resolved, while preserving other usable information.
-
An authorised correction records old/new association, reason and actor; it does not erase the prior audit trail.
-
Clock tolerances and who may approve a correction remain To Confirm.
Command lifecycle refinement
Proposed refinement of the existing states, subject to selected-device validation:
| Current state | Permitted next observation/state | Guard and evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Requested | Sent, Failed or Expired | Sent requires IoT dispatch evidence; failure is definitive rejection/failure; expiry means validity elapsed before permitted dispatch. |
| Sent | Confirmed, Failed, Expired or Unconfirmed | Confirmed requires correlated device-specific execution evidence; elapsed waiting alone does not prove failure or success. Timeout/expiry meanings are defined per action/adapter. |
| Unconfirmed | Confirmed or Failed only after correlated reconciliation evidence; otherwise stays Unconfirmed | Retain prior uncertainty and receipt times. A repeated delivery is not a new logical command or evidence of execution. |
| Confirmed / Failed / Expired | Append late/contradictory evidence; review any correction with an audit record | No automatic new action, replay, case closure or history erasure. A late report of execution outside validity is a control exception to investigate, not normal success. |
- Restrictions are evaluated before issuing an action and before retry eligibility.
- The physical device’s ability to enforce expiration, stop limits and duplicate suppression must be established; the central record cannot retroactively prevent an already dispatched physical action.
- Where safe confirmation/idempotency cannot be established, use the restricted device policy defined through verification rather than claiming exactly-once operation.
Data validation evidence
- Proposed cases cover identity collision across sources; repeat import with unchanged and changed records; missing confidence/impact/geometry; an unmatched incident with a usable location; genuine repeated detections versus retransmission; relocation boundary/late/uncertain-time events; command timeout and late acknowledgement; outcome retirement and historical report consistency.
- Expected results follow the rules above.
- Retention durations, field-size limits, allowed enumerations and source mappings require the selected TM/device data and applicable policy, and remain explicit configuration/acceptance decisions.
5.2 Recorded drafting decisions
The six latest decisions below are confirmed by the user for drafting; TM approval remains pending. Earlier recorded directions on roles, imports, IoT, commands, video, cases, reporting, preventive work and the assistant have been incorporated into their owning sections. Details added during consolidation remain Proposed.
| Reference | Confirmed direction | Requirements |
|---|---|---|
| RWD-001 | An authorised Operator may close a reviewed false alarm, duplicate or unverifiable alert without a case, with an outcome and note. Investigation, assignment or field intervention requires a case. | SRS-EVT-011/012; SRS-EVT-014 is a supporting refinement. |
| RWD-002 | New alerts use a shared Operator queue. Acknowledgement records the Operator and time separately from case ownership. | SRS-EVT-008/009/010. |
| RWD-003 | A linked alert displays the case’s responsible Operator; there is no separate alert assignee. | SRS-EVT-013. |
| RWD-004 | Grouping uses a configurable fixed window starting at the first qualifying detection. Subsequent detections do not extend it. | SRS-EVT-015. |
| RWD-005 | A new qualifying detection after closure creates a new alert and preserves closed-alert history. | SRS-EVT-016. |
| RWD-006 | Case closure offers “Also close linked alert” and requires confirmation of the alert outcome when selected. Case closure alone does not close the alert. | SRS-EVT-017/018. |
Role decisions agreed for drafting
| Reference | Agreed direction | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ROLE-001 | Add Superadmin for technical administration. Operational access requires a separately assigned role. | User agreed; TM review pending. |
| ROLE-002 | Add Field Team accounts from M3, limited to assigned work, progress, evidence and completion submission. | User agreed; TM review pending. |
| ROLE-003 | Operators retain case ownership, assign field work, review submitted results and close cases. Field Team completion does not close the case. | User agreed; TM review pending. |
5.3 Proposed state and transition rules
This table shows details left unresolved by the six drafting decisions, separating agreed behaviour from proposed states. It does not establish TM approval of a new lifecycle.
| Record and transition | Actor / trigger | Preconditions and recorded result | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alert creation | Platform, qualifying event | Record first detection, assessment/rule version and linked events; put in shared queue. | Existing drafting direction; detailed fields Proposed. |
| Alert acknowledgement | Authorised Operator | Record actor/time independently of case ownership; reject stale conflicting update. | RWD-002; concurrency treatment Proposed. |
| Alert assignment stage | Operator assigns linked case | Read responsible Operator from case; no independent alert assignee. | RWD-003; TM interpretation pending. |
| Alert escalation | Enabled rule or permitted Operator | Retain escalation rule/reason/recipient and time; escalation alone is neither resolution nor closure. | Proposed. |
| Reviewed alert → Closed without case | Authorised Operator | Outcome No threat found, Duplicate or Unable to verify; note required. No fabricated threat-resolved finding. | RWD-001; eligible source states To Confirm. |
| Case Open → In Progress | Responsible/permitted Operator | Record progress/action and actor/time; exact action permission and transition preconditions require review. | Three-state lifecycle confirmed for drafting; transition details Proposed. |
| Case Open/In Progress → Closed | Authorised Operator | Required outcome and note; attachments optional; default leaves linked alert unchanged. | Existing case direction and RWD-006. |
| Case closure with linked-alert closure selected | Authorised Operator | Require confirmed alert outcome and allowed alert state; retain distinct case and alert transitions. No silent partial-success message. | RWD-006; atomicity/partial-failure and cardinality To Confirm. |
| Closed alert + new qualifying detection | Platform | Create new alert ID; do not alter old history. | RWD-005. |
| Closed case/alert reopening | No default permission assumed | Reopening policy requires explicit approval; do not infer it from the presence of an edit action. | To Confirm. |
| Command Requested → Sent | IoT dispatch report | Preserve command ID and dispatch evidence. | Existing drafting direction. |
| Command Sent → Confirmed | Agreed device-specific execution evidence | Confirm the physical action under adapter semantics; no threat-resolution inference. | Existing drafting direction. |
| Command → Failed/Expired/Unconfirmed | Definitive failure / expiry / missing confirmation | Retain attempts and timing; show reason and prevent unsafe replay. Late acknowledgements need an agreed rule. | State meanings retained; transitions/limits To Confirm. |
| Device Unknown/Online/Offline | Registration/contact/timeout | Use approved thresholds and last contact; show IoT unavailability separately. | Existing drafting direction; thresholds To Confirm. |
For repeated detections, the fixed grouping window is anchored at the first qualifying detection and does not slide. The treatment of exact boundaries, out-of-order delivery, uncertain clocks and competing alerts must be decided once and used in the rule engine, interface contracts and tests.
5.4 Open decisions and acceptance parameters
- A review draft can list unresolved decisions. Values still require TM or engineering agreement.
- The following decisions block the affected baseline or acceptance assessment, not the act of drafting.
- Suggested accountable roles are listed for routing only; named owners remain To Confirm.
| ID | Decision required | Affected area | Suggested decision parties | Gate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OPEN-01 | Agree standalone/offline scope disposition against live enterprise integration and initial-phase marks. | I-TM; source software interfaces; N06/N20 | TM architecture/product and delivery lead | Scope baseline |
| OPEN-02 | Identify Pilot sites in two states, equipment quantities, readiness and field constraints. | Field deployment, power, sensing, Pilot | TM site owner and engineering lead | Site design/installation |
| OPEN-03 | Select devices, supported sensing/deterrent commands and physical execution/stop evidence. | IoT, active control, edge and sensors | Hardware/IoT leads and TM operations | Operational activation |
| OPEN-04 | Agree rule priorities, action approval catalogue, maintenance/pause permissions and retry/cooldown/expiry/stale-age values. | Workflow/commands | TM operations and platform/IoT leads | Enable automatic actions |
| OPEN-05 | Agree grouping clock, exact end boundary, late arrival and competing matches. | Events and alerts | TM operations and platform lead | Alert acceptance |
| OPEN-06 | Agree alert source states, case/alert cardinality, combined-closure failure policy and reopening. | Events/cases/state model | TM operations and BA | Lifecycle baseline |
| OPEN-07 | Agree input schemas, matching identities, coordinate mapping and quality/exclusion rules. | Imports, GIS and risk | TM data owners and data lead | Import/model acceptance |
| OPEN-08 | Agree prediction objective, geographic unit, horizon, dataset suitability, baseline and pass thresholds. | Historical/predictive risk and models | TM SMEs and AI/data leads | Model acceptance |
| OPEN-09 | Agree supported classes/conditions and order of construction versus theft/vandalism capability. | Threat detection and milestones | TM SMEs and delivery lead | Capability baseline |
| OPEN-10 | Agree hosting, security policies, identity technology, data classes, retention and recovery targets. | Security, compliance and operations | TM security/data/architecture | Environment/acceptance approval |
| OPEN-11 | Decide assistant applicability/allocation, LLM processing provider/region/data/retention and evaluation. | AI assistant and conditional agents | TM product, security and AI leads | AI data processing |
| OPEN-12 | Resolve original version discrepancy, FALCON terminology, duplicate REQ-MLOP-004, missing REQ-FUNC-011 list and conflicting AI titles/descriptions. | Source register and related responses | TM requirement owner | Source interpretation baseline |
| OPEN-13 | Agree notification recipients, escalation timing, repeat policy and any external channels. | Alerts/notifications | TM operations | Notification acceptance |
| OPEN-14 | Agree live-view timeout, quality, transport and concurrency; no recording expansion implied. | Camera/IoT | TM operations and engineering | Video acceptance |
| OPEN-15 | Agree report layouts, time bases, availability denominator and export limits. | Reporting | TM operational/reporting reviewers | Report acceptance |
| OPEN-16 | Name SRS owner/reviewers/signatories, milestone authority, waiver rules and handover responsibilities. | Governance/acceptance | TM sponsor and delivery lead | Baseline/sign-off |
| OPEN-17 | Agree lifecycle-cost horizon, costing basis/currency/tax, selected service tiers, supplier terms, allowances and exit obligations. No purchase is authorised. | Cost evaluation and delivery | TM commercial/technical reviewers and delivery lead; named authority To Confirm | Cost/design review |
Source clarification register
All Q01–Q14 items below remain To Confirm and sit under the applicable OPEN decision above. No clarification is treated as an amendment to the TM source.
| Ref | Affected source | Observation | Required clarification or treatment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q01 | REQ-MLOP-004 | Two different rows use this ID: Model Degradation and Closed-Loop AI/ML. | Confirm the intended distinct identifiers; retain both source rows using section, title and locator. |
| Q02 | REQ-COMP003; REQ-ARCH -004; REQ-O&M-001; REQ-O&M-002 | ID syntax differs from the common pattern. | Retain literal IDs; ask whether TM intends editorial corrections before changing aliases. |
| Q03 | 3.5.14; 3.6.6; 4.2 | These section numbers each occur for different headings. | Always include heading text and table locator. Confirm corrected numbering in the next TM revision. |
| Q04 | REQ-FUNC-011 | Description ends at “At minimum, the solution shall support:” with no following list. | Confirm the intended categories; do not silently complete the source using other rows. |
| Q05 | REQ-AIML-003 | Title says Additional Sensors; description specifies AI/ML performance evaluation. | Propose mapping by description to model evaluation and request title confirmation. |
| Q06 | REQ-MLDM-004 | Title says Training, Validation and Test Data; description repeats REQ-AIML-004 Baseline Comparison. | Confirm whether data split/leakage controls were intended, or whether both obligations apply. |
| Q07 | REQ-MLGRL-005 | Title says Human Approval; description repeats REQ-MLDM-005 Data Representativeness. | Retain both meanings as an unresolved conflict. Human approval remains independently covered by REQ-FUNC-072 and REQ-WFO-003. |
| Q08 | Source cover and Document Control | Cover states Version 1.0 / Release 0.1; control table says version 0.1 and contains approval placeholders. | Confirm the source revision label and formal approval state. User has designated this file as the baseline regardless of its draft label. |
| Q09 | 2.6 Apportioning of Requirements; 1.3 TM Production Environment and POC Environment | Initial-phase marks include enterprise integration, knowledge retrieval, AI Agent and advanced predictive models; glossary describes isolated POC/Pilot without TM production integration unless agreed. | Confirm actual interface boundaries and release allocation. Do not silently defer marked capabilities or commit production integration. |
| Q10 | 3.3; REQ-PERF-001 to 004; REQ-AVAIL-001; REQ-REL-003; REQ-SENS-003; REQ-AIML-003 | Several measurable targets and test conditions are left for POC or agreement. | Agree target-setting owner and stage; record numeric criteria and representative load/environment before acceptance. |
| Q11 | REQ-SITE-001; REQ-TEST-001; REQ-REL-003 | Generic titles Architecture or Data Protection obscure site assessment, test planning or recovery content. | Map using description; confirm editorial titles without altering the source extract. |
| Q12 | REQ-VER-002 nested example table | Examples include REQ-WF-002 and REQ-API-002, which are not requirement-row IDs in the source. | Treat example rows as illustrations, not new requirements. Request correct cross-references. |
| Q13 | 1.4 Document Overview; section 5 reference | The document describes appendixes in section 5, but no section 5 heading is present in the extracted body. | Confirm whether appendixes or referenced architecture/data artifacts are supplied separately. |
| Q14 | REQ-SEC, REQ-COMP, REQ-INTSW, REQ-CCP and 2.5 | Policies, source access, data samples, hosting approval and some external interfaces depend on TM inputs. | Request applicable policy versions, named data/system owners, sample data, approved environment and access arrangements. |
Numerical parameters
- No numeric performance or acceptance values are assigned here.
- Each entry needs its value/unit, applicable requirement and milestone, workload/site/dataset, measurement method, acceptance decision rule, named owner/reviewer, agreement date and source reference. All values and named owners in this register are To Confirm. The proposed timing is before the relevant acceptance test is judged; exploratory POC measurements may inform the agreement but are not automatically acceptance criteria.
| Parameter ref | Target or condition | Source / owning requirement | Definition still required |
|---|---|---|---|
| PAR-01 | Event processing time | REQ-PERF-001, URG-T25-R02; SH-PER-001 | Start/end measurement points, event/evidence mix, arrival load, target and treatment of delayed events. Source target is TBD during POC. |
| PAR-02 | Alert latency | REQ-PERF-002, URG-T25-R03; SH-PER-001 | Measure from receipt of sufficient evidence to classify the event, as stated by URG; define that boundary, destination, load and target. Do not silently substitute original observation time. |
| PAR-03 | Monitored capacity and dashboard response | REQ-PERF-003/004, URG-T25-R04/R05; SH-PER-001 | Locations/devices/assets, event/data volumes, users, dashboard actions and normal operating conditions; capacity and response targets. |
| PAR-04 | Availability and recovery | REQ-AVAIL-001/002, URG-T28-R02/R03; REQ-REL-001–003, URG-T27-R02–R04; SH-REL-001 | Operational/measurement period, maintenance-window treatment where applicable, failure scope, recovery time and permitted data loss. |
| PAR-05 | Sensor coverage and detection | REQ-SENS-002/003/005, URG-T33-R03/R04/R06 | Designated risk area, range, field of view, sensitivity, detection frequency, sampling, accuracy and false-positive/false-negative characteristics where applicable; environmental and calibration conditions. |
| PAR-06 | Model performance and improvement | REQ-AIML-003/004, URG-T51-R04/R05; PL-RSK-001 | Applicable POC/Pilot minimums, reference baseline, dataset/ground truth, prediction horizon/unit and measurable improvement. Classification-based prediction must report Precision, Recall and F1 Score as well as overall Accuracy; other listed metrics apply where appropriate. |
| PAR-07 | Model degradation threshold | REQ-MLOP-004, Model Degradation, URG-T56-R05 | Monitoring period/data, material-degradation threshold and alert/notification test. Keep separate from conditional closed-loop REQ-MLOP-004, URG-T57-R05. |
| PAR-08 | Workflow and alert timing | PL-WFO-001–004; PL-EVT-001/002 | Grouping window/zone, rule time basis, cooldown, pause duration, permitted event age, approval/notification/escalation timing and boundary behaviour. |
| PAR-09 | Commands and connectivity recovery | Interface Contracts; HW-CON-001/002; PL-DEV-002 | Retry attempts/intervals, command expiry/confirmation timeout, offline/service thresholds, buffering capacity and overflow/reconnect conditions, device-specific duplicate-execution controls. |
| PAR-10 | Live-view quality and sessions | Interface Contracts; HW-SEN-001; SH-ACC-001/SH-AUD-001 | Resolution/frame rate, latency/bandwidth, concurrent streams/users and inactivity definition/timeout. One camera per panel is an initial presentation constraint, not a system-wide concurrency target. |
| PAR-11 | Power and sustained operation | HW-PWR-001/002; HW-TST-001 | Preserve the existing confirmed overnight-operation requirement; agree duration, duty cycle, workload, initial battery/power condition, site environment and interruption behaviour. Do not infer a fixed number of hours or select solar by this register. |
| PAR-12 | Retention, backup and reporting scale | SH-REL-001; SH-AUD-001; PL-RPT-001; REQ-COMP-004, URG-T30-R05 | Retention by data/evidence class, backup scope/frequency and restoration data; report time basis, volume/download limits and device-availability calculation. |
OPEN-12 includes AI title/description conflicts. Retain the unresolved wording when designing evaluation; do not treat REQ-MLDM-004 as an agreed data-split policy or REQ-MLGRL-005 as a resolved human-approval specification. Independently stated approval obligations still apply. Applicable TM policies and data/hosting approvals remain dependencies under OPEN-10.
Detailed review questions
These questions preserve unresolved details from the requirements and author review. They do not add approved scope. Every entry is To Confirm; named owners, review outcomes and agreement dates remain to be recorded. OPEN references identify the parent topic where available; PAR references identify shared numerical conditions.
| Detail ref | Requirement / review context | Question or agreement to record |
|---|---|---|
| DET-001 | SH-ACC-001 — Role and action permissions | Confirm the remaining To confirm entries in section 2.2, including downloads, audit access and Administrator operational permissions. |
| DET-002 | SRS-ACC-001 — Suspend access | Agree active-session revocation timing. |
| DET-003 | SRS-ACC-101 — Authentication | Agree identity integration, TM security requirements, session expiry/revocation and service credentials. TM SSO access is not assumed. |
| DET-004 | SRS-ACC-103 — Data Access | Agree the active-session policy for role changes and revocation. |
| DET-005 | SRS-DAT-102 — Multi-Source Data Ingestion | Confirm supplied sources, approved mappings and retention; source candidates do not establish approval. |
| DET-006 | SRS-DAT-103 — Data Correlation | Agree mapping profiles and the distinct-incident rule for multiple dockets. |
| DET-007 | SRS-DAT-106 — Additional Data Sources | Approve any connected production integration and the relevant source profile. |
| DET-008 | SRS-GIS-102 — Fibre Network Visualisation | Agree coordinate reference system, map provider and display of positional uncertainty. |
| DET-009 | SRS-GIS-103 — Fibre Proximity Assessment | Agree coordinate system, spatial method and measurement tolerance; no alarm-distance threshold is presumed. |
| DET-010 | SRS-GIS-105 — Hotspot Identification | Agree spatial grouping, recurrence criterion and distinct-incident policy. |
| DET-011 | SRS-GIS-109 — Geographical View | Agree basemap licensing, coordinate system and any spatial extension such as PostGIS. No distance threshold is presumed agreed. |
| DET-012 | SRS-DEV-101 — Device Identification | Confirm registration and relocation authority in the final role matrix. |
| DET-013 | SRS-DEV-102 — Device Health | Agree freshness interval and contact timeout. |
| DET-014 | SRS-DEV-103 — Loss of Connectivity | Offline deterrence remains To Confirm; buffering support does not establish offline deterrence. |
| DET-015 | SRS-DEV-109 — Full Diagnostics | Agree diagnostic retention policy. |
| DET-016 | PL-RSK-001 — Explainable risk priorities | Agree the prediction evaluation dataset, horizon and baseline. |
| DET-017 | SRS-RSK-101 — Risk Identification | Agree method, weights and thresholds after inspecting TM data; provisional factors do not establish final values. |
| DET-018 | SRS-RSK-102 — Risk Classification | TM must supply the missing minimum category list. The interim taxonomy is a proposed interpretation, not a correction to REQ-FUNC-011. |
| DET-019 | SRS-RSK-103 — Risk Level | Agree assessment unit, factors, missing-data rules, level labels, threshold equality behaviour and validation examples with TM. |
| DET-020 | SRS-RSK-104 — Rodent Risk Identification | Agree and validate elevated-risk factors and thresholds during POC. |
| DET-021 | SRS-RSK-105 — Preventive Alert | Confirm threshold comparison and grouping configuration; agree the specific M3 automatic action policy. |
| DET-022 | SRS-RSK-106 — Fibre Fault Risk Prediction | Agree target, horizon, spatial unit, factors, output interpretation, refresh trigger and acceptance measures. No predictive acceptance claim precedes agreed measures/results. |
| DET-023 | SRS-RSK-108 — Prediction Confidence | Define confidence interpretation and validation in the model specification; no universal scale or calibration target is assumed. |
| DET-024 | SRS-RSK-109 — Risk Scoring | Agree weights, bands and thresholds after examining TM files; current factors are provisional. |
| DET-025 | PL-WFO-002 — Rule conditions | Agree availability and semantics of site/device and detection-confidence conditions before treating those refinements as accepted scope. |
| DET-026 | PL-WFO-003 — Manual automatic and hybrid execution | Action policy remains To Confirm. |
| DET-027 | PL-WFO-004 — Traceable response sequence | Detailed workflow lifecycle remains To Confirm. |
| DET-028 | SRS-WFO-102 — Automated Workflow | For the selected device/action agree safe operating conditions, designated approval need, command expiry, cooldown scope/start/reset, retry eligibility/limits, pause bounds and physical confirmation. Offline deterrence remains To Confirm pending device selection. |
| DET-029 | SRS-EVT-006 — Cross-device alert grouping | Exact grouping boundary, late-arrival and competing-alert rules remain in section 5.3. |
| DET-030 | SRS-EVT-017 — Optional linked-alert closure | Combined case/alert closure transaction policy remains To Confirm; this requirement does not prescribe atomicity. |
| DET-031 | SRS-EVT-101 — Threat Classification | Detailed subcategories, whether one record can carry multiple families, and correction permissions remain To Confirm. |
| DET-032 | SRS-EVT-111 — Alert Lifecycle | The proposed transition table in section 5.3 supplies the review baseline; allowed source states, combined-closure transaction policy and exceptional reopening remain To Confirm. |
| DET-033 | SRS-EVT-112 — Duplicate Events | Event-time membership is a proposal pending clock and late-arrival agreement. Exact window-end inclusion, competing matches and events that occurred before closure but arrived afterwards remain To Confirm. |
| DET-034 | SRS-EVT-113 — Escalation | Specify timer start/pause/stop rules, business-time versus elapsed-time behavior, severity criteria, permitted manual escalation and each recipient before activation. Numerical thresholds and role assignments remain To Confirm. |
| DET-035 | SRS-EVT-114 — Incident History | Retention and backup/recovery values remain To Confirm, and evidence may become unavailable only under an approved policy with that limitation visible. |
| DET-036 | SRS-DET-003 — Stop and fault response | Device-specific operating limits remain To Confirm. |
| DET-037 | PL-CAS-003 — Case states | Reopening and automatic-closure policy remain To Confirm. |
| DET-038 | PL-PRV-001 — Additional detailed work planning | Adoption, scope and allocation of this additional detailed-planning proposal remain To Confirm. |
| DET-039 | SRS-PRV-101 — Resource Mobilisation | Confirm which basic states/fields arrive in M4 versus M5, eligible responding parties, contact handling and any approved communication channel. |
| DET-040 | PL-RPT-001 — Operational summaries and exports | The measures remain subject to agreement. |
| DET-041 | SRS-RPT-101 — Trend Analysis | Selectable time buckets are proposed and need to suit the available history. |
| DET-042 | SRS-RPT-102 — Operational Reporting | Confirm the availability denominator; treatment of unknown, offline and service-outage states; response-time boundaries; template layouts; download permissions and volume limits. Report metadata remains a proposed detail. |
| DET-043 | SRS-RPT-103 — Threat Reporting | The disclosure treatment for non-additive groupings is proposed. |
| DET-044 | SRS-RPT-104 — Management View | Agree the prevention evidence definition, incident counting rule, comparison periods, monitoring coverage and emerging-threat criteria. Initial management measures remain proposed. |
| DET-045 | SRS-AUD-101 — Audit Trail | Agree the critical-action policy for logging failures. The application permission controls are proposed. |
| DET-046 | SRS-AUD-104 — Auditability | Agree the retention/hold policy. |
| DET-047 | SRS-AUD-106 — Audit Trail | Agree retention policy and approve any protected-input reproducibility limitations or retained snapshots. |
| DET-048 | PL-AST-003 — English and Bahasa Malaysia | Evaluation dataset and quality thresholds are To Confirm. |
| DET-049 | PL-AST-006 — LLM API failure isolation | LLM provider selection and processing approval remain unresolved, together with the module-level region, retention and evaluation decisions. |
| DET-050 | SRS-MED-004 — Retention and preservation | Agree the data-class retention schedules and preservation restrictions before accepting expiry behaviour. |
| DET-051 | SRS-NTF-002 — Escalation execution | Agree the qualifying states, timer basis, recipients, priorities and stop conditions for enabled rules. |
| DET-052 | SRS-CFG-002 — Parameter change validation | Agree numerical defaults and applicable parameter validation rules. |
| DET-053 | I-IMPORT; SRS-INT-101/105/106 | OPEN-07 / Q14 — Import accepted formats, encoding, maximum size/rows, matching keys, source permissions and accepted/rejected/unmatched code list after TM profiling. |
| DET-054 | I-OBS/I-HEALTH/I-CMD/I-RESULT | OPEN-03 / Commands and connectivity recovery — Selected broker/protocol version/topics/QoS remain unselected; qualify native identity, sequence/clock, command correlation, duplicate control and physical execution evidence. |
| DET-055 | I-OBS/I-HEALTH/I-CMD/I-RESULT | OPEN-03 / Commands and connectivity recovery — Record buffering capacity, overflow/drop and recovery behaviour. |
| DET-056 | Interface safety boundary; SRS-INT-103 | OPEN-04 / Commands and connectivity recovery — Agree command expiry, stop behaviour, cooldown, permitted event age, confirmation timeout and bounded retry/backoff; selected-device safety review governs further action after unconfirmed/late result. |
| DET-057 | Interface acceptance; SRS-INT-104–107 | OPEN-07 / OPEN-16 — Release exact technical endpoints/topics/payloads, named owners, schema compatibility/deprecation and adapter limits before integration readiness; logical SRS contracts do not select these designs. |
| DET-058 | Protected interface paths; SRS-SEC-101 | OPEN-10 / Q14 — Approve encryption profiles, key custody/rotation, residency and data classification against TM policy before operational-data deployment; choose credential provisioning/revocation and identity provider. |
| DET-059 | I-MEDIA/I-LIVE | OPEN-10 / OPEN-14 — Agree media provider/upload mechanisms, formats/integrity/retention, retrieval/link mechanism and expiry; choose live transport, quality, bandwidth, inactivity and concurrency values. |
| DET-060 | I-AI; SRS-SEC-109 | OPEN-11 — Approve provider/model, data classes, permitted purposes, processing region/retention, provider-training use, TM processing approval, cost and evaluation before external operational-data use. |
| DET-061 | I-REPORT | OPEN-15 / Retention, backup and reporting scale — Agree report layouts, export access, row/size limits and synchronous/asynchronous execution. |
| DET-062 | SRS-PER-105/106 | Q10 / Monitored capacity and dashboard response — Agree expanded site/device/source profiles, resource/cost triggers and tier boundaries; record synthetic representativeness, currency/rate basis, BOM/service rates and uncertainty. |
| DET-063 | SRS-MNT-101/102 | OPEN-10 / OPEN-16 / Availability and recovery — Agree maintenance emergency exception/approval process, windows and overrun treatment; retain runbook ownership, supported-version/license and spare/replacement constraints. |
| DET-064 | MD-PRED-003/006; SRS-PRD-101/102/107; SRS-MLD-108 | OPEN-08 / Model performance and improvement — Training reproducibility tolerance; scoring schedule/triggers; input missing-value/imputation and eligibility policy; explanation availability/release policy; frozen split protocol and small-data limitations; label adjudication, outcome availability and no-event ground truth. |
| DET-065 | SRS-PRD-108/113/114; SRS-MLD-104 | OPEN-08 / Model degradation threshold — Drift reference profiles, review windows, material-change criteria, sample sufficiency, labelled monitoring cohorts and notification review rules; distinguish drift from verified degradation. |
| DET-066 | SRS-PRD-111/112/116/117 | OPEN-10 / OPEN-16 — Model release authority, change window, handling of in-flight work, retained compatible rollback packages and fallback/retirement evidence. |
| DET-067 | SRS-PRD-111/115/116/119 | OPEN-11 / OPEN-08 — Hosted or closed-model retraining alternative, available revision pinning and previous-version fallback; explicit TM disposition for any unmet retraining or rollback obligation. |
| DET-068 | SRS-PRD-109 | OPEN-04 / OPEN-08 — Workflow-specific corroboration applicability; sufficiency of contextual history versus contemporaneous evidence; correlation and freshness requirements. |
| DET-069 | SRS-MLD-102/103 | OPEN-09 — Supported theft/access scenario evidence, supplied authorised-work context, coordinated-activity correlation and classification-correction permissions. |
| DET-070 | SRS-ARC-113; SRS-DEL-101; REQ-COST-001/003 | OPEN-17 — Agree lifecycle-cost evaluation horizon, costing basis/currency/tax, selected subscription/service tiers and current supplier terms, including unknown pricing/allowances and exit obligations. |
| DET-071 | SRS-ARC-113; SRS-DEL-101; REQ-COST-001/003 | OPEN-17 — The SRS authorises no purchase or subscription. |
| DET-072 | SRS-DEL-102; REQ-DEPL-001 | OPEN-16 / Q09 — Resolve inconsistent source milestone dates across workbook tabs and name the authoritative approved schedule; reconcile older Case/Preventive deferrals with current user-confirmed M3 cases/M4 preventive direction without treating them as TM approval. |
| DET-073 | Source-listed M5 performance/load/stress/VAPT deliverables in 3.5.11 | OPEN-10 / OPEN-16 / PAR-03 — Agree authorised assessment environment/targets, scope, method, assessor/independence if applicable, permitted activity, data handling, disruption limits, severity/disposition rules and audience; retain numeric load/acceptance thresholds and TM sign-off authority as unagreed. |
| DET-074 | Source-listed M5 performance/load/stress/VAPT deliverables in 3.5.11 | OPEN-10 / OPEN-16 / PAR-03 — No paid assessor, certification or test authorisation is implied. |
| DET-075 | SRS-PWR-104; REQ-PEM-004 | OPEN-03 / OPEN-04 / PAR-11 — Confirm critical-device designation and device/site safe behaviour during brownout and power restoration. |
| DET-076 | Account and role administration; SRS-ACC-001/101/102 | Agree who provisions Superadmin accounts, which account types each administrator can manage, who grants additional roles, and the review required for privileged role changes. |
5.5 Glossary
-
This section preserves the designated URG’s table 6 definitions and usage.
-
The identical original DOCX was rechecked on 9 October 2026 MYT; source identity is in Source and Research Register.
-
Repeated FCAPS is consolidated into one entry because both expansions are identical and both usages concern applicable infrastructure/solution management.
-
No TM terminology correction is inferred.
-
The source expands FALCON differently in section 1.2 (“Fibre Analytic Cognitive solutioNs”) and table 6 (“Fibre Analytics, Learning and Cognitive Operations Network”).
-
This draft uses the neutral name FALCON and retains the table definition below; the formal expansion is To Confirm .
-
“Asset” is broad in the source; the implementation-facing logical model distinguishes TM infrastructure assets from FALCON device records without narrowing the source concept.
Source definitions
| Term | Definition | Source interpretation and usage |
|---|---|---|
| AI | Artificial Intelligence | Refers to computational techniques that enable the solution to perform tasks such as analysis, prediction, classification, reasoning or decision support. |
| AI/ML | Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning | Used collectively to refer to AI and machine learning capabilities incorporated into the FALCON solution. |
| API | Application Programming Interface | A defined interface that enables systems, applications or services to exchange data and invoke functions. |
| Asset | A physical or logical resource that is monitored, managed or associated with the solution | May include fibre infrastructure, network assets, sensors, IoT devices, locations and other relevant resources. |
| Alert | A notification generated when a defined condition, event, risk or threshold is detected | Used to notify relevant users or systems of potential or actual fibre-related threats or incidents. |
| AI Agent | A software component capable of interpreting information, reasoning over defined objectives, retrieving information and/or invoking authorised tools or actions | Where proposed, AI agents may support operational analysis, recommendations and controlled workflow execution. |
| CFSB | Cradle Fund Sdn Bhd | Refers to Cradle Fund Sdn Bhd, the programme partner for the BIG initiative. |
| Dashboard | A visual interface that presents operational information, status, alerts, trends and other relevant data | Used for centralised monitoring and decision support. |
| Data Pipeline | A sequence of processes used to acquire, validate, transform, enrich, process and store data | Used to support data ingestion and preparation for analytics and AI/ML processing. |
| ETL | Extract, Transform, Load | A data processing approach for extracting data from sources, transforming it into a required format and loading it into a target system or repository. |
| FCAPS | Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security | Refers to the functional areas used for management and monitoring of applicable solution components. |
| FALCON | Fibre Analytics, Learning and Cognitive Operations Network | Refers to the proposed solution/initiative for predictive and proactive fibre fault prevention and mitigation. |
| Fibre Fault | A condition affecting fibre infrastructure that results in, or may result in, degradation or interruption of service | Includes actual faults and potential threats that may lead to fibre damage or service disruption. |
| GIS | Geographic Information System | A system used to capture, manage, analyse and visualise geographically referenced information. |
| HITL | Human-in-the-Loop | An operational approach in which human review, approval or intervention is incorporated into an automated or AI-assisted process. |
| IoT | Internet of Things | Refers to connected physical devices, sensors and equipment used to collect, transmit or process operational data. |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | A measurable indicator used to assess the performance or effectiveness of the solution or a defined operational process. |
| MLOps | Machine Learning Operations | Practices and processes for deploying, monitoring, maintaining, versioning and managing machine learning models throughout their lifecycle. |
| Model | A computational representation developed using data to perform a defined analytical or predictive task | In this SRS, generally refers to an AI/ML model used for detection, prediction, classification or risk assessment. |
| NFR | Non-Functional Requirement | A requirement specifying a quality attribute, constraint or performance characteristic of the solution rather than a specific business function. |
| POC | Proof of Concept | A controlled implementation used to demonstrate technical feasibility and validate defined solution capabilities before Pilot deployment. |
| Pilot | A controlled deployment of the solution in designated operational locations to validate its capabilities under representative conditions | For FALCON, the Pilot is intended to cover two designated sites located in two different states. |
| Predictive Analytics | The use of historical and current data, statistical methods and/or machine learning to estimate future events, conditions or risks | Used to identify potential fibre threats or faults before they occur. |
| RAG | Retrieval-Augmented Generation | An AI approach that retrieves relevant information from defined knowledge sources to support generation of responses or recommendations. |
| Risk Assessment | A process of evaluating the likelihood and potential impact of a threat or event | Used to determine the level of risk associated with potential fibre damage or service disruption. |
| SRS | Software Requirements Specification | The document defining the functional, non-functional, technical, AI/ML, compliance and other requirements of the FALCON solution. |
| UI | User Interface | The interface through which users interact with and access the solution’s functions and information. |
| Workflow | A defined sequence of activities, decisions and actions performed to achieve a specific operational outcome | Used for alert handling, escalation, preventive action, mitigation and other operational processes. |
| Workflow Orchestration | The coordination and execution of multiple activities, systems, users and services according to a defined workflow | Used to automate and coordinate operational responses to identified risks or events. |
| Threat | A condition, activity or event that has the potential to cause damage to fibre infrastructure or disrupt services | FALCON primarily considers construction activities, theft/vandalism and animal/rodent activities. |
| Construction Activity | Construction, excavation, infrastructure or civil works that may cause physical damage to fibre infrastructure | Includes excavation, drainage works, road works, heavy vehicle activity and other relevant activities. |
| Theft / Vandalism | Unauthorised removal, interference with or intentional damage to fibre infrastructure or associated assets | Includes cable theft, manhole/cabinet tampering and deliberate or opportunistic damage. |
| Animal / Rodent Activity | Animal or rodent activity that may cause damage to fibre infrastructure | Includes recurring animal-related or rodent-related damage, particularly at identified hotspots. |
| Hotspot | A geographical or operational area exhibiting a relatively high concentration or recurrence of defined events, faults or risks | Used to identify locations requiring enhanced monitoring or preventive intervention. |
| Preventive Action | An action taken in advance to reduce the likelihood or impact of a potential fibre fault | May include notification, mobilisation, physical intervention, reinforcement or other approved mitigation measures. |
| Mitigation Action | An action taken to reduce the impact or consequences of an identified or occurring threat or incident | May be initiated through automated or human-approved workflows. |
| Guardrail | A control mechanism that limits, conditions or prevents an AI/ML prediction or recommendation from resulting in an unauthorised or inappropriate action | May consider confidence, data quality, risk severity, business rules and human approval requirements. |
| Human Approval | Explicit authorisation by an authorised user before a defined action is executed | Used for operational actions designated as requiring human intervention. |
| Model Drift | A change in data or operational conditions that causes an AI/ML model’s performance to deteriorate over time | Used in the context of AI/ML model monitoring and lifecycle management. |
| Model Retraining | The process of updating or rebuilding an AI/ML model using new or updated data | Used to maintain model performance when required by monitoring or operational conditions. |
| Model Version | A uniquely identifiable version of an AI/ML model and its associated configuration | Used for traceability, deployment control, monitoring and rollback. |
| Closed-Loop Workflow | A workflow in which an event or prediction initiates an action and the resulting outcome is subsequently monitored and recorded | Used to demonstrate the complete detection-to-action-to-outcome lifecycle. |
| End-to-End (E2E) | Covering all relevant stages of a process from its initial trigger through to its final outcome | Used for end-to-end data, workflow and operational verification. |
| Centralised Management | Management and monitoring of distributed solution components through a common platform or interface | Used for monitoring multiple sites, devices and operational activities from a central location. |
| Remote Operations | The ability to monitor, configure, administer or manage applicable solution components without requiring physical presence at the deployment site | Used particularly for geographically distributed field devices and sites. |
| Scalability | The ability of the solution to accommodate increases in sites, assets, sensors, users, data volume or processing requirements | Used when considering expansion beyond the initial POC/Pilot deployment. |
| Portability | The ability to deploy or replicate the solution, or relevant components, across additional locations or supported environments without fundamental redesign | Used to assess the solution’s suitability for wider deployment. |
| Interoperability | The ability of different systems, applications, devices or services to exchange and use information effectively | Used particularly for APIs, external systems, IoT devices and future TM integration. |
| Lifecycle | The complete period from solution design and deployment through operation, maintenance, upgrades and eventual replacement or retirement | Used when assessing maintainability, cost, hardware and change management. |
| TM | Telekom Malaysia Berhad | Refers to Telekom Malaysia Berhad, the organisation commissioning the FALCON solution. |
| TM Production Environment | TM’s operational environment supporting live production systems and services | The POC and Pilot are intended to operate in an isolated environment and do not require integration with TM production systems unless otherwise agreed. |
| RFI | Request for Information | A formal request used to obtain information from potential solution providers during the information-gathering or market-engagement stage. |
| RFP | Request for Proposal | A formal procurement document inviting proposers to submit technical and commercial proposals against defined requirements. |
| SLA | Service Level Agreement | An agreed level of service performance, availability or support between relevant parties. |
| POC Environment | The isolated technical environment established for demonstrating and validating the POC | Used to validate technical feasibility without integration into TM’s production systems. |
Project operational terms
These are proposed clarifying definitions for consistent SRS interpretation, not corrections to TM wording.
| Term | Meaning in this draft |
|---|---|
| Observation | Source measurement or captured indication; it may require validation/processing before a classified event exists. |
| Event | Individually retained detection/occurrence record with source identity and time. Grouping does not remove it. |
| Grouped alert | Handling record linking qualifying events under the configured event-type, zone and time-window rules. |
| Notification | Delivery attempt informing a recipient about an alert/work item; it is separate from alert acknowledgement. |
| Case | Operator-managed investigation/assignment/response record with Open, In Progress and Closed states. |
| Command | One uniquely identified request for a permitted device action, with status/evidence independent of case outcome. |
| Confirmed command | Execution supported by agreed device-specific evidence; it does not establish that a threat was resolved. |
| Deployment | Time-bounded placement of a device at an asset/location, preserved through relocation. |
| Unmatched incident | Imported incident retained without a confirmed asset association; usable location/data can remain available. |
| Historical risk indicator | Assessment of past incident/activity evidence for a stated unit/period. |
| Prediction | Estimate of a future target/outcome over a stated horizon, evaluated separately from historical summaries. |
| Draft response | Proposed SRS answer to a source obligation, including any conditional/deviation/clarification treatment. It is not a test result. |
| Review complete | All designated source rows/narrative entries have a reviewable response and decisions are recorded; this does not establish TM approval. |
| Acceptance | An explicit authorised decision for identified requirements/deliverables and evidence, distinct from a passed test or attended demonstration. |
Shall, should and may retain the source meanings: mandatory, recommended and optional respectively. Source applicability/feasibility qualifiers remain attached to their obligations. Proposed local refinements are labelled and decision-logged; they do not retroactively change a source modality.
5.6 Traceability and source records
The active coverage record is the current mapping. Every numbered source row maps to a unique source-response requirement; supporting local and detailed requirements retain their own IDs and provenance. The complete original source text remains in the TM requirement extract (internal reference) and TM Word baseline (internal reference).
The Decision Log (internal reference) records user agreements. The Review Register (internal reference) tracks unresolved reviews. The previous RTM and previous full draft remain historical comparison material; they do not govern this edition’s test results.
5.7 Narrative source responses
N01–N28 are source locators for narrative obligations, not invented numbered TM requirement IDs. The response below is part of this review draft. Allocation exceptions and conditional capabilities retain their stated disposition.
N01 Document identity and approval
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Cover and tables1–3, Document Control, Revision History and Approval Record. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; source version/approval unresolved. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Document Control identifies the active SRS, source hash, review revision and separate source/SRS approval states. |
| R02 | Preserve the cover1.0/release0.1/control0.1 discrepancy under Q08. |
| R03 | Original placeholder names/signatures are not approvals. |
| R04 | Record actual named authority, reviewed revision, decision and date only when supplied. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N01 | inspection | reconcile the source identity/hash and control fields; confirm no placeholder is promoted to a name or approved state. |
N02 Purpose and full-solution scope
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Sections1.1–1.2. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; targets pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Scope defines fibre-fault prevention/mitigation and restoration-cost objectives, the intended lifecycle audiences and full software/data/security/AI/operations coverage. |
| R02 | Separate technical capability measures from operational/cost benefit. |
| R03 | Report limitations where cost baseline or comparable data is absent; do not promise an unsupported reduction percentage. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N02 | inspection/analysis | match stated objectives and boundaries to all domains, and check that each success measure has a proposed data/evaluation method. |
N03 Eleven in-scope domains
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.2/table4. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with integration/AI decisions pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Scope explicitly answers core intelligence/workflow/visualisation, user interfaces/APIs, systems/integration, data, AI/ML/agents/RAG, security, operations, verification, data scouting, governance and asset protection/mobility/inventory. |
| R02 | The owning module requirements and shared sections specify the behaviour. |
| R03 | Live TM access and conditional agent scope have explicit dispositions rather than silent omission. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N03 | inspection | trace every table4 domain to a response and verify that a missing deployment dependency is not treated as a scope deletion. |
N04 Exclusions
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.2/table5. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Retain legal/prosecution action and financial reconciliation/fraud-misconduct investigation exclusions. |
| R02 | Operational evidence and cost/effectiveness reporting do not authorise prosecution or financial investigation. |
| R03 | The blank third row is not filled with an invented exclusion. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N04 | inspection | compare exclusions with source and check related theft/reporting/diagram interpretations for contradiction. |
N05 Pilot locations
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.3/table6 Pilot definition. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; sites/criteria pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Retain pilot intent of two designated sites in two different states. |
| R02 | M2’s controlled location and M3’s integrated field demonstration are earlier increments, not substitutes for pilot coverage. |
| R03 | Site identity, readiness, equipment quantities and the operating/assessment period require agreement and survey evidence. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N05 | inspection/demonstration | the pilot plan and eventual as-built/test records identify both approved sites/states and criteria; earlier demonstrations are labelled by their actual scope. |
N06 Isolated POC and production boundary
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.3/table6 TM Production Environment and POC Environment definitions. |
| Disposition | Proposed deviation pending TM. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Use the standalone POC/Pilot and FALCON-developed IoT service; accept TM exports offline. |
| R02 | Live production integration is excluded from the proposed delivery boundary. |
| R03 | Preserve table10’s initial enterprise-integration mark and numbered interface obligations as an explicit Q09 proposed deviation/interpretation for TM. |
| R04 | No modification to live network infrastructure is assumed. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N06 | inspection/interface tests | demonstrate documented field/offline paths and review the unimplemented production interface disposition. Do not mark live integration passed from a file import. |
N07 Glossary
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.3/table6. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; terminology correction pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Glossary preserves all55 distinct source terms, consolidates duplicate FCAPS and labels local operational definitions separately. |
| R02 | Retain the different FALCON expansions in section1.2/table6 as a terminology question. |
| R03 | Source Asset includes a broad resource class; the logical data model still separates TM assets and FALCON devices. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N07 | inspection | compare each original term/definition and confirm no changed formal expansion. |
N08 Normative language and controlled change
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section1.4. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Preserve shall/should/may and source qualifiers. |
| R02 | Existing PL/HW/SH/MD/FE IDs remain immutable. |
| R03 | Locator-based response sections retain every literal TM ID and source identity, including anomalies. |
| R04 | Record material change rationale/impact on data/interfaces/allocation/tests and the decision authority; draft proposals are separated from approved changes. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N08 | inspection | audit source modality and IDs, check each material new choice has a review decision, and sample cross-artifact impact linkage. |
N09 Enterprise context and closed-loop operation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.1 Solution Perspective and Scenarios. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with Q09 integration disposition. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | System Context maps source/data, processing, intelligence, workflow/integration, user interaction and governance responsibilities onto the lightweight FALCON application/IoT/analytics boundaries. |
| R02 | Keep Data → Intelligence → Decision → Action → Monitoring → Feedback traceability without requiring every event to execute an action. |
| R03 | Reuse approved enterprise capability where practical, while preserving the current isolated boundary and future integration decision. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N09 | architecture inspection/end-to-end demonstration | trace the relevant observation to decision/action/outcome and audit, including record-only/uncertain paths. |
N10 Three threat scenarios
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.1/table7. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; Capability2/3 order and evaluation conditions pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Operational Scenarios and functional responses retain construction (oversized vehicles/drainage/excavation), animal/rodent (monkey drop-fibre and recurring rodent damage), and theft/vandalism (manhole/cable damage, mistaken copper theft and coordinated activity). |
| R02 | Define supported observable criteria with SMEs and selected sensing; example motives/impacts are not machine-proven facts. |
| R03 | No source example selects an algorithm, species list, external authority or deterrent. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N10 | scenario inspection/test/demonstration | represent each agreed scenario and its non-threat/uncertain conditions; document untested variants explicitly. |
N11 Acquisition scouting and lineage
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.1. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Data Integration responses and the Data Dictionary specify source discovery/permission, relevance/quality, approved intake, validation/transformation/enrichment, consolidation and lineage. |
| R02 | Reviewed offline TM files and actual-device data are initial paths. |
| R03 | Structured and applicable unstructured sources receive source-specific mapping; no blanket integration with every potential system is committed. |
| R04 | Invalid/unmatched data remains visible with use-specific eligibility. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N11 | inspection/import tests | reconcile source inventory, permitted-use records and lineage; use mixed valid/invalid/unmatched/repeated imports. |
N12 Intelligence and analytics
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.2. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with conditional assistant/timing. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Distinguish descriptive/historical views, prediction, classification/anomaly/risk identification and recommendations. |
| R02 | M3 future-risk prediction needs its own target/horizon/baseline/evaluation; history alone does not satisfy it. |
| R03 | Where AI/ML is used, provide versioned evaluation, monitoring, governance and oversight. |
| R04 | Knowledge-grounded responses are handled by the separately proposed M4 assistant, subject to allocation reconciliation. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N12 | analysis/test | compare known historical and future-risk results; inspect model/data evidence and verify the assistant’s source/uncertainty controls if adopted. |
N13 Conditional agent capabilities
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.3. |
| Disposition | Proposed conditional response; Q09 allocation/action scope pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Initial assistant proposal retrieves permitted FALCON records and generates read-only recommendations/summaries; it cannot mutate cases/rules or command devices. |
| R02 | The source may permit broader agents where applicable, including approved tools/authorised tasks/escalation. |
| R03 | Retain those capabilities as a scope decision, not silently classify them as unrelated extras. |
| R04 | Any later action-capable agent needs an explicit tool/action catalogue, identity/permissions, approval/guardrails, failure limits and audit before activation. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N13 | permission/adversarial tests and inspection | initial assistant cannot execute operational writes, even when retrieved text requests them. Evaluate broader actions only if expressly adopted with an approved boundary. |
N14 Workflow orchestration
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.4. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; action policies/parameters pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | PL-WFO and functional responses define event triggers, conditional/manual/automatic/hybrid execution, status, approvals, exceptions and escalation. |
| R02 | Parallel or sequential activities may be composed where a use case requires them; a general graphical workflow-designer product is not implied. |
| R03 | Platform owns business policy; IoT service owns bounded device delivery, with outcomes linked to cases/interventions. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N14 | workflow tests | trace applicable task order/dependencies, approval/rejection, conflict/maintenance/pause, retry exhaustion and outcome/audit records. |
N15 User interaction and decision support
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.5. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; conversational allocation pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Provide role-appropriate dashboards/maps, searchable records, alerts, recommendations, task/approval and reports. |
| R02 | Conversational/search/knowledge interfaces apply through the read-only M4 proposal rather than becoming necessary for ordinary operations. |
| R03 | Display freshness, missing data and distinction between factual records and interpretations. |
| R04 | English/Bahasa Malaysia is agreed for assistant outputs, not automatic whole-application localisation. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N15 | UI/API tests | exercise permitted/denied actions, no-data/stale/error conditions and supporting-record navigation; test both assistant languages if adopted. |
N16 Monitoring and feedback
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.2.6. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Monitor service/device health, workflow completion/failure, data quality, model performance and usage/operational measures. |
| R02 | Link diagnostic signals to actionable review without conflating telemetry with audit evidence. |
| R03 | Retain user/field outcome feedback and corrective-action history; a new label/model release follows controlled evaluation rather than automatic unreviewed learning from any closed case. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N16 | failure injection/analysis | produce a stale device, failed workflow, quality anomaly and model-monitoring condition; inspect visibility, correlation and follow-up evidence. |
N17 Technical security AI and operational constraints
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.3. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with policy/hosting dependencies. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Use approved hosting/standards and practical enterprise reuse where applicable; enforce role/privilege boundaries, protected storage/transmission, approved authentication and audit. |
| R02 | AI outputs cannot bypass authorisation or required human validation; uncertainty/unsupported requests are handled explicitly. |
| R03 | Operate within available support/infrastructure and consider interface availability/performance/maintenance. |
| R04 | Process/system changes require appropriate approval. |
| R05 | Applicable policy versions, hosting and operational limits remain explicit dependencies under Q14. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N17 | inspection/security/failure tests | check policy-to-control mapping, permitted interfaces, role denials, protected data and AI guardrails; record missing policy approvals as unresolved. |
N18 Seven user classes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.4/table8. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Map the seven TM user classes to the five application roles or review duties. Technical administration belongs to Superadmin; field updates belong to assigned Field Team members. |
| R02 | Job titles do not confer privileges; named people and acceptance authority remain To Confirm. |
| R03 | Field Team members report assigned work directly from M3. Operators review the results and close cases. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N18 | inspection/permission tests | all seven classes have an interaction/responsibility treatment and least-needed permissions; no unapproved new role/site restriction is assumed. |
N19 Assumptions and dependencies
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.5/table9. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; external inputs pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Scope and Delivery identify system/API owners, TM data, platform capacity/hosting, security approval, SMEs and AI services, with required inputs and impact/mitigation. |
| R02 | Source role labels remain categories until named assignments are accepted. |
| R03 | Unavailable source data, device capability or security clearance triggers a documented scope/acceptance decision rather than silent substitution or unauthorised access. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N19 | inspection | each dependency has impact, mitigation, needed evidence and a named-owner field explicitly pending or sourced. Confirm no source role is mistaken for an assigned person. |
N20 Initial and future requirement allocation
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section2.6/table10. |
| Disposition | Proposed deviation/conditional allocation pending TM. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Delivery Allocation reproduces all nine initial and three future/deferred areas with their source marks and proposed local treatment. |
| R02 | Do not hide enterprise integration, knowledge retrieval, AI Agent or advanced prediction because they differ from the current staged scope. |
| R03 | The “Full vs Focused predictive model based on areas” future wording is retained pending interpretation. |
| R04 | Dates and release commitments depend on the separately identified workbook conflicts and TM decisions. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N20 | inspection | compare every original table10 row/mark and proposed disposition; no initial-marked area is silently dropped or claimed delivered. |
N21 Requirement registry and complete coverage
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3 preamble and3.0. |
| Disposition | Proposed response. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | The canonical requirements and RTM cover199 numbered rows/198 literal IDs plus28 narrative entries, preserving duplicate IDs through locators. |
| R02 | Requirements support the three threat families through sensing/data/AI/workflow/human intervention and prevention/response. |
| R03 | Old scaffold counts or prototype screens are not evidence of source compliance. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N21 | automated identity/count/link checks plus semantic review | each source locator appears once in the response catalogue and once in the RTM; each has a proposed verification record and honest disposition. |
N22 External interface boundaries
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3.1 and introductory hardware/software lists. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with selected-adapter detail pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Interface Contracts identify direction, selected protocol family, logical data/version/authentication/error semantics and dependencies. |
| R02 | Candidate hardware/software lists require relevance/capability/approval assessment rather than an obligation to integrate every named technology. |
| R03 | No underlying TM network change is assumed. |
| R04 | Field communication is IoT-mediated; imports and assistant API are separate interfaces. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N22 | interface inspection/test | catalogue every adopted interface, review excluded/conditional candidates, and trace each source/software access approval; verify no direct-device bypass. |
N23 Measurable quality attributes
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3.3 preamble. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; numerical agreement pending Q10. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Verification defines the measurable-target register for latency, capacity, availability/recovery, sensing/model quality, workflow timing, video and other applicable conditions. |
| R02 | Record units, boundaries, workload/site/dataset, observation period and decision rule. |
| R03 | Values may be established during POC as the source permits; acceptance cannot be fabricated by choosing a favorable observed value after the fact. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N23 | inspection/measurement | every applicable quality test identifies its agreed criterion or explicit blocker, with no assumed zero/default/pass. |
N24 Architecture narrative and prospective diagram
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3.5.1 and embedded prospective architecture image. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; selected topology pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | System Context and technical responses map the source’s field/connectivity/edge/platform/AI/application/workflow layers and data-to-action-to-feedback flow onto FALCON’s proposed components. |
| R02 | Preserve its architecture purpose without interpreting illustrative drones, external authorities, hourly cadence or history labels as adopted commitments. |
| R03 | Final topology and technology justification follow selected data/device/site assessment and recorded decisions. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N24 | architecture inspection | each applicable logical layer/component and flow has a responsibility and requirement link; compare diagram examples against adopted scope and recorded exceptions. |
N25 Hardware necessity and lifecycle
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3.5.2 preamble. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; equipment selection pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Technical responses require each selected field component to be justified by monitored risk, coverage, operational value, reliability, serviceability, power/security/environment and lifecycle cost. |
| R02 | Survey existing capabilities and lower-hardware alternatives; do not treat a prior Jetson/solar/roller/drone candidate as mandatory. |
| R03 | Include failure/replacement, updates, maintenance/calibration and eventual retirement in evidence. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N25 | design/cost inspection and field qualification | each BOM item has rationale, alternatives and lifecycle/support assumptions linked to the site/use case. |
N26 AI methods and guardrails
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section3.6 and3.6.3 preambles. |
| Disposition | Proposed response with applicability/criteria pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Select and justify the detection/prediction method against task/data/field constraints and an appropriate baseline; no algorithm is mandated without TM direction. |
| R02 | AI/ML responses specify data-to-decision-to-action-to-outcome traceability, data-quality/confidence/risk/approval guardrails and model governance. |
| R03 | Initial read-only assistant remains bounded; operational model deployment and physical action require their own authorisation. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N26 | model analysis/guardrail tests | compare task-appropriate baselines, uncertainty/invalid input, human approval, monitoring and feedback; retain source modality and Q05–Q07 conflicts. |
N27 Objective evidence and end-to-end verification
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | Section4.1 and4.2/table58. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; execution/acceptance pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Verification and the design-stage RTM require mandatory-obligation traceability to verification activities, objective evidence and complete operational flow beyond component tests. |
| R02 | Evidence may include test results, logs, screenshots, dashboards, readings, API responses, workflow/model/configuration/architecture records, demonstrations, field observations and incident records as relevant. |
| R03 | Representative conditions and actual-device evidence are required where the claim concerns physical operation. |
| R04 | Current planned cases are Not Run, not passed demonstrations. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N27 | inspection plus eventual end-to-end demonstration | sample source-to-case-to-result-to-evidence links and trace detection through response/outcome/audit, including negative/failure paths. |
N28 Authoring checklist and baseline readiness
| Attribute | Specification |
|---|---|
| Source | SRS Authoring & Review Checklist and table60. |
| Disposition | Proposed response; baseline approval pending. |
Response:
| Item | Proposed response / constraint |
|---|---|
| R01 | Document Control and the review decision register cover the review topics listed below. |
| R02 | A comprehensive review draft is not formally baselined while essential targets, authority, source interpretations or exceptions remain unresolved. |
| R03 | Record any acceptance of residual issues explicitly rather than leaving a checkbox ambiguous. |
Baseline review topics
| Topic | Coverage |
|---|---|
| Scope and sources | Scope/boundary; immutable source references; exclusions. |
| Requirement quality | Testability/traceability; functional/NFR separation; interfaces. |
| Controls and change | Security/observability/compliance; installation/change. |
| Delivery | Component/release allocation; dependency owners; stable artifacts. |
| Verification | Evidence and ownership. |
| AI | Model lifecycle and agent boundaries. |
Verification:
| Reference | Method | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| VN-N28 | structured baseline review | inspect each checklist topic and record result/open decision against the exact SRS revision. No approval inferred from this drafting exercise. |